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1970 MIDDLE EAST

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

14 September, 1970.

*This criticism has been
overaken by events. I think
the right course is for the
FCO. to have in mind the
Prime Minister's view for
Dear Christopher, dealing with any new
situation of a compound change. P.M. 15/9*

I am replying to your letters of 3 September, 4 September and 7 September, quoting the Prime Minister's comments on a number of telegrams dealing with the suggestion made by the Jordanians at the outset of the present crisis in Jordan that the four powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France) might issue a joint statement in New York.

The terms in which the Jordanian suggestion was conveyed to H.M. Ambassador in Amman are set out in Amman telegram No. 445. Our first reaction to the suggestion was as set out in FCO telegram No. 248 to Amman. Our view about the likelihood of all four powers being able to agree on the terms of a joint statement did not subsequently vary. When, however, we learned that the French mission in New York had been instructed to seek to concert a joint statement and to propose a four power meeting for this purpose (Paris telegram No. 779 and UKMIS New York telegram No. 1837), we decided to instruct our mission to support the French unless the Americans were positively unenthusiastic about their proposal (FCO telegram No. 741 to Moscow, paragraph 3). Mr. Warner subsequently reported from New York that the Americans were strongly opposed to the French proposal and that Dr. Jarring did not like the idea of a four power meeting (UKMIS New York telegram No. 1837). Having received this report, we decided to instruct Mr. Warner to seek to dissuade his French colleague from pursuing his proposal, using the line of argument that it would not be useful for him to do this (FCO telegram No. 1105 to UKMIS New York).

Although the French expressed disappointment at our unwillingness to continue to support them (Paris telegram No. 791), it is clear that they made no serious effort to press their proposal themselves. Mr. Warner reported that his French colleague considered that the whole exercise was almost certainly dead (UKMIS New York telegram No. 1844).

/Although

C. Roberts, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

Note

All refs to be found in Pt 1.

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Although the four powers did not take action on the Jordanian suggestion (in spite of active sponsorship by the French), a good deal of action was taken bilaterally in capitals. We participated on 4 September when H.M. Ambassador in Moscow spoke to the Soviet Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs who is responsible for the Middle East, suggesting that the Soviet Union should exercise its influence with the Iraqis to prevent them from intervening in Jordan (FCO telegram No. 741 to Moscow and Moscow telegram No. 1022).

...

I enclose copies of all telegrams referred to in this letter.

Yours sincerely,
Ian McNaney.

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SITREP AT 0800 ON 14 SEPTEMBER

(All times referred to are B.S.T.)

I Situation in Jordan

H.M. Ambassador at Amman reported (Amman telegram No. 539) that the town had rapidly become calmer after the release of the statement of H.M.G.'s intention to release Leila Khaled as part of a package. He warned, however, that this statement might lead some Fedayeen erroneously to expect her early release.

2. Mr. Phillips confirmed this general assessment in a Telex conversation at 1630, in which he emphasised Leila Khaled's importance as a "symbol of Palestine resistance and a folk heroine".

II Future of Miss Khaled

3. In an earlier Telex conversation at 1215 he had warned that her transfer to Holloway would undoubtedly be misunderstood by the Fedayeen, and might lead to outbreaks of violence. As a result of this assessment, Ministers decided not to move her. The Home Secretary made an Order to amend the Aliens (Places of Detention) Order, which designates the police station where she is detained an approved place of detention.

The Home Office made the following statement on the record:

"It seems best from all points of view that she [Miss Khaled] should not be moved at the present moment. The five-day period has been extended by the Home Secretary by use of his powers under the Aliens Order".

Unattributably, the Home Office said that to move Miss Khaled to prison might be misinterpreted by the guerrillas.

/III

III The Passengers

4. Those released: A total of 59 passengers and crew of the VC 10 left Amman and arrived at Heathrow via Nicosia in the afternoon. They were met by Mr. Godber.

5. The Swiss passengers (102) travelled via Nicosia to Zurich. The 100 TWA passengers were thought to be spending the night in Nicosia.

6. Mrs. Potts

Shortly after arriving in London, Mrs. Potts, who, with her husband and two daughters had been on the hi-jacked VC 10, telephoned to ask if she could see someone from the Foreign Office. Her husband, a major in the Abu Dhabi Defence Force, was one of the hostages remaining in Amman in the hands of the P.F.L.P. Mr. Tripp visited Mrs. Potts, who was in the company of two of her husband's colleagues. They emphasised that, in the light of the various incidents at Dawson's Field, there was little time to lose if the remaining hostages were to be released safely, as they were "in the hands of dangerous maniacs". They suggested a unilateral deal of Leila Khaled for the remaining British hostages. Mr. Tripp said he was well aware of the dangers of the situation and would report this conversation to Ministers.

7. Remaining hostages: Amman telegram No. 543 reports that the breakdown of passengers and crew still detained by the P.F.L.P. is:

TWA	39
BOAC	9
Swissair	8
	<hr/>
TOTAL	56
	<hr/>

/The P.F.L.P.

(The P.F.L.P. had released the Dutchman whom they had originally intended to hold).

8. In his Telex conversation at 1215 Mr. Phillips said that, according to the Swiss Ambassador, who had it from the Red Crescent, the hostages were being held in a number of places in the southern part of Amman.

IV I.C.R.C.

9. In the same Telex conversation Mr. Phillips reported that Freymond and Rochat had left Amman. Jacquinet was left in charge. He was prepared to deal with the mechanics of an exchange, but not negotiate terms (see conversation at 1630).

V The Israelis

10. Mr. Eban received the Secretary of State's message of 13 September "quite calmly". (Tel Aviv telegram No. 825). He said he saw no reason for making new concessions and characterised the suggestion that the Israelis should make a further contribution as an "extraordinary idea". His reaction was confirmed at a Cabinet meeting, when no new decisions were taken (Tel Aviv telegram No. 828).

11. Israeli press reports claimed that several scores of Arabs had been detained by the Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Tel Aviv telegram No. 827). Those arrested are said to include women, children and two uncles of George Habbash. According to Reuters, Israel has officially announced that the Arab detainees number 450.

VI Negotiations for the release of Hostages

The German attitude

12. Mr. Phillips reported (Amman telegram No. 541) that, according to the German Embassy, Wichnewski, Mr. Brandt's

/special

special envoy, had been authorised to make a statement to the P.F.L.P. reaffirming German willingness to release the three Fedayeen prisoners held in Munich in return for the two German hostages. The P.F.L.P. had agreed to this deal. However, Mr. Richards reported (Bonn telegram No. 1083) that a Federal Government statement issued at 1330 hours said that Wichniewski had been acting "on his own initiative". The statement reaffirmed the readiness of the Federal Government to release the three Arab prisoners held in Germany as soon as pre-conditions for this had been fulfilled.

13. The P.U.S. spoke to the German Minister who said there had been no change in the German position. This was confirmed by a telephone call from Mr. Richards from the Embassy in Bonn, who said the Federal Government were quite firm about staying in step with the other members of the Berne group for as long as possible. This attitude was also reflected in the instructions sent to the German representative in Berne, which were passed to us by the German Embassy.

The Americans

14. Washington telegram No. 2676 gives Mr. Freeman's assessment of the four main pre-occupations of the U.S. Administration. These are:

- (a) In a fluid and fast-moving situation they see advantage in proceeding cautiously and completing each stage of the complicated negotiations before embarking on the next.
- (b) They are acutely anxious about the position of their dual nationals.
- (c) They are convinced that direct pressure on Jerusalem tends to make the Israelis more intransigent.

/(d)

(d) Their overriding concern remains the longer-term problem of the Arab/Israel peace negotiations.

15. In a conversation with Mr. Sisco (Washington telegram No. 2677) Mr. Freeman elicited that the U.S. position continued to be that the paramount need was for the five powers to maintain a united front; and that the problem of smoking out the Israelis would probably have to be faced, but not yet. Sisco emphasised that he thought that, with the release of the majority of the passengers, a new situation had arisen which needed careful examination.

16. Meanwhile, the Secretary of State sent a personal message to H.M. Ambassador in Washington expressing his concern about the Americans' apparent passivity. The Secretary of State emphasised the importance he attached to the question of an Israeli contribution to the package and asked Mr. Freeman to have a frank talk with Mr. Rogers (F.C.O. telegram No. 2029) to Washington.

17. Mr. Freeman saw Mr. Rogers at 2100 (Washington telegram No. 2678). Mr. Rogers agreed that the best way to secure the release of the hostages was still joint five-power action. But he refused to budge on the question of obtaining Israeli contribution to a package and the consequent urgency of exerting pressure on the Israelis. According to Mr. Freeman, Mr. Rogers clearly took a more optimistic view of the situation than the British did. Mr. Rogers believed that natural pressures would begin to make themselves felt on the Israelis and that these would in the end cause them to show some flexibility.

/18.

18. This telegram crossed with two F.C.O. telegrams (Nos. 2031 and 2032) instructing Mr. Freeman to put certain points to Mr. Rogers and pass to him a message. The text of the message delivered is:

"John Freeman has told me of his conversation with you earlier today and I am of course considering what you said to him. I have asked him to give you this message urgently. It is our considered judgement that we shall not be able to hold the Berne group together unless the Israelis make a positive sign, and quickly, that they are willing in principle to exchange prisoners for hostages. You will have seen already the difficulty of the Germans and the Swiss in not making individual deals. We have a lot of sympathy with them, because we cannot put ourselves at the mercy of Israel's tactical moves in relation to the Fedayeen. If therefore, like us, you want to hold the group together I am sure that you must exert the maximum pressure on the Israelis, and soon. You may find yourself in the position you want to avoid of being left alone with the Israelis to bargain for the return of the American citizens. We will do all we possibly can to act together, but I felt I had to make quite plain to you the danger of the group disintegrating".

19. At 0235 Washington asked the Unit by telephone for confirmation of these instructions. Mr. Graham (who confirmed to the Unit that Washington telegram No. 2678 had not been received when the instructions were drafted) said that H.M. Ambassador should proceed with his instructions. He should stress the following points not covered by Mr. Rogers' earlier Reply:

/(i)

- (i) H.M.G.'s view that the hostages were in the hands of desperate men and therefore at considerable risk;
- (ii) H.M.G.'s view that time was not on our side;
- (iii) H.M.G.'s fears that the Berne group was in danger of disintegrating.

20. H.M. Ambassador was informed by telephone and said he would proceed on this basis. He reported in Washington telegram No. 2679 that he had taken action and Rogers had taken careful note of what he had said.

Instructions to Berne

21. After Ministers had reviewed the situation in the light of the Berne meeting of 12 September, instructions were sent to Berne requesting Mr. Midgely to arrange for a meeting of the Group as soon as possible. Mr. Midgely was instructed to take the line that the British position was still to work for a five-power package, and that we, the Swiss and the Germans should bring pressure on the Israelis and the Americans to play a positive part. In particular, an assurance was needed from them that they were prepared to agree to an exchange of detainees.

22. Mr. Midgely was also instructed to raise the question of who should continue the negotiations. If the I.C.R.C. refuse to cooperate, possible alternatives might be the Swiss Ambassador at Beirut and Amman, Thalman, or the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Amman. During his meeting with Mr. Freeman, Mr. Rogers had already expressed agreement to this proposal, though he had not committed himself on the name of the new negotiator. One of the most important tasks of the new negotiator would be to elicit from the Fedayeen the names of those they wished the Israelis to release.

The Meeting

23. The five-power group met at 0115 (Berne telegram No. 257). Proceedings were confused. The I.C.R.C. reported that they had not withdrawn from Amman. Jacquinet had been left in charge and his job there was not confined to humanitarian activities. Freymond would be unable to return to Amman owing to previous arrangements but the I.C.R.C. were looking for someone else when Jacquinet needed reinforcement. Jacquinet would be directed to establish an authoritative list of those still detained by the P.F.L.P.; to discover their whereabouts and obtain access to them; to elicit a complete list of Fedayeen demands on all five governments; and to maintain contact with the P.F.L.P. Freymond told the meeting that it was now essential to enlist the help of the Jordanian Government. Mr. Midgeley urged that time was not on our side but the U.S. Ambassador thought it would be a mistake to take an initiative in the immediate future. The Swiss Foreign Minister agreed. The meeting agreed that the Swiss and Germans should contact the P.F.L.P. through the I.C.R.C. and Wischniewski respectively asking for complete lists of hostages and demands.

VII The Body

24. The Home Office confirmed that the dead hi-jacker is an American citizen. The P.U.S. informed the U.S. Minister of this.

VIII Daily Telegraph Report

25. The Prime Minister called the Emergency Unit at 0140 hours, and instructed that a telegram be sent to Berne and other posts drawing their attention to a report in the early morning edition of the Daily Telegraph. The report said that

/Mgr.

Mgr. Jean Rodhain, President of Caritas International, had had talks with the P.F.L.P. in Amman. Mgr. Rodhain was quoted as saying that the Fedayeen had agreed to negotiate for the liberation of hostages in exchange for the freeing by Israel of 600 prisoners. See F.C.O. telegram No. 168 to Berne. In reply Mr. Midgeley reported that the Federal Foreign Minister had confirmed this report in general terms and had said that Mgr. Rodhain had now left Jordan for Israel. (Berne telegram No. 168).

IX Press Line

26. M. Freymond, Vice-President of the International Red Cross in Switzerland, stated that there was nothing more for the Red Cross to do except on the humanitarian side. News Department took the line that this statement would be noted and be the subject of discussion at the meeting of the joint five-powers in Berne.

27. According to the B.B.C. (0700) M. Naville has since said that there has never been any question of the Red Cross discontinuing negotiations.

28. Otherwise News Department have had a relatively quiet night.

Middle East.

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Ats.

September 15, 1970.

Thank you for your letter of September 14 to Christopher Roberts about the Jordanian proposal earlier this month for a four power statement condemning Iraqi intervention in Jordan.

Since this matter arose so much has happened and the situation has so changed that I do not at this time propose to put the papers to the Prime Minister. I am sure, however, that you will wish to keep in mind the views which have been expressed by the Prime Minister in so far as they may be relevant to the handling of any similar situation in the future.

PSM

J. McInerney Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SITREP AT 0800 ON 15 SEPTEMBER

[All times referred to are B.S.T.]

*

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL
HAS BEEN RETAINED
UNDER SEC 3 (1) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 AND 1967

I Situation in Jordan

The night 13/14 September was quiet but the situation has grown more tense following the killing of Fedayeen, including Fatah officers near Irbid. A steady trickle of the British community have been leaving the country. A total of 177, including Embassy staff, remain. (Amman telegram No. 548).

2. Contingency evacuation plans for the British community are still on ice; Ministers have agreed that the Britannia, should return to the U.K. on six hours' readiness. The Argosy aircraft would remain in Cyprus.

II The Hostages

3. ~~~~~~~~~ reported that the hostages had been divided into groups. One "particularly sensitive" group was in a former women's military camp. (Tel Aviv telegram No. 837).

4. Two similar letters from the BOAC hostages were delivered to H.M. Ambassador at Amman via the Palestine Red Crescent and the German Embassy (Amman telegrams Nos. 556 and 557).

Mr. Phillips commented that the messages must have been approved by the P.F.L.P. The hostages say they understand they are being held against the release to an Arab country of Leila Khaled and perhaps the dead body; they emphasise the gravity of the situation, request her release and ask to be visited. The first message is signed by:

/Richard Dunn

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Richard Dunn, Solicitor

Captain C. Goulborn, Captain BOAC

E/O E.R. D'Eye, BOAC

Second Officer J. Lindsay, BOAC

Lt. Commander J. Wallis, R.N.

Mr. E. Hartill

Mr. R.F. Dare, B.P.

Major F.N. Potts, M.B.E., T.D., Abu Dhabi Defence Force

Mr. G.H.W. de Koning, BOAC, Dutch (Reuters subsequently
reported he had been released)

The second letter is signed by the three BOAC crew members.

5. De Koning later gave the names of the following
additional Swiss hostages:

Ernst Eng Hollenweider

Horst Jerosch

Hans Slidher

Norbert Kuster

Walber Yost

6. The Embassy made urgent but unsuccessful efforts through the Red Cross to arrange for consular access to the British hostages: but Ghazi Saudi of the Palestine Red Crescent informed Mr. Phillips in the evening that the P.F.L.P. attitude appeared to be hardening (probably as a result of Israeli arrests of Arabs on the West Bank) and the Fedayeen had refused all outside access to the hostages. (Amman telegram No. 560). Thus an earlier offer to BOAC and Swissair of access to their passengers was later cancelled.

7. Saudi also implied the P.F.L.P. were thinking in terms of holding all the Western hostages, as well as the Israeli
/ones,

ones, until both the Israeli-held prisoners and the seven Fedayeen held in Europe were released (i.e. a package deal).

8. Reuters reported in the evening that the P.F.L.P. had announced they considered the American and Israeli hostages as one group. They had closed the door on all further mediation to obtain the release of the hi-jacked airline hostages.

III Libyan Initiative

9. The Libyan Government offered themselves as mediators between the British Government and the guerilla organisation (Tripoli telegram No. 1286) but did not give precise details as to how they intended to achieve this.

10. H.M. Embassy were instructed (F.C.O. telegram No. 901) to establish that the plan would not involve the release of all the passengers and crew still held by the P.F.L.P. in exchange for the seven Fedayeen detained in Europe; if this were correct, they should thank the Libyans for their offer, but point out that matters were still in the hands of the Red Cross and that the most helpful thing the Libyans could do would be to issue a statement condemning hi-jacking in general.

IV The I.C.R.C. Negotiator

11. Mr. Phillips reported (Amman telegram No. 549) that in his view Jacquinet was not an adequate negotiator capable of obtaining a complete list of Fedayeen demands on all five governments. He had made it clear that he conceived his task as a purely humanitarian one and had said he would on no account talk to the P.F.L.P. Mr. Phillips later reported that Jacquinet had made a little progress, a junior member of his staff having visited the P.F.L.P. and been shown a draft

/list

list of names, which he had not however been allowed to read (Amman telegram No. 560).

12. Mr. Phillips did not however alter his earlier recommendation that an alternative negotiator, possibly Melchior Borsinger de Baden (the I.C.R.C. Delegate General for Europe) be appointed.

13. In the light of this H.M. Ambassador at Berne spoke on a personal basis to Thalmann who said that the Swiss Government had just decided to press the I.C.R.C. to appoint a fully qualified negotiator (Berne telegram No. 261). The Germans told H.M. Embassy in Bonn that they agreed a competent negotiator was essential. The State Department, however, saw no advantage in sending out a fresh high level negotiator (Washington telegram No. 2688).

V Negotiations in Berne

14. The Berne Group met at 20.00 (Berne telegram No. 265). Mr. Midgley had been instructed by telephone to express concern about the lack of progress and to urge that the I.C.R.C. send out a negotiator capable of achieving results, possibly M. Borsinger-Baden.

15. The meeting was long, with much inconclusive discussion. The Germans agreed the situation was urgent and warned that Germany might feel compelled to start separate negotiations. The American was predictably relaxed. The British representative spoke as instructed.

16. The most important result was that the I.C.R.C. reported they had summoned back to Geneva the Head of the I.C.R.C. delegation in Cairo with the intention of offering him the Amman post. He has already arranged exchanges of prisoners

/between

between the Arabs and Israelis. However the earliest he could be in Amman was 16 September. The British representative argued for an immediate announcement on this, but was opposed by the American and Swiss.

17. The Group agreed to meet again at 11.00 15 September after which the following announcement would be issued:

"The Berne Consultative Group of representatives of the countries concerned met at 11.00. It heard a report from the I.C.R.C. that the I.C.R.C. representatives in Amman met this morning the Jordanian Prime Minister and will meet this afternoon representatives of the P.F.L.P.

The Group expects to receive a report on these talks late this evening".

Following a Ministerial meeting attended by Sir P. Adams, new instructions were sent to Mr. Midgley (F.C.O. telegram No. 170). He is to urge that the I.C.R.C. nominate their new negotiator without further delay and approve a reference to the man they have in mind in the proposed announcement. Mr. Midgley is to stress the importance of securing Israeli agreement in principle to release some Arab detainees.

VI Press Line

Libyan Plan

18. Unattributably the I.C.R.C. is the appropriate body for negotiation and we shall continue to work through them. We are pleased that the offer has been made on humanitarian grounds.

/The Body

The Body

19. The following line was agreed with the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. authorities have now confirmed to H.M.G. that the hi-jacker of the El-Al plane was Patrick Joseph Arguello, a U.S. citizen resident in Nicaragua and travelling on a U.S. passport. The U.S. Government do not believe they have the right to demand the possession of the body or object to the proposed disposition.

Messages

20. News Department have confirmed that the British Embassy in Amman received more than one letter yesterday from the hostages. They did not go into details but indicated that they were appeals for help. We have been trying to get Consular access but have so far been unsuccessful.

21. If asked about "Consular" access News Department propose to take the line that the Embassy's Consular Officer is best fitted to visit British subjects.

P.F.L.P. refusal to negotiate

22. Reuters reported that the P.F.L.P. said tonight (14th) that it had closed the door on all further mediation to obtain the release of hi-jacked airline hostages. The line is that there is no official confirmation of this report.

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SITREP AT 0800, 16 SEPTEMBER

[All times referred to are B.S.T.]

I Situation in Jordan

Two members of the Embassy staff in Amman were summoned on the evening of 15 September by Prince Hassan and Zaid Rafai. They were told that the Government and the Chief of Staff had resigned and that a military government was about to be formed. This was to be announced at 0500 on 16 September. The intention was that the Army would then surround Amman and settle accounts with the Fedayeen (Amman telegram No. 584).

2. In a Telex conversation at 0200 H.M. Ambassador at Amman reported the King was at Hommar. Mr. Phillips said there was no likelihood of being able to arrange an evacuation of the British community.

3. Arab posts have been alerted to the situation in Jordan and advised to take whatever precautions they think necessary. (F.C.O. telegram No. 884 to Cairo).

4. In a Telex conversation at 0530 the Embassy in Amman said the announcement had been made of the formation of a military Government, but reported that the situation remained quiet and that traffic was moving normally. There was no fighting. Reuters have carried news of the change of Government since 0600.

5. Earlier in the same conversation we put it to Amman that we should ask the B.B.C. to broadcast a statement calling on the Jordan Government to ensure the safety of British lives

/and property.

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and property. The Embassy said they preferred no statement to be issued until (and if) fighting breaks out. If it does, they will report promptly.

II Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street at 0100 to discuss developments in Jordan

6. The Prime Minister, Secretary of State, Permanent Under-Secretary and Sir Philip Adams met. They instructed H.M. Ambassador at Amman to ask the King urgently to make a public appeal for the safety of the hostages and all foreign nationals (Telex conversation 0500). The Permanent Under-Secretary spoke on the telephone to General Haig at the White House (in the absence of Kissinger). (F.C.O. telegram No. 2055 to Washington). Haig stated categorically that the U.S. Government had no prior knowledge of the plan to install a military Government. The Americans had secured an undertaking from King Hussein that, in the announcement he intends to make on the formation of a military Government, he will call on the Fedayeen not to harm the hostages. Otherwise the U.S. Government have taken no action, but Haig would not rule out the possibility of their giving ~~our~~ ^{us} support for the Jordan Army.

7. The P.U.S. subsequently spoke to Mr. Sisco of the State Department. Sisco stated that the American assessment of the situation in Jordan was different from ours. The American view is that the King will fight only if the Fedayeen attack first. Sisco added that Amman had been surrounded by troops for weeks and the only change would be the emergence of a military Government. He thought that if things went wrong for King Hussein, the Israelis would intervene.

/III

III The Hostages

8. In the Telex conversation at 0200 hours Mr. Phillips said the King was aware of the danger to the Western hostages but intended to take action against the Fedayeen nevertheless.

9. We do not know for certain the whereabouts of the hostages. Zein, the Director-General of Trade in Sharjah, known both to Dunn, one of the hostages, and the P.F.L.P. secured an interview with Dunn who said the hostages were being well looked after but they expected a move in the near future. Zein brought a letter from the hostages saying that conditions were fair. (Amman telegrams Nos. 581 and 582). BOAC reported that the hostages had been split up into smaller groups and removed from Amman; the P.F.L.P. had no intention of harming the hostages. (Amman telegram No. 585).

10. The latest report from the Embassy in Amman is that the hostages were in a group of houses in Ashrafiya adjoining the Wafdalut Camp. (Telex conference at 0500).

11. The attempts of H.M. Embassy in Amman to contact the hostages have proved fruitless. The P.F.L.P. told Michael Adams of the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding that there would be no question of a consular visit to the hostages unless a visit to Leila Khaled could be arranged (Amman telegram No. 575). We have also had an approach from Miss Kendall of the Palestine Red Crescent Society asking for access to Miss Khaled together with a doctor. /we have instructed Amman to ask the Palestine Red Crescent whether this arrangement would be agreeable to the P.F.L.P., and if so to agree provided we receive reciprocal

/access

access to all the British hostages. (F.C.O. telegram No. 319).

IV Negotiations in Amman

12. Jacquinet summoned the representatives of the four countries on the evening of 15 September to hear a report from his deputy Hocke on his meeting with the P.F.L.P. this afternoon. (Amman telegram No. 579).

13. The P.F.L.P. had told Hocke that they now insisted on a separate approach, country by country. Their terms for the release of the hostages were as follows:

- (a) the three Swiss-held Fedayeen in return for all Swiss nationals;
- (b) the three German-held Fedayeen in return for all German hostages;
- (c) Leila Khaled and the body of the hi-jacker in return for all British nationals.

14. The P.F.L.P. also demanded an official statement by the Israeli Government agreeing in principle to free the two Algerians arrested in Tel Aviv, one Swiss boy at Haifa, the ten Lebanese captured in exchange for Rosenwasser, in addition to an undertaking to exchange commandos against hostages. The P.F.L.P. will release a list of persons to be released in exchange for the Israeli and dual Israeli/American hostages. It was made clear that the U.S. citizens fell into this category. (Berne telegram No. 273 confirms these terms).

15. Hocke said that if he were to go back to the P.F.L.P. to convey the agreement of the Five Powers to these terms, he was sure that the Red Cross would be accepted as the body to negotiate the mechanics of the exchange.

/16.

16. There has also been discussion in Amman of the possibility of an informal meeting between the representatives of the four countries and the Palestine Red Crescent.

V Developments in Berne

17. A meeting of the Five Power group was held in the morning of 15 September at which agreement was reached that an announcement would be made on 16 September of the appointment of Boisard as the new I.C.R.C. negotiator (Berne telegram No. 268). The meeting issued a neutral announcement that the Berne Group had been informed that the I.C.R.C. delegation in Amman would continue to take action. A report on the result of present negotiations was expected shortly.

18. H.M. Ambassador emphasised that this announcement did not satisfy our need for an early announcement of Boisard's appointment.

19. However, at about 2130 Mr. West telephoned from Berne to say that the I.C.R.C. had already announced that Boisard, together with Boissier, another member of the I.C.R.C., would go to Amman, the latter immediately. Mr. West could throw no light on this volte face by the I.C.R.C. who had only just before claimed it was impossible to make an announcement before tomorrow. The Americans in Berne were taking this calmly.

20. At 2305 Mr. West telephoned again to say that the Germans had requested a Five Power meeting by midnight. The Unit spoke to Mr. Brooks~~Richards~~ in Bonn who elicited from the German Foreign Ministry that the Germans were calling the meeting in order to demand new terms of reference for a negotiator which should be binding on all Five Powers.

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21. The Unit spoke to Mr. Tripp who said that Mr. West should be told urgently that the British should not get out of alignment with the Germans and the Swiss.

22. The Unit spoke again to Mr. West who said the meeting was still in progress. The German representative was under instructions from a "very high authority". His Government wanted a clear mandate for the I.C.R.C. for negotiation with appropriate participation from all governments by noon today. Otherwise the Germans would consider alternative action. When asked what was meant by a "clear mandate" Von Keller said this meant a realistic and adequate contribution from the Israelis. The Israelis rejected this.

23. Mr. West stressed that the Swiss were not weakening. After the meeting he telephoned again to say that the Swiss had told the Ambassador that they wished to consult with us and establish a common line in case the Germans did break ranks. It was agreed that a meeting between the Swiss and the British should take place at 11 o'clock this morning. Mr. West has asked for instructions before the 11 o'clock meeting. (see Berne telegram No. 274).

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Private Secretary

Mr. West telephoned from Berne at 0010 hours. The meeting was still in progress. I told him that I had spoken to Mr. Tripp about his ~~intentions~~^{instructions} and that Mr. Tripp had emphasised the importance of avoiding ~~the~~ falling out of alignment ~~with~~^{with} the Germans and the Swiss. If the Germans had opted for a bi-lateral deal, and the Swiss followed suit, Mr. West should at all costs avoid being left in an isolated position between the Germans and Swiss on the one hand and the Americans and Israelis on the other. Nor should he allow himself to be grouped together with the Israelis and the Americans.

2. Mr. West told me that the German representative had said he was under instructions from a "very high authority". His Government wanted a clear mandate for negotiation with appropriate participation from all Governments by noon today. Otherwise the Germans would consider alternative action. When asked what was meant by a "clear mandate" Von Keller said this meant a realistic and adequate contribution from the Israelis.

3. The Israeli representative said his Government considered their offer to release two senior Algerian security officials to be an adequate contribution. His Government would not consider the latest German demand, particularly as it had a deadline only 11 hours ahead. If the German Government wished to put a request of this kind they should approach the Israeli Government direct. In any case the Red Cross had ^{not} complained that their mandate was insufficient. The next step was to wait and hear what demands the Fedayeen had.

4. Mr. West stressed that the Swiss were not weakening. Indeed in view of the German initiative the Swiss had asked for a talk with Mr. West immediately after the meeting.

5. Mr. West telephoned Mr. Powell again at 0135 to say that the meeting had concluded. The Swiss had remained staunch and told the Germans that they bitterly regretted their threat to break solidarity. The meeting concluded with a plea to the German
/representative

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representative to obtain an extension to the German deadline.
He undertook to try.

7. After the meeting broke up the Swiss representative approached the Ambassador and Mr. West and said that if the Germans did break ranks, the Swiss would want to consult with us and establish a common line. It was agreed that we should meet the Swiss at 11.00 a.m. this morning. The Swiss Federal Council is to meet at 9.00 a.m. Mr. West hopes that we would be able to get instructions to them before the 11.00 meeting.

Vernica Beckett.

(V. BECKETT)
Emergency Unit

16 September 1970.

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Private Secretary

Mr. Fischer-Dieskau of the German Embassy telephoned at 01:10 this morning and dictated the following message from the German Government.

"If by noon today (16 September) the advisors' (Five Power) group in Berne has not appointed a new chief negotiator and has not given to him a clear mandate for the negotiations, with proper participation of all Governments concerned, the Federal Government will be compelled to look for other possibilities for a solution."


(C. D. Powell)

Emergency Unit

16. 11. 70.

c.c. P.U.S.

P.S. No. 10

Sir Philip Adams

Mr. Tripp

Mr. Gallagher

Mr. Hanbury-Tenison

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UNCORRECTED COPY ^{Final} P.A. 16/1

TELEPHONE DISCUSSION BETWEEN SIR DENIS GREENHILL AND
GENERAL HAIGH ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16 AT APPROX 0200 HOURS

[a few lines only of "greetings"]

The first part of the tape was indistinct - it starts as follows:-

Sir Denis - Yes. He will make a statement at 0400 hours?

General Haigh - Yes.

Sir Denis - I see and that will also presumably cover your own Community and the Community of the other countries concerned.

General Haigh - Well yes possibly. ... the hostages ..
This was done by the Embassy officials in Amman.

Sir Denis - I see, so he will definitely call upon the Fedayeen to protect - to do nothing to the hostages.

General Haigh - Yes, they anticipate that the King will do this at our request.

Sir Denis - But apart from that you are just going to let it ~~rest~~ rip?

General Haigh - No other plans beyond the steps we have been taking for the last several weeks.

Sir Denis - You are not yourselves trying to get in touch with the Fedayeen at all?

General Haigh - No we have not.

Sir Denis - Do you know whether the Israelis are planning to do anything when this happens? Do they know about it?

General Haigh - We do not know whether they know about it. We anticipate that there will be a good chance that they would move if the situation deteriorated.
/Sir Denis

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- 2 -

Sir Denis - If it goes against the King you think they will move?

General Haigh - That would be my judgment, and I think Dr. Kissinger's judgment, that if it looked like the King were not going to succeed, or if civil war broke out, that they would be in.

Sir Denis - I see; now we were thinking whether we should take any action to protect our own people and I will report to the Prime Minister what you have said and what you have done. Now have you also considered tonight the latest terms that the Fedayeen put?

General Haigh - Yes we are aware of them, but I would not say that we are particularly pleased with them. We think they are expensive and excessive.

Sir Denis - But you are not discussing them actively now in the light of what the Germans have said. You have heard what the Germans have said?

General Haigh - Yes; I will have to get you the latest information. There have been a lot of round table discussions at State this afternoon and I will have to get back to you on that.

Sir Denis - All right. Well I may come through to you again but I think I have asked all the questions at the moment and I am most grateful for the clear answers. Let me just go through them again. The first point - that you have no knowledge of the situation until this afternoon's report.

General Haigh - We got the report of it from our Embassy today.

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/Sir Denis

Sir Denis - Yes, I mean you had no part in it before that?

General Haigh - No.

Sir Denis - No, I see, and the steps you have taken to protect the hostages are to ask the King to warn the Fedayeen when the balloon goes up to protect the hostages.

General Haigh - That is correct.

Sir Denis - And apart from that you are going to let the situation rest.

General Haigh - Well no, we are having a series of meetings to consider our contingency action and the further courses of action of course. There has been some right now but I have not had a report on them yet.

Sir Denis - Does that include armed intervention?

General Haigh - We have not anticipated that, on the other hand I would not rule out perhaps air if necessary.

Sir Denis - Air support to the King?

General Haigh - Yes, but I would not rule it out, but there is no decision made to do that.

Sir Denis - I see, thank you very much. And you think that the Israelis don't know about this but that they may well intervene if things go wrong?

General Haigh - Yes I do and that is a judgment, not a fact.

Sir Denis - Okay General, well I shall be in touch with you again in a moment.

General Haigh - If you would like I will call Dr. Kissinger, and I will make some queries over the area personally and may be get back to you in about an hour, if that would be satisfactory.

Sir Denis - That would suit us very well but I don't preclude Do you know where the President is, physically, now?

General Haigh - The President is here in the White House.

Sir Denis - I see, so that if the Prime Minister wished to speak to him he could get him?

General Haigh - Yes, I think he could do so. I would suggest we sort out a few more details here.

Sir Denis - Yes, all right, I will expect you back in an hour unless you hear from me in the meantime.

General Haigh - Yes, very good.

Sir Denis - Thanks so much.

Distribution:

✓ Sir D. Greenhill
and Mr. Graham (FCO) ONLY

16.9.10

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SECRET

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16/9

TELEPHONE DISCUSSION BETWEEN SIR DENIS GREENHILL,
DR. KISSINGER AND MR. SISCO AT APPROX. 0345 HOURS
ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1970.

Dr. Kissinger - These things always happen at odd hours.
I have several of my ^{senior} associates here.
Would you like me to answer your various
questions?

Sir Denis - Yes, you go ahead.

Dr. Kissinger - I have a list of seven questions.
1. The only advance information we had ^{was} a
couple of hours ago, ^{it} was of the King's intention
to set up a military government and of his
intention to announce that at 1.00 a.m. our
time. He also informed us that he would
not force the issue and use force only if ^{force}
used against him. The first indication
that we did not think this was a crisis
situation was that the three of us, the
Chairman of the ^{Joint} Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Sisco
and the Deputy Secretary of Defence were ^{due} at
a dinner 40 miles away from here.

All went to that dinner

2. Have we taken any special steps to
protect our hostages? We have taken no
special steps except those with which you
are familiar. We have taken none in the
last 24 hours.

Sir Denis - That is to ask the King to call upon the
Fadayeens to protect them.

Dr. Kissinger ^{yes;} - Except what General Haigh told you. We do
not know where they are moreover.

3. Have we taken any other steps? No.

4. Are we trying to get in touch with the
Fadayeens ourselves? No.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

5. Do we know about whether the Israelis know about it? No. We do not know but we assumed they ~~do not~~ ^{did not}, at least not before we ~~do~~ ^{did}.

Sir Denis - Yes. You think they may but you have no evidence that they do.

Dr. Kissinger - 6. We have no evidence, ^{but} We have some indirect evidence that they ^{probably} ~~did~~ not and we have not informed them. Similarly if it goes against the King, ^{do} we think that they will move: ~~to protect~~ ^{is yes} Our judgment, especially if the Iraqis get involved. We have the terms ~~that~~ ^{of} the Fadayeens ~~put~~ under active consideration.

7. Concerning contingency action. We don't preclude it. We have a number of ideas, especially relating to the evacuation of Americans.

Sir Denis - What the General said was we do not rule out air support. Does that mean a sort of military support in support of the King? I mean, actually shooting up people?

Dr. Kissinger - No. There are no decisions of any kind of this sort now.

No:

Sir Denis - ~~But~~ I mean what he said was he did not rule it out.

Dr. Kissinger - Well, it is ~~in defence of~~ a contingency which might be considered but not one that we are now considering in relation to this thing we have under consideration now.

/Mr. Sisco

SECRET

Mr. Sisco

- May I say, Henry, the principle contingency, ~~is~~ not the only contingency, but the principle contingency that we have considered is the contingency of what we might have to do to evacuate Americans. That has been a ~~point~~ ^{contingency} that we have ~~considered~~ ^{been} every day, every other day as the situation has evolved and we have made ~~no~~ ^{special} study of it since we have received this information two hours ago of the King's intention to establish a military government.

Sir Denis

- I see. The only comment that the Prime Minister made ^{was} ~~that~~ that if you were thinking in terms of the military intervention in support of the King, actually participating in any battle that broke out — if it was possible for the King to win the battle without.....

Dr. Kissinger

- If the King made such a request in the circumstances it is something that is not precluded ^{but it is} ~~and~~ not something that we would particularly ... er, ^{we would} ~~tend~~ to look to other recourses.

Mr. Sisco

- Our assessment is the same as ^{yours} ~~that~~ ^{is anything} ~~that~~ if the King is forced ^{the} the best way is for him to win by himself, ^{of course}.

Sir Denis

- A hundred per cent. Can we just have a word about the terms. You say you are considering the terms. If this matter had not come up about this action by the King — those terms do not seem so bad to us, as you know. SECRET

/Mr. Sisco

SECRET

- 4 -

Mr. Sisco

Can I say a word on this, ^{Henry?} Let me tell you what the problem is with these terms so ^{that} you will understand. Because we want to maintain a united front both with you as well as with the others.

Sir Denis

You have had all the German ~~s~~ reports today?

Mr. Sisco

Sure, yes.

Here is what the proposal is, ^{as you know} You release your people, the ^{Swiss} ~~German~~ release their people, the ^{Germans} ~~Swiss~~ release their people and then there is a paragraph which says the Israelis will release the Algerians, the Lebanese and some others. The last paragraph of the proposal ^{is to get on} is ~~the~~ Israeli commitment to the exchange principle and then we will consider giving you a list. ^{But they don't even want to go that far.} ~~And that~~ the problem is this — the Israelis have been very resistant as you know to the idea of accepting the principle before they know what the totality of the demands are. Our efforts over the last four or five days ^{get the ICRC to} have been to try to ^Lforce the PFLP to give a concrete list. In other words the strategy we have felt and feel is that we have got to get the other side to put on the table in the first instance their total demands ^{and then} ~~so that~~ we and you and the other two ~~concerned~~ can consider how we can influence our Israeli friends. But how in the hell are we going to influence the Israelis if the Fadayeen won't even tell us before there is a commitment in principle by the Israelis just how many

SECRET

/Fadayeen

Fadayeen they want exchanged in the situation.
That is the problem you see.

Sir Denis But the only comment I make on that Joe is that it does not require much imagination to guess what the Fadayeen terms are or who would appear on their list when the time comes.

Mr. Sisco Well, ^{perhaps you are} ~~you are~~ a lot clearer than we are, because we have had three different numerical terms cited in the Press - 200 Fadayeen, 400 Fadayeen, 600 Fadayeen and you and we would be much more effective to the Israelis if we knew concretely what the other side ^{is trying to ask} ~~had asked~~ for.

Sir Denis But that does not really effect to my way of thinking the fact that the Israelis ought to ^{a thing} agree in principle. If you agree in principle ^L you do not commit yourself to 2,500, 2,000, 1,000, three or four hundred, you just agree in principle there has got to be some exchange.

Mr. Sisco I tell you what the difficulties are. ^{Let me just say to you that} ~~We~~ are going to give this careful consideration in the morning and absolutely no decisions have been taken on this.

Sir Denis Okay Joe. Well I am most grateful. I think that you have answered all our questions and we just hope that when the balloon goes up that the King makes out all right. I mean, the latest telegram that we have got from Amman says that the intention was the army would ^{then} surround Amman and settle accounts with the Fadayeen, but you say the King says that he won't shoot unless shot at.

SECRET

- 6 -

Mr. Sisco

- But he has had the city surrounded for a long time. There is nothing new about that.

Sir Denis

- Yes, but I mean you do not feel that he is not going to do anything unless somebody shoots at him.

Mr. Sisco

- He is not going to force the issue is what he has told us.

Sir Denis

- I see, right-ho.

Dr. Kissinger

- It may happen we just do not know.

Mr. Sisco

- Don't assume that it is not going to happen.
but this
~~That~~ is what we have been told.

Sir Denis

- Yes. Right. Fine. Now just half a minute, and I will see if anybody here wants to ask any more questions. No. I think that is fine. It is now 0400 hours.

Copied to Sir Denis Greenhill
Mr Graham for only.
16-9

SECRET

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class.....PR 415
Piece124

Internal FCO minute
dated 16 Sept 1970
extracted and
retained under
Section 3(4)

(date).....9 June 2000
(Signed).....J. R. Green

CONFIDENTIAL
Telex Conference ~~1200~~ 0100 BST 16/ix

① Q. Where is the King?

A. At Hammur.

② Q. Does he realize the danger to Western hostages, possibly death; and danger to Western communities.

A. Yes, but he feels that he has to do this in the interests of law, order and unity.

③ Q. What prospect is there of a bilateral deal on hostages before the situation deteriorates?

A. None

④ Q. What prospect is there of getting the hostages out after the military government has been announced?

A. Once control has been gained, prospects should be good. One simply cannot tell at this stage.

⑤ Q. Evacuation. ~~Is~~ Is there likely to be time in which to do anything?

A. Presumably evacuation of hostages is intended. In which case please see answer to 4 above. I do not anticipate at this moment that a move

(2)

General evacuation will be necessary. It will be more a question of keeping heads down.

(6) Q. What is the situation at the airport?

A. So far as we know, it is still normal.

But troop dispositions are going on as I speak.

(7) Q. Who is or will be commanding the troops? Have you any forecast of the operation?

A. C-in-C is — MAJALI. We have no forecast of how the operation will be carried out. But the King has said that he is confident that all situations are provided for.

(8) Q. Do you expect the Fedayeen to stand and fight or to run? How long could Fedayeen hold out against concerted military attack in terms of ammunition, supplies etc.

(3)

A. I am pretty sure they will fight for a while, but they ~~are~~ ^{may} already ^(be) short of ammunition after the desultory fighting last week. But we simply cannot tell how long they can carry on. [? Some people think] that they cannot keep up the fight for long. But I myself am rather less optimistic, particularly in the areas where they are strongest.

Before we break with
the U.S., should we ask
them whether they want
us to try to exchange
L. R. for the U.S. hostages?
as well as our own?
We shouldn't succeed. But
we could say thereafter
either that we had tried
or that the U.S. knew
that we were willing to
try but had rejected
our offer.

REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SIR DENIS GREENHILL,
DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND MR. JOE SISCO, HELD ON THURSDAY,
SEPTEMBER 17, AT APPROX. 1.00 p.m.

After preliminaries:

Sir Denis - Listen, can we discuss for a few minutes the present situation in Amman?

Dr. Kissinger - Yes.

Sir Denis - What is your latest report actually from the City?

Dr. Kissinger - Our latest report is that the army has secured the Western Heights and is moving in on the road past the Intercontinental Hotel and your Embassy into the City and it has secured the Southern Heights. They have not yet entered, apparently, the very heart of the Palestinian section.

Sir Denis - And do you think that the King's claim that he will have the hostages tonight is a valid one?

Dr. Kissinger - We can't judge that. Our judgment is that the whole operation will probably take somewhat longer than a day.

Sir Denis - Yes, well that is important.

Dr. Kissinger - But our judgment is also that he can defeat the Fedayeen by himself.

Sir Denis - He can, yes.

Dr. Kissinger - That is our judgment.

/Sir Denis

Sir Denis - Yes, I get it. Well now Henry, I don't know whether you have seen the text of what we have proposed the Berne Group should put out this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger - I have not seen it. I have Joe Sisco on the line with me. We were just meeting.

Sir Denis - Yes, has Joe seen it?

Mr. Sisco - Good morning, Denis.

Sir Denis - Good morning, Joe.

Mr. Sisco - How are you?

Sir Denis - Not bad.

Mr. Sisco - No, I have not seen what you are talking about. I am au courant but I have to admit it I have read all the traffic but nothing in terms of this afternoon.

Sir Denis - Well now we have proposed that the Berne Group should put out the following communique - can I read it to you?

Mr. Sisco - Yes please.

Sir Denis - It says, "The five governments are ready to open negotiations about the proposal of the PFLP immediately the PFLP provide the Berne Group with their total demands, including specific lists of the Fedayeen whom the PFLP want. They have furnished the ICRC with an urgent mandate on this basis, meanwhile they must make it clear that they will hold the PFLP responsible for the safety of the hostages in Jordan." How does that sound to you?

/Mr. Sisco

Mr. Sisco

- Our reaction is that it sounds very good because its really the precise position that we discussed with you and with the others in the course of yesterday's meeting. Obviously Henry and I will want to discuss it with the others and in particular we would want to evaluate the impact of such an announcement on the evolving situation on the ground, that is one of the obvious considerations. My own personal reaction is, certainly one quite sympathetic in an initial reading and then I think we can just let you know.

Sir Denis

- Yes. You are considering ...

Dr. Kissinger

- I share Joe's view.

Sir Denis

- Yes, fine. Well now the second thing is have you received the representations yet from the Germans?

Mr. Sisco

- We have not.

Sir Denis

- They are going to make some representations to you which they have already made to us.

Mr. Sisco

- To what effect.

Sir Denis

- Well, what it amounts to is this, that they think that if we cannot keep a five power basis could we proceed via a four power and/or a three power, or finally two collective agreement for unilateral action for each of us to do the best for our hostages.

Dr. Kissinger

- Denis, may I interrupt one second?

Sir Denis

- Yes.

/Dr. Kissinger

Dr. Kissinger - If you have no other business on the general situation we have left a meeting reviewing the whole situation, I hope I can return to that and let Joe talk to you about the hostage situation in which he is involved.

Sir Denis - That is very nice of you Henry. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger - Is that all right with you?

Sir Denis - Yes it is.

Mr. Sisco - I will join you in a moment, Henry.

Dr. Kissinger - Good.

Mr. Sisco - Denis, on this ...

Sir Denis - Can I just say we have Ministers at a meeting I am in No. 10 at the moment and, of course, we are, as we always have been, particularly concerned on public opinion concerning the hostages and ...

Mr. Sisco - Of course, but you see ...

Sir Denis - Can I first of all say, there are three possible courses if you abandon the five power approach, one is that the four of us say that the European prisoners could be exchanged for all hostages except the three Israelis, or whatever number the Israelis are?

Mr. Sisco - Well it is really three, but these three are also Americans.

Sir Denis - They are not pure Israelis?

/Mr. Sisco

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Mr. Sisco - No, no, they are Americans.

Sir Denis - So it is three duals and so that deal would only be a feasible one for you if it was the European prisoners for all the hostages - period.

Mr. Sisco - Yes. See you cannot distinguish in that this deal is no deal for us.

Sir Denis - Yes, but I mean if we could get all the Americans and the duals: are there no pure Israelis involved?

Mr. Sisco - No.

Sir Denis - You are certain of that.

Mr. Sisco - Well, we are satisfied that these two or three have an American connection, they have American passports.

Sir Denis - Yes, I see.

Mr. Sisco - So that is the problem you see.

Sir Denis - Yes, all right, well look there is theoretically a possible deal of all the European prisoners for all the hostages including the Americans and the duals.

Mr. Sisco - How does that really differ from really the kind of an announcement that you are talking about?

Sir Denis - Well, it ...

/Mr. Sisco

Mr. Sisco

- If this kind of a deal were available, we have really been trying to get this deal from the other side but the other side doesn't go simply because they are insisting on this exchange.

Sir Denis

- But its not really I think ... except that in their new situation they might agree to it. Well now, another deal would be, and I am talking in theory, that in view of the danger to our people that the Germans, the Swiss and ourselves swop our prisoners for our hostages leaving you unprovided for. The final stage is that we should agree amongst ourselves that nobody would mutually reproach the other if each person did the best they could for their own people.

Mr. Sisco

- Right, well Denis, obviously I can tell you we would have difficulty with all three of these approaches. And moreover I think your Government would want to weigh very very carefully the kind of outcry that would occur in this country against your taking this kind of an action as well as the Germans.

Sir Denis

- Yes.

Mr. Sisco

- It would be very strong indeed and be very sure your Ministers understand that.

Sir Denis

- Well they do Joe, but there is also an outcry in this country on the lines of because your visitor wont lift a bloody finger and put any contribution to a bargain our people get killed and you can imagine how bad that would ... and if it all comes out that we could have got our people out but for the obduracy /of you

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- 7 -

of you and the other people so to speak,
I am just talking

Mr. Sisco

- Although who knows what even a separate deal
is feasible in present circumstances.

Sir Denis

- Yes, I mean people say why the bloody hell
didn't you try.

Mr. Sisco

- Sure, sure; Denis, let's put it this way,
as soon as I am out of this meeting we will
give active consideration to the first
proposal. You know, of course, that late
last night

Sir Denis

- The first proposal being the communique.

Mr. Sisco

- Yes, but you should know that we have now
gone through the Israeli's directly.
Have your people been informed of this?

Sir Denis

- I think so, but saying what precisely?

Mr. Sisco

- Well to say to them basically that we want
to act together and ...

Sir Denis

- Have you gone as far as to say that they must
pitch in?

Mr. Sisco

- That is right, in other words, this is the
first time we will have gone to them in a
concrete and a unilateral way as it relates
to a prospective Israeli contribution.

Sir Denis

- I see.

Mr. Sisco

- So I sent that out about 7.00 last night and
I expect a report in the course of the
morning on it.

/Sir Denis

- Sir Denis - Well, the Israelis are saying, of course ... what they are saying to us is that they cannot agree to anything because their whole apparatus is with you, so presumably you will
- Mr. Sisco - We will go now and let us see what we get on that. So I will report back to you and also give consideration to the communique idea.
- Sir Denis - Yes all right. You have the text of the communique so let me re-capitulate.
- Mr. Sisco - All right.
- Sir Denis - You will consider the text of the communique that I have given you. You will continue your discussions with the Israelis about making a contribution.
- Mr. Sisco - Yes, correct.
- Sir Denis - You will give us a view about the other proposals that I suggested to you ...
- Mr. Sisco - And the interim reaction is negative on this.
- Sir Denis - Yes. When I say proposals they are not proposals they are our reactions to this kind of thought.
- Mr. Sisco - That is right.
- Sir Denis - I am not proposing
- Mr. Sisco - No, let us not talk in terms of proposals because that is better
- Sir Denis - Line of thought.

/Mr. Sisco

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- Mr. Sisco - Line of thought, let's use that.
- Sir Denis - Okay. Rightho Joe. Just let me ask ...
- Mr. Sisco - I have now become a regular member of the White House team.
- Sir Denis - Yes, so long as they provide you with a bed. Let me just ask the chaps here if they have got anything: Yes, the Berne meeting is at 2.30 this afternoon and that is whatever it is your time.
- Mr. Sisco - Okay, 2.30 and that is five hours ...
- Sir Denis - Its 8.15 with you now, its five hours, its ..
- Mr. Sisco - If we need an hour or two delay you will understand won't you, because you see the Secretary is scheduled to see Schumann this morning but if you should get a statement that we need two hours delay you will know its because we have got it under active consideration.
- Sir Denis - Okay, Joe. Thank you.

Distribution - Mr Edgeston
Sir S. Greenhill } No.
Mr Graham }

SITREP at 0700 on 17 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

SECTION I : Jordan Internal

On 16 September the situation was tense but comparatively quiet. At 0400 on 17 September firing broke out in Amman; by 0500 this had become more general. (Amman Tel. Nos. 604 and 606)

2. Mr. Phillips saw the King at Hamar on the morning of 16 September. The King said his purpose in forming the new military government was both to ensure that his own troops would be kept in better discipline and also to ensure that if they had to fight the Fedayeen they would be effectively led and directed (Amman Tel. No. 596). The King also said that the agreement concluded the previous day between the Fedayeen and the old government would be respected by the new government. This agreement provided for a reduction of military guard and security forces in Amman on the one hand and the withdrawal of the Fedayeen from military posts and positions in the city on the other (Amman Tel. No. 587). The King was pleased with the reactions so far to his new government. He said that his conversation with Embassy staff the previous night foreshadowing a showdown between the army and the Fedayeen had been meant to convey only that force would be used to meet force. He still feared that it might come to this, although he hoped not.

/3. . .

SECRET

3. Mr. Phillips commented (Amman Tel. No. 597) that he was inclined to accept the King's explanation of his motives.

4. In a Telex conversation at 1730, Mr. Phillips reported that a general strike had been called for 17 September.

US Assessment of the Situation in Jordan

5. The American assessment is more optimistic than the British: they consider that during the night and early morning of 15/16 September the situation was potentially very dangerous, but after that there seemed a fair prospect of the crisis diminishing or disappearing (Berne Tels. Nos. 277 and 278).

Israeli Assessment of the Situation in Jordan

6. Mr. Barnes reported from Tel Aviv (Tel. No. 851) that, in the view of the MFA, the King had at last been driven by the deteriorating situation into taking firm action which he should have taken earlier. He had realised that unless he gave support to the army he would lose control completely. The Israeli MFA thought he had acted just in time and that with luck he should be able to avoid the drift to chaos.

SECTION II : The Hostages

7. HM Ambassador reported in his Telex conversation that he had no further news of their whereabouts. However, Amman Tel. No. 590 contains a message from the BOAC captain stating that the hostages were being treated "most fairly" in the circumstances, and had better food than their guards. Conditions were very crowded and perilous. The captain said morale was high but asked that the hostages should be got out as soon as possible.

/SECTION III

SECRET

SECTION III : Negotiations in Amman

8. Mr. Phillips also reported in this conversation that there was little further news from the Red Cross. They were waiting for further instructions from the Berne Group on the most recent PFLP terms. Boissier, the new ICRC negotiator, was expected to arrive early on 17 September.

SECTION IV : Negotiations in Berne

9. Sir Philip Adams telephoned instructions to Mr. West early on 16 September in the following terms:

"In view of the prospect of civil war in Jordan and the consequent risks to all foreigners, particularly the hostages, HM Government consider it is essential that the Berne Group should now agree on a joint negotiating position.

You may imply (but not say in terms at this stage) that if the Berne Group cannot agree, eg. because of Israeli refusal to accept a principle of making a contribution over and above the Algerians, that HMG will feel free to seek other means of securing the early release of British hostages".

10. The Berne Group met at 1600. HM Ambassador had previously told the Swiss ^{of} alone the line he would be taking. At the meeting the Israeli Ambassador said that he was not authorised to make any advance on the two Algerians as an Israeli contribution to the package. There was almost complete identity of view between the Germans and the British.

/11. . . .

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11. At the end of the meeting the US Ambassador on instructions put forward the following formula:

"The Berne Group should furnish the ICRC with a mandate indicating that the five Governments agree to consider the proposal of the PFLP at such a time as the PFLP provides the Group with its total demands, including specific lists of the Fedayeen whom the PFLP wants."

(Berne Tel. No. 278)

12. Ministers considered the American formula. They thought it inadequate in the sense that it did not specifically provide for a contribution by each country to the total number of detainees to be released. Nevertheless, it was decided (FCO Tel. No. 620 to Bonn) that HM Ambassador at Berne should convey British acceptance of these terms to his colleagues on the understanding that they too would quickly agree so that Boissier could start tomorrow his efforts to extract a list from the PFLP.

13. On instructions HM Ambassador at Washington spoke to the Americans in this sense (Washington Tel. No. 2723). Mr. Campbell of the Embassy in Bonn spoke to the Federal Foreign Ministry who told him that the Germans' instructions to Berne were very similar to the British: the Germans agreed with our line. Mr. Campbell passed this information at 2315 on the telephone to the Unit who telegraphed it to Berne (FCO Tel. No. 174 to Berne).

14. A little earlier Mr. West had telephoned from Berne to say that the Group would meet on 17 September at 0800 or 0900 to discuss reactions to the American proposal.

/SECTION V

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SECTION V : Miss Khaled

15. Negotiations have been in progress over reciprocal visits: i.e. that two nominees of the PFLP should visit Miss Khaled in exchange for consular access to the hostages. FCO Tel. No. 330 to Amman informs Mr. Phillips that there would be no objection to a visit to Miss Khaled by the two Red Crescent nominees (Ghazi Saudi and Mrs. Itisar Jurtaneh), but the visitors may not be alone with Miss Khaled. In return, the Embassy representative should not see the hostages alone. .

SECTION VI : Beirut Airport

16. HM Ambassador at Beirut suggested further points which might be put to BALPA in an attempt to prevent their declaring a ban on Beirut airport (Beirut Tel. No. 452), due to come into force at midnight 16/17 September.

17. After consultation with Mr. Hanbury-Tenison, the Unit despatched a telegram to Beirut saying that BALPA had been unmoved by arguments similar to those now put forward by Mr. Edden, but giving him discretion to inform the Lebanese that BALPA's decision was not a governmental one;

STOP PRESS

At 0730 the communications staff in Amman reported that heavy firing was going on near the Embassy. The windows of the operations room had been smashed and they were therefore unable to send messages in cypher. They were taking cover but they will be able to receive and periodically despatch messages en clair.

/Cypher

SECRET

Cypher communications have now been restored, and we have asked the Embassy whether the Amman telephone system is still working. It is (8.20 am)

Middle East CrisisSitrep at 0700 on 13 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

I Jordan InternalGeneral Situation

Fighting continued in Amman throughout the day, but at 2130 Amman reported in a telex conference that most areas had by then been cleared by military action. The night has been quiet, but dawn has brought artillery firing in the direction of Asrafiaya and Jebel Hussein. It appears to be directed away from the Embassy.

Communications

2. Efforts were made to allow HM Ambassador to get to the Embassy, but this appears to have been to no avail. Secure communication between H.E. and the Embassy is not currently possible. Similarly the telephone system is out of action and it has not proved possible to get in contact with the King; a telex conference proposed for 2230 did not take place.

Cease Fire

3. In the course of the afternoon, the Jordanian Prime Minister offered a cease fire on condition that guerrillas turned in their arms to their central bodies. The offer is understood to have been refused.

HMG's Statement

4. In the light of the situation in Jordan, HMG issued the following statement at 1045 hours.

/"In the light

"In the light of reports of serious developments in Jordan the British Government call on the Jordanian Government to ensure the safety of British lives and property in Jordan.

"The British Government also call on those with hostages in their hands to safeguard the lives of these hostages and of all other foreign nationals."

Iraqi Forces

5. The 2130 telex conference ended by reporting a rumour that Iraqi forces had been seen leaving Jordan, contrary to Fedayeen wishes.

II The Hostages

Location

6. There are conflicting reports on the whereabouts of the hostages. The French understand them to be held at Wahdat (Paris Tel. No. 849) which was to be held at all costs. The Americans believe them to be "outside Amman and in no immediate danger" (Washington Tel. No. 2731). The Israelis had identified three places where hostages were being held - Zerka, Jebel el Sufir and Wahdat.

Release

7. The King proposes that house to house searches should now take place throughout Amman which will, he intends, inter alia finish the Fedayeen in the city. Once he has established control, a curfew is to be imposed and with their guards isolated and unable to summon assistance it will be only a matter of time before the hostages are located. Since their captors may well attempt to use
/the hostages

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the hostages as a means of survival, it is unlikely that there will be a bargaining phase.

Additional Hostages

8. Berne Tel. No. 285 reports that some further hostages have been taken from a group of foreigners at the Intercontinental. The group includes two Swiss, but it is not known if any UK nationals are involved.

III Negotiations for the Release of Hostages

Israeli Response to US Proposals

9. In Berne the Israeli Embassy gave the Swiss Government and ourselves the Israeli response to the formula proposed by the US representative at the meeting of the Berne Group on 16 September.

10. As Mrs. Meir was already on her way to Washington and M. Eban was about to leave Israel, no definite reply was possible. However, the Israelis thought that there was no possibility of fruitful negotiations in the present circumstances and they hesitated to take a position on the US formula "because that could lead to contradictory interpretations" (Berne Tel. No. 279).

Mr. Eban's View

11. The US Chargé d'Affaires in Tel Aviv spoke to Mr. Eban at the airport just before his departure, to seek Israeli acceptance of the American formula (Tel Aviv Tel. No. 860). Mr. Eban said that the Israeli Government could not sign a blank cheque in the absence of Mrs. Meir and himself; it would be very difficult for the Cabinet to change their position. In any case he thought it would be physically impossible to take any effective action in Amman at present (Tel Aviv Tel. No. 860).

12.

/12. . . .

12. The US Chargé in Tel Aviv was subsequently told that the formula had been put to the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister, who also considered it impractical in the present circumstances. He thought that King Hussein might object if the ICRC were to approach the PFLP on behalf of the Berne Group at the present juncture, as he might consider such an approach contrary to his objective of dealing firmly with the Fedayeen. He suggested that the Americans should seek the King's view before any action was taken (Tel Aviv Tel. No. 864).

Call for Berne Group Meeting - New Formula

13. In view of the serious fighting in Amman, a telegram was sent to Berne (FCO Tel. No. 175) with instructions to call for an urgent meeting of the Group to discuss the following re-draft of the American formula:-

"The five Governments are ready to open negotiations about the proposal of the PFLP immediately the PFLP provide the Berne Group with their total demands, including specific lists of the Fedayeen whom the PFLP want. They have furnished the ICRC with an urgent mandate on this basis. Meanwhile they must make it clear that they will hold the PFLP responsible for the safety of the hostages in Jordan."

German Ambassador's Call

14. The German Ambassador called on Sir Denis Greenhill and said that he expected that he and the German Ambassadors in Washington and Berne would be instructed to make representations in the three capitals that, to ensure that lives were not lost by further delay, the Four needed to take a collective decision

/permitting

SECRET

permitting each to make individual arrangements to secure the release of the detainees. If the Americans were reluctant to agree to this, the Germans would like a decision on the same proposition from the Three. The Ambassador also confirmed that he had received instructions supporting his earlier remarks. (FCO Tel. No. 623)

Telephone Conversation - P.U.S., Sisco and Kissinger

15. Sir Denis Greenhill spoke to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Sisco at 1300 hours. Mr. Sisco said that our proposed re-draft of their formula sounded very good. The Permanent Under Secretary referred to the approach from the Germans and concern here about public opinion on the hostages. If the five-power approach were abandoned, there were three possibilities:-

- (a) the European prisoners could be exchanged for all prisoners except the Israelis (Mr. Sisco said they were dual US/Israel nationals);
- (b) the European prisoners could be exchanged for all the hostages; or
- (c) the Germans, Swiss and British could swap their prisoners for their hostages, leaving the Americans unprovided for.

Mr. Sisco said that the Americans would have difficulty with all three approaches and that HMG should weigh very carefully the likely reaction in the United States. The Permanent Under Secretary said that British public opinion would be outraged if British hostages suffered on account of the intransigence of another country (by implication Israel).

US Pressure on Israel

16. Mr. Sisco said that the Americans were putting pressure
/on the

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on the Israelis for an Israeli contribution to the package (FCO Tel. No. 2073 to Washington).

Report of Berne Group Meeting

17. When the Berne Group met at 1600 hours the American and Swiss agreed to our re-draft of the US formula subject to the first sentence being modified to read:

"The Four Governments are ready to continue negotiations at once about the PFLP, as soon as the PFLP provides . . . "

The Israeli said he could not agree to it without reference back to his government; and the German said his government would probably be unwilling to agree to it until they knew the Israelis were going to first.

Compromise Formula

18. In order to get round the PFLP's insistence on Israeli public acceptance of the principle of an exchange, the Americans proposed that:-

"The representatives on the Berne Group of the UK, USA, Germany and Switzerland will ask Naville, President of the ICRC, to telegraph to Boissier, saying that if the latter considers it would be helpful, he 'could point out to the PFLP that previously Israel has in effect already agreed to the principle of such exchanges by its exchange of prisoners for Israelis held by Syria in connexion with a previous TWA hijacking and by its evident willingness (as indicated privately to ICRC) to release two Algerians as part of an agreement in the present case'".

The Israeli did not dissent from this device (Berne Tel. No. 285).

Mr. West's Confirmation

19. Mr. West confirmed by telephone at about 2300 hours that this proposal has been put to Naville; but he did not know if a message had been sent to Boissier.

SECRET

/IV Beirut

IV Beirut

20. Demonstrations have been banned by the government. Nonetheless one took place yesterday morning (Beirut telno. 454), but subsequently fizzled out. Elaborate precautions have been taken at the airport, but there have been no other incidents. Balpa have agreed not to impose a ban on flights into Beirut.

V Israel

21. The Israeli Ambassador with Mr. Eban is to see the Secretary of State at noon today. Tel Aviv think it unlikely that the Israelis will intervene (see Tel Aviv telno. 863) unless there is substantial Iraqi or Syrian intervention.

VI Amman Evacuation

22. Beirut have aircraft on call until the end of Saturday (telno. 455). They await instructions before committing themselves.

VII Miss Khaled

23. A plan has been drawn up, and submitted to the Prime Minister, for exchanging Miss Khaled and the body of her late colleague for the hostages. At the meeting in Berne Mr. Midgley was asked if he foresaw the possibility of an ICRC visit to Miss Khaled as a quid pro quo for an ICRC visit to the hostages. He thought this very possible.

/Neither

Neither the ICRC nor the Palestine Red Crescent has as yet visited Miss Khaled.

VIII Chinese Activity

24. Peking has reported (telno. 591) that the Chinese have been asked by the Swiss to mediate on their behalf to secure the release of the Swissair hostages. The Swiss apparently made no mention of the other hostages or of the ICRC efforts. The outcome of the Swiss request is as yet unknown. Peking further reports (telno. 593) that George Habbash is in Peking and the assessment of the U.A.R. Ambassador that the Chinese are likely to be opposed to the guerillas' hi-jacking activities if unwilling to exert pressure against them.

IX Possible U.S. Intervention in Jordan

25. Washington telno. 2747 reports that Dr. Kissinger has told Mr. Freeman that the White House had been taken by surprise by some "unpremeditated and somewhat highly coloured language" used by President Nixon in the course of background press briefings in Chicago. He is thought to have used phrases which dramatize the conflict with the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and might be interpreted as encouraging Israeli intervention in Jordan. Dr. Kissinger asked that the Secretary of State should be assured that the President's remarks were not "the opening shot in a sharpening of confrontation". No decisions relevant to military action had been taken which the

/Secretary

SECRET

Secretary of State had not been told of. Dr. Kissinger asked that any official British comment should be kept in the lowest possible key. The Voice of America at 02.00 hours referred to reliable reports that the U.S. might intervene if Syria and Iraq were to attack Jordan.

STOP PRESS

Amman reported at 07.15 that H.M. Ambassador had arrived at the Embassy in a troop carrier.



P.A.

M.

18/9

Peter

You mentioned to
the FCO Emergency Unit
the Palestinian appearing
on the BBC. The Unit
'phoned to say that
the Under Sec. concerned
is going to talk to the
BBC and tell them
that this sort of thing
will not do!

 18/9.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE OF ACTION TAKEN FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S
TALK WITH SIR DENIS GREENHILL AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET
AROUND MIDNIGHT ON THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 18/19, 1970

The Prime Minister's

Following ~~your~~ talk with Sir Denis Greenhill tonight
the following action was taken:-

(i) Sir Denis Greenhill spoke to the Soviet Ambassador. He said that we had received a report that the Syrians had moved some tanks across the Jordanian frontier for a short distance and had been firing on Jordanian positions. He was informing the Ambassador of this so that the Soviet Government might reinforce their representations to the Syrian Government for restraint. The Ambassador undertook to inform his Government.

(ii) Sir Denis Greenhill spoke to Dr. Kissinger and asked:-

a. Had they anything to tell us about the attitude of Mrs. Meir on the question of the hostages and of making a contribution towards their release following Mrs. Meir's talks with President Nixon?

b. Had they anything to tell us about the talks more generally?

/Dr. Kissinger said

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Dr. Kissinger said that there had been no significant movement from Mrs. Meir on the hostages. On the wider question of Middle East negotiations she had been pretty "strong". Her line had been that there could be no negotiations without rectification of the cease-fire violations.

Dr. Kissinger said that they also had received the report of the Syrian tank movements. Sir Denis Greenhill told him that he had just spoken to the Soviet Ambassador about this, which Dr. Kissinger greatly welcomed.

Dr. Kissinger said that they had received a note from the Russians on the situation which they thought conciliatory. He asked what our impression was of it and Sir Denis Greenhill said that we had formed the same view.

Dr. Kissinger said that he would ask Mr. Sisco to ring us back on the question of the hostages. He did so some half hour later to confirm that there had been no headway. The Israelis seemed to be waiting to see how the Jordanian situation came out. He said that they were considering what could be done on our initiative in the Berne group. Sir Denis Greenhill said that we also had been looking at

CONFIDENTIAL

/that

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

that and that they would be receiving some fresh ideas from us. Mr. Sisco promised to study them.

(iii) I spoke to Sir Colin Crowe in New York. I told him of the report of the Syrian tank movements a limited distance across the border and of the firing. I asked him to take this up with U. Thant and to urge U. Thant to speak to the Syrians to have them withdraw. He should make it clear to U Thant that he should not associate us with his approach to the Syrians. Sir Colin Crowe confirmed that this would be possible since there was already sufficient information about the Syrian movement from public sources on which U Thant could base himself. Sir Colin Crowe when I spoke to him was at a dinner at which U Thant was also present, and he said that he would carry out the instructions straightaway.

(iv) A telegram was sent to Cairo (repeated to certain other posts) asking our Ambassador to speak to the U.A.R. Government to urge them to restrain the Syrians drawing attention to the dangers of an Israeli intervention.

M.

c.c. Sir Denis Greenhill

September 19, 1970

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

18 September, 1970

Prime Minister

Mr.

18/9

Dear Peter,

18/9

You spoke to me about King Hussein's complaint about the B.B.C. I attach a copy of a minute by Norman Reddaway on the action taken. To amplify paragraph 3, Sir Denis Greenhill spoke first in uncompromising terms to Mr. Whitley and Reddaway then followed up with the Head of the Arabic Service.

Yours ever

Richard

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Graham

BBC Arabic Service Reporting on Jordan

At 1000 BST on 18 September H.M. Ambassador in Amman reported by Telex a complaint by King Hussein about BBC Arabic Service reporting on events in Jordan.

2. The King asserted that the BBC Arabic Service was doing more damage than Kol Israel, mainly by quoting Fatah sources almost exclusively. The King regarded this as sabotage and a threat to good relations between the two countries. Unless this was put right he would have to consider action against the BBC on the lines taken by the Indian Government.

3. This message was communicated immediately to the BBC: both to the Head of the Arabic Service and to the Director of External Broadcasting, who is now also Acting Director-General (Mr Whitley).

4. At 11.30 Mr Whitley personally phoned to express concern and every wish to redress the balance in BBC reporting. The main reason for the imbalance, he said, was the extreme dearth of material from the Jordanian Government side and the flood from guerrilla sources in Beirut. He hoped that, as soon as communications and movement are restored in Amman, the BBC correspondent there could be given an interview by the Palace. He added that the main Arabic Service News on 17 September had given pride of place to government news from Amman and to Mr Challis's helpful reports from Beirut.

5. The BBC's response was passed to H.M. Ambassador in Amman in the course of a Telex message at 1330 BST.

6. We hope to improve the performance of the BBC Arabic Service by including in the FCO Emergency Unit the Middle East Area Officer in GIPD who will make special arrangements for Bush House to be kept entirely in the picture. The BBC are hopeful that their reporting of events in Jordan will improve when their three reporters - presently believed restricted to the Intercontinental Hotel - can move about.

7. I understand that the Prime Minister would like to be informed of the situation.

N. Reddaway

(G. F. N. Reddaway)
18 September 1970

Copied to:

Sir Philip Adams
Mr Tripp
Mr Hill
Mr Daunt

CONFIDENTIAL

*Dance &
motion
of Repr.)*

DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED ADDRESS(S)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified	Flash Immediate Priority Routine

(Date) _____
Despatched _____
IMMEDIATE

PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair.
Code
Cypher

[Security classification —if any] CONFIDENTIAL
[Privacy marking —if any]
[Codeword—if any]

Draft Telegram to:—
TEL AVIV
No. _____
(Date) _____
And to:—

Addressed to TEL AVIV
telegram No. _____ (date) _____
And to _____
repeated for information to AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, BERNE, PARIS
Saving to _____

Repeat to:—
AMMAN,
CAIRO,
BEIRUT,
UKMIS NEW YORK,
MOSCOW
BERNE
PARIS
Saving to:—

The Israel Foreign Minister ~~who is in London~~ ~~for a private visit~~, called on me this morning at my request.
2. Mr. Eban thought that King Hussain was now in a dominant position provided he had the political will to follow through his initial military success. There was no sign of Syrian or Iraqi action ~~apart~~ from verbal threats ~~words~~.
3. Mr. Eban ~~considered~~ ^{said} that the Berne group was considering the next move over the hi-jacked hostages too much in isolation from the situation on the ground. The key question in Jordan now was who had sovereignty: any further negotiations about the hostages must take this into account. One possibility was that the hostages could be handed over to King Hussein; this action might provide one of the conditions for a ceasefire.

Distribution:—
NED
EMERGENCY UNIT
FCO WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Copies to:—

CONFIDENTIAL

4/.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Mr. Egan
18/9
to E
to D

4. Mr. Eban went on to say that he was glad of a chance to clear the air with us over the whole question of the negotiations. Even if only the seven fedayeen held in Europe were released, Israelis believed they would be paying a "total price": all these people were known murderers of Israelis. Thus Israeli public opinion found it most unreasonable when the British press had suggested that Israel should also contribute ^{further} ~~her share~~ to secure the release of the hostages. In particular, the Israelis were not prepared to ^{quite agree in principle} sign any blank cheque for the PFLP. ^{in the matter it was that there were any} ~~The only principle which should be followed was that~~ there should be no surrender to blackmail. Considerable nerve and patience was needed in dealing with such situations - and the Israelis had had some experience.

5. I agreed that the PFLP actions were reprehensible blackmail. However, we also had a difficulty over public opinion: for we could easily secure the release of the British hostages, ^{by releasing Miss Khalid and the body.} ~~at the expense of a~~ ~~single gesture~~. Although we had from the outset taken the line that we must be concerned to secure the release of all the hostages ^{regardless of nationality} [this was not an easy line to maintain in the face of domestic pressure to secure the release of the British nationals. ^{It was this reason that we were pressing the Israeli Govt to make a move.} Mr. Eban agreed with me that the most urgent thing now was to make contact with King Hussein. ^{It was this reason that we were pressing the Israeli Govt to make a move.} The International Red Cross should not at this stage become involved in further negotiations; the mandate of M. Boissier ^{when} ~~if~~ he

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managed to get ~~through~~ to Amman ~~at all~~) should be limited at present to approaches on humanitarian grounds, especially in view of the latest report that the King's forces were attacking Wahdat camp where the hostages were being held, with the aim of securing their release. ~~However~~, There was nothing we could do until we knew whether this operation had succeeded.

6. Mr. Eban confirmed that none of the hostages were straight-forward Israeli nationals. Of the 35 Americans, 5 were rabbis, ^{and} of these, 2 were dual nationals; but ~~all~~ ^{both} in fact lived in the United States and were travelling on US passports.

7. I told Mr. Eban that King Hussein had earlier today informed HM Ambassador in Amman that Israeli forces had opened fire over the ceasefire line in the North of the Jordan Valley. The King had said he would be dealing with that area after the fedayeen resistance in Amman had been dealt with; the Israeli action was not helpful. The Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Comay, remarked that the King no doubt was able to convey this information direct to the Israel Government if he thought the situation was serious.

Turning to the Middle East dispute generally
6. ~~/ On Soviet/Egyptian violations of the~~
~~ceasefire~~, I said that since the Russians clearly knew that the Americans were aware that they had cheated over the terms of the ceasefire, I was surprised that the US

/Government

Government had not published the evidence in greater detail. World public opinion was not yet aware of the extent of the Russian deception. Mr. Eban replied that he thought the American mishandling of the ceasefire violations in the first ten days of the ceasefire had been due ~~to~~ ^{to the} ~~injured pride~~. Since then, however, US evaluations had been ~~largely~~ ^{or even more learning} similar to the Israeli ones, ^L Israel would be taking the matter up with the Americans in New York tomorrow, and would suggest that since this was a matter of such international ~~interest~~ ^{concern} the Americans should publish more information.

ll
18 9.

fact that in
the pride of
authorship of
the ceasefire
they could not
believe that
Dobrynin's
solemn
assurances
had been
swift
aside.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

S E C R E T

Telgram from Tel Aviv

IDF say fighting in Amman is still confused but Army already hold large areas of city and are steadily getting on top. Intermittent fire continues.

Army have sent strong forces of two brigades with artillery support and 100 plus tanks to Irbid. Town remains in Fedayeen hands but is surrounded by Jordan Army. IDF assume attack will be put in shortly.

There is a report that "an Iraqi force" has contacted a senior personality in the Jordanian Government and assured him that Iraqi forces will evacuate Jordan, same source is also said to have told Jordanians that Iraq will support Jordan against Syria if there is any intervention by latter. IDF now have evidence that fighting equipment is also being moved back to Iraq particularly from the No. 1 Division of the Iraqi forces in Jordan. There is no cooperation whatsoever between the Iraqi and Syrian forces in Jordan.

The situation in Ramta is that town remains in Fedayeen hands. Apparently Jordan Army with one battalion of infantry and two companies of tanks attacked yesterday afternoon and Fedayeen appealed to Syrians for help. Artillery support was given to Fedayeen from behind Syrian border and some tanks number unspecified crossed border and penetrated 2 kms inside Jordan. Telramta police station was taken over by Syrian forces. The Jordan Army attack was thrown back but there are indications that a counter attack is being mounted shortly. The IDF believe the Syrian tanks have withdrawn across their own border.

In Mafraq the Fedayenn are in control. There are no Jordan Army units in vicinity but main force of Iraqi troops are concentrated.

In Salt the Army continues to take over town. There has been serious fighting in area mainly because Fedayeen supply dumps are located there. At midnight September 18 the clearance of the town had not been completed.

The IDF say there is now no contract between the two sides. Therefore in their view no compromise is likely. Arab states, particularly Egypt, have been seeking to stop fighting but all attempts have failed. The continued presence of the Egyptian Chief of Staff, Sadeq, is evidence that attempts to mediate continue.

Fedayeen reinforcements mainly from the SAIQA Group are coming in from both Syrian and Lebanon. Casualties are said to be not as heavy as indicated by the intensity of fire. The IDF could not comment on figure of 5,000 published in El Ahram. The IDF had information which confirmed the Fedayeen claim that Commanders of the Jordanian Second Division and 12th Infantry Brigade had been captured. They have also confirmed that the Army are capturing substantial numbers of Fedayeen. Both sides are beginning to husband their ammunition since the earlier profligate and indiscriminate use of weapons. Any shortages are bound to hurt the Fedayeen more than the Army.

The IDF say that the fear of foreign intervention particularly the US precautionary move and the possible threat of Israeli action has ~~scared~~ scared both the Syrians and Iraqis. They emphasise that they have avoided any threat of Israeli intervention "we have kept very quiet".

The IDF are expressing cautious belief that the Army is gradually getting on top and securing the country.

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.



(Eben seems to know I am writing)
19/9.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister

M.

P.A.

M.

20/9

18/9

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

S.W.1

R/ 18 September, 1970

MR. ARMSTRONG FROM PETER MOON

AS 19/4

The following has occurred in the course of the morning:-

- (1) New York has reported that U Thant has agreed to speak to Syrians. The Syrian Permanent Representative is apparently ill and U Thant was going to get hold of whoever he could as quickly as possible. We have not heard what he has said and of course he may be very cagey about doing so.
- (2) Ambassador, Cairo has reported that he hopes to speak to the Egyptians this morning. He advises against his making any reference to the risk of Syrian intervention provoking an Israeli reaction.
- (3) It is hoped that the Berne Group will meet this afternoon. It did not meet this morning so as to allow time for the Americans to get instructions on our new formula (this was the formula agreed by the Prime Minister last night). The Germans have already agreed the new formula and we anticipate no difficulties with the Swiss. The F.C.O. have asked the Embassy this morning to put further pressure on the Americans.
- (4) The situation in Amman. An exchange with Amman is at the moment going on and a separate message will follow.

13.30 p.m.

The following has emerged from the talk with Amman:-

- (1) The Embassy have had contact with the Palace (though this does not appear to have been at the level of the King). The Palace say that the general situation is good from the Government view point. They claim Wahdat and Hussein Camp are subdued. They speak again of having everything cleared up by night fall but of course this has been said before.

(2) On the hostages, the hunt is proceeding but still no news. The Palace do not believe that they are at Masrat.

(3) The Palace deny The Times' story of Syrian tanks advancing a substantial distance and Jordan forces withdrawing. The Embassy report our diplomatic effort in this connection has been greatly appreciated by the Palace.

(4) It is hoped that the First Secretary will see the King this afternoon. The Ambassador will see the King himself as soon as this can possibly be arranged.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BERNE

Following is translation of message received at 0930Z this morning by ICRC Geneva from their delegation at Beirut.

Brosier and Broisard have had talks this morning at Beirut with PFLP leaders. Talks dealt with liberation of hostages.

PFLP leaders understand that US Government may have accepted PFLP conditions for freeing hostages. They want to receive official confirmation of this acceptance.

If this is confirmed PFLP will disclose the total number of Palestinian detainees in Israeli hands whom they wished to be freed.

If US Government agrees to this total, PFLP will reveal list of names of detainees concerned.

If US accepts the list and the PFLP's other conditions as well all the hostages will be freed.

PFLP leaders have assured our delegates that all the hostages are at present safe.


We remind you that PFLP conditions for freeing of the hostages are:-

(1) liberation of 7 Palestinians held in Europe and return to Amman of the dead commando.

(2) official statement of Israeli Government agreeing in principle to free the 2 Algerians arrested at Tel Aviv Airport 1 Swiss and 10 Lebanese prisoners of war.

(3) liberation of a certain number of Palestinians detained by the Israelis.

FROM TEL AVIV



IDF report Jordan Army appear to be gaining control of Amman. It is likely that they will be in full control of the city shortly. King is reported as being very concerned over the fate of the hostages. He is letting it be known by all available means that he holds Arafat responsible for their safety. In Irbid there is no change, no attack has yet been made by the Jordan Army who continue to surround city with tanks. There have been some moves of Iraqi units in Masfraw area. One brigade have moved west of town to high ground. IDF regard this as change in defensive disposition to place Iraqi forces in better position to guard against any possible IDF attack. Alternatively, it would place them in better position should there be any Syrian intervention requiring action by the Iraqi forces. IDF emphasise all their information indicates Iraqis have no intention of intervening militarily themselves.

TEXT OF STATEMENT RELEASED FOR BROADCAST BY THE FIVE MEMBERS
OF THE BERNE GROUP

AK 1/9

The Five Governments hold responsible for the safety of the hostages all those in whose hands they may be. The Governments call upon those holding the hostages to provide information on their whereabouts and well-being. They require that the hostages should be brought to a safe place which, in the view of the Governments is a prerequisite for an orderly transfer. The Governments stand ready to consider at any time proposals for the release of all the hostages. They also re-affirm their mandate to the ICRC.

TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED
BY TELEX FROM H.M. AMBASSADOR, AMMAN.

AK 19/7

King Hussein asked me to send a message to Mr. Heath to say how grateful he was for Britain's evident moral support at this time of crisis. He had searched his heart in order to be quite sure whether there was not some alternative to the dreadful operation on which he had embarked and which he thought would very soon be over. He had considered seriously abdicating to prevent bloodshed but had decided that this would solve nothing and that he would be deserting his post - a post which demanded that he restored the security of a vital part of the Middle East. Had he deserted he would be letting down his allies. He hoped that Mr. Heath would understand his predicament. His message did not require a personal answer.



PRIME MINISTER

Handwritten signature/initials

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has approved an announcement on aid to Jordan which is being put out tonight. He has also approved a reply to the King's message which Mr. Armstrong has agreed should go out under your name. Copies of this will be coming up from London for first thing tomorrow morning.

PD SM.

Private Secretary

I attach a transcript of F.C.O. telex conference
with Amman at 08.15 today, 19 September.

(C.D. Powell)
19 September 1970

Copies to:

Mr. Renwick
Mr. Daunt
Mr. Bottomley
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Tripp
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison
P.S. No.10

TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN

AMMAN

0815 BST 19 SEPTEMBER

A QUICK SITREP

MY FIRST SEC. HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RAISE THE PALACE LAST NIGHT OR SO FAR THIS MORNING BUT WE ARE TRYING THEM EVERY ~~ONE~~ HOUR ON THE HOUR, NO MORE ON HOSTAGES IM AFRAID FIGHTING CONTINUES PARTICULARLY AT THE TOP END OF JEBEL HUSSEIN AND THE EDGE OF THE TOWN IN THE DIRECTION OF THE WAHDAT CAMP. SOME AREAS WHICH HAD GONE QUIET YESTERDAY SEEM TO HAVE COME TO LIFE THIS MORNING. THE SITUATION IS THEREFORE SOMEWHAT CONFUSED BUT I HOPE WE SHALL HAVE A CONTACT WITH THE PALACE BEFORE LONG TO CLARIFY IT.

LONDON

THE TIMES THIS MNG HAS A STORY THAT QUOTE SOVIET BUILT TANKS OF THE PLA RPT PLA UNQUOTE HAVE ADVANCED TO THREE MILES BEYOND RAMTHA AND THAT THE JORDANIAN FORCE HAS PULLED BACK TO NEAR IRBID. GLAD OF ANY CONFIRMATION YOU MAY OBTAIN OF THIS. NEXT REGARDING THE REPORT THAT THE HOSTAGES MAY HAVE BEEN MOVED TO MAFRAQ, DO WE OR THE JORDANIANS HAVE ANYONE THERE WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO COMMENT.

WE HAVE TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ACTION OVERNIGHT IN RESPONSE TO THE KING'S SUGGESTION OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO MEET THE SITN IN WHICH SYRIAN TANKS CROSSED THE BORDER FIRST. A TELEGRAM HAS BEEN SENT TO CAIRO AND BAGHDAD ASKING FOR ~~RESP~~ REPRESENTATIONS TO BE MADE ~~TO THE EGYPTIAN E-EE-EE~~ TO THE EGYPTIANS AND IRAQIS UNLESS THE AMBASSADORS FELT THAT SUCH A MOVE MIGHT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. SECONDLY, THE PERM UNDER SEC ~~SEC~~ SPOKE TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND INFORMED HIM OF THE SYRIAN MOVE AND ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO REPORT THE FACTS TO HIS GOVT AND SUGGEST THAT THEY SHOULD SPEAK TO THE SYRIANS. THIRDLY, UKMIS NY ~~WHOWARE~~ ARE ASKED TO REPORT THE EVENTS TO U THANT AND ASK HIM TO SPEAK TO THE SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVE ~~WHOWARE~~ WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE SOURCES OF THIS INFO. U THANT SHOULD LINK THIS TO THE REPRESENTATIONS ~~WHOWARE~~ WHICH THE ARAB GOVTS HAD MADE TO HIM DURING THE AFTERNOON. SIR COLIN CROWE HAS SINCE SPOKEN TO U THANT.

YOU MAY WISH TO TELL THE KING WHAT WE HAVE DONE.

AMMAN

I WILL MENTION THE TIMES STORY ABOUT PLA TANKS TO THE PALACE WHEN WE GET THROUGH. LIKEWISE THE EFFORTS MADE IN DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR THE KING'S APPEAL. THE JORDANIANS PROBABLY HAVE ~~SOME~~ SOMEBODY AT MAFRAQ WE HAVE NO FURTHER PROGRESS ON THIS, JUST AWAIT CONTACT WITH THE PALACE.

PAGE 2

LONDON ~~RE~~. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OR WILL BE SEEING COPENHAGEN TELNO 351 RPT 351 ABT A MISSING DANISH RADIO TEAM. WE HAVE NOW HAD A MSG DIRECT FROM THE SWEDISH RPT SWEDISH BCASTING CORP. THEY ARE WORRIED ABT TWO MEN - A REPORTER MAGNUS FAXEN RPT FAXEN AND A PHOTOGRAPHER OLLE OEHLLSSON WITH WHOM THEY HAVE LOST TOUCH SINCE THE BATTLE BEGAN. THEY WERE STAYING AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL. ~~OESER~~ ~~EEE~~ EOLHLLSSON HAS BEEN WOUNDED. GLAD IF YOU REPORT ANY NEWS ABT THEM WHICH COMES YOUR WAY.

AMMAN AS REGARDS THE MESSAGES ABOUT DANES AND SWEDES WE WILL CERTAINLY REPORT ANYTHING AS SOON AS IT COMES OUR WAY. AS I THINK YOU KNOW I ASKED THE PALACE YESTERDAY TO LET ME HAVE AN ARMoured CAR FOR

- A. VISITING COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY MY OWN STAFF WHO MAY BE WITHIN REACH.
- B. GETTING MESSAGES TO AND FROM JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS
- C. GETTING ANOTHER MEMBER OF MY STAFF IN TO THE EMBASSY TO HELP

LONDON I SHOULD HAVE BEGUN BY SAYING THAT WE ALL HOPE YOU HAVE SPENT NOT TOO BAD A NIGHT.

I TAKE IT THAT YOU HAVE SPENT THE NIGHT COOPED UP IN THE EMBY AND THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE SINCE YDAY RECRADING MOVEMENT FROM THE EMBASSY NOR IN YOUR LOCAL COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS, THAT IS TO SAY BETWEEN THE EMBY BUILDING, YOUR FIRST SEC AND THE PALACE. I ALSO ASSUME THAT LOCAL PHONES ARE OUT OF ~~ACTIVETE~~ ACTION.

AMMAN ALL ABOVE ASSUMPTIONS ARE CORRECT I MYSELF PASSED A PEACEFUL NIGHT AMONG THE MORE IMPORTANT FILES IN THE STRONG ROOM. I WILL LET YOU KNOW WHEN I HAVE MORE TO REPORT. WE HOPE TO RAISE THE PALACE EITHER AT 0800 OR 0900Z. NO MORE FOR NOW.

Private Secretary

I attach a transcript of F.C.O. telex conference
with Amman at 12.00 B.S.T. today, 19 September.

(C.D. Powell)
19 September 1970

Copies to:

Mr. Renwick
Mr. Daunt
Mr. Bottomley
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Tripp
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison
P.S. No.10

TEXT OF TELEX CONFERENCE
W/ ANMAN at 1200 BST on 19 September.

ANMAN

GOOD MORNING PETER.

~~W/~~
~~W/~~ WE HAVE AT LAST RE ESTABLISHED A CONTACT WITH THE PALACE AND
BILL PINK WHO VOLUNTEERED FOR THE JOB MANAGED TO REACH THE
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL WITH A MESSAGE FROM ME TO MICHAEL ADAMS
HEY ARE PREPARING A LIST OF ALL THOSE FOREIGNERS AT THE HOTEL
WITH ADDRESSES SO THAT WE CAN REASSURE THEIR RELATIVES
WE ALL ALREADY HAVE A NUMBER OF NAMES BUT THERE MAY BE SOME
DELAY IN GETTING

HAVING THE REST SINCE P. BILL PINK HAS HAD TO COME BACK
MICHAEL ADAMS REPORTS ALL FOREIGNERS WELL APART FROM ONE SWEDISH
YOUNG MAN WHO WAS REMOVED TO HOSPITAL ON FRIDAY WITH A MINOR *Bullet wound*.
THE DANISH TEAM WHOSE NAMES WERE LISTED IN TELEGRAMS ARE AT THE
HOTEL AND WELL. WE WILL SEND LISTS OF NAMES AND ADDRESSES
AFTER THE CONFERENCE.

AS RESULT OF CONTACT WITH THE PALACE I HAVE THE FOLLOWING TO
REPORT.

GENERAL SITUATION GOOD FROM GOVT. POINT OF VIEW. MDSB
THE WAHDAT AND HUSSEIN HU CAMPS HAVE BEEN SUBDUED AND THEY HOPE
TO HAVE EVERYTHING CLEARED UP BY SUNSET
THE HUNT FOR HOSTAGES PROCEEDS HOUSE BY HOUSE THE PALACE
DO NOT BELIEVE MA'RAQ STORY.
THERE IS STILL A LITTLE OPPOSITION COMING FROM JEBEL LUWEIBDY
THERE IS NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER (ACCORDING TO THE PALACE) IN THE
TIMES STORY THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE MOVED AND THE JORDANIANS
FACING THEM WITHDRAWN. OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS CONCERNING
THE SYRIAN TANKS ARE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED BY THE PALACE.

The Palace are confident that

TURKISH AMBASSADOR IS UNHARMED THEY ARE SURE THEY WOULD HAVE
HEARD IF ANYTHING HAD HAPPENED TO HIM BUT I HAVE AGAIN ASKED
~~FOR MORE POSITIVE CONFIRMATION.~~

~~FOR MORE POSITIVE CONFIRMATION.~~ 34

'CAID RIFAI' IS COMING THIS AFTERNOON TO ESCORT MY FIRST SEC.
TO SEE THE KING FOR A DISCUSSION ABOUT IN PARTICULAR HOW TO
IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR THE FOREIGN AND ESPECIALLY
THE BRITISH COMMUNITY AND FOR A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF TSLN IT 7/3? (21)

DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION.

PLEASE INFORM BOAC THAT THEIR CHAPS AT THE HOTEL ARE ALRIGHT.

MICHAEL ADAMS WOULD LIKE A WORD SENT TO HIS WIFE TO SAY THAT HIS
EXPERIENCE AS POW IS COMING IN USEFUL

LONDON

I HOPE THIS IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN EARLY VISIT BY YOU TO THE KING

I THINK MINISTERS WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT YOU HAD TAKEN
FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO THE KING YOURSELF
IF YOU FEEL THIS IS WISE IN THE LIGHT OF THE LOCAL SITUATION

AMMAN

THE KING HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED TO SEE FIRST SEC. AND I SHALL OF
COURSE SEIZE THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY OF DOING SO

CSLHZSONHQ WORSE

I AM NOT SURE THAT I UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF YOUR QUESTION

I HAVE OF COURSE BEEN TRYING TO GET AT THE KING THROUGHOUT THIS
CRISIS BUT HAVE BEEN DEPENDANT ON HIS RESPONDING TO OUR RADIO CON-
TACTS MOSTLY THROUGH ZAID RIFAI. NOW HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE
PALACE AT ALL SINCE EARLY YESTERDAY EVENING FIRST SEC. HAS RECEIVED
A MESSAGE FROM ZIA ZAID RIFAI THAT HE WILL BE ESCORTED BY ZAID
TO THE PALACE THIS AFTERNOON. FIRST SEC. KNOWS THAT I SHOULD PRE-
FER TO SEE THE KING MYSELF BUT IT IS CLEARLY BETTER TO GET HIM
THERE THAN NOBODY. THE FIRST SEC'S HOUSE IS EASIER TO REACH
FROM THE SAFE AREA TOWARDS HOMMARBUT I HAVE EVERY HOPE THAT
WITH THE SITUATION QUIETING AS IT IS I SHALL BE ABLE TO GET UP

LONDON

THERE MYSELF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

First Sec. WILL NO DOUBT SAY TO THE KING ON YOUR BEHALF THAT HE KNOWS HMG
HOPES THAT THE KING WILL BE ABLE TO SEE YOU VERY SOON.

2. PLEASE ASK 1ST SEC TO TELL THE KING THAT WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST
WITH THE B B C, THAT THE BBC ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO IMPROVE
AND THAT THEY HAVE IN FACT IMPROVED.

BUT THEY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO WORK WITHOUT HAVING MATERIAL TO QUOTE

AND THEY WOULD LIKE MUCH MORE INFORMATION THRU AMMAN RADIO

PD THEY SAY THAT THEY HAVE ONLY HAD ONE BROADCAST FROM AMMAN RADIO
SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN. AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT THEY ARE UP AGAINST
THEY TAPES ARE NOW REPORTING THE DEFECTION TO THE DEESE FEDAYEEN
OF THE KING HUSSEIN BRIGADE. ASSUMING THAT THIS IS NOT TRUE
IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE KING COULD ISSUE A DENIAL.

3. CIA XXX CAIRO RADIO BROADCAST EARLIER THIS MING AN APPEAL
BY PRESIDENT NASSER TO THE KING FOR A CEASE-FIRE QUOTE AT THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT UNQUOTE AND THAT ERAS
QUOTE XXXXXX UNQUOTE AND SAID THAT THE KING HAD AGREED TO THIS
PD THE EGYPTIAN APPEAL CONTAINED A GOOD DEAL OF STUFF SUPPORTING
THE PALESTINIANS AND SAID THAT THEYEEEE THAT THE UAR WOULD DETERMINE
ITS ATTITUDE IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESPONSE RECEIVED TO THE
QUOTE DISINTERESTED EFFORT UNQUOTE WHICH IT IS NOW UNDERTAKING PD
GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS

4. THANKYOU FOR THE INFORMATION ABOUT OHLSSON P

PD SWEDISH EMBY HAVE ASKED WHETHER THIS COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCL-
UDE NEWS OF ANY OTHER SWEDISH SWEDS. XXX SWEDS THAT MIGHT BE
IN JORDAN.

5. SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM THE SWISS.

WE HOPE THAT WHEN YOU GET THE LIST FROM THE INTERCONT HOTEL WE
MAY HEAR SOMETHING OF DUBOIS PD

SWISS ALSO GRATEFUL FOR ANY NEWS OF OTHER SWISS, EVEN IN THE FORM
OF A NEGATIVE REPORT SAYING THAT WE HAVE NO NEWS OF ANY INCIDENTS.
ASSUME WE MAY TELL THEM THIS.

6. DO YOU X X X X DO YOU BELIEVE THE PALACE'S OPXXXX CLAIM
WHICH WE HAVE NOW HEARD FOR THREE DAYS RUNNING THAT EVERYTHING
WILL BE UNDER CONTROL BY SUNSET. AS SEEN FROM HERE (AN WE CANT
SEE VERY CLEARLY) THIS MAY BE RATHER OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SO FAR
AS EVENTS IN THE NORTH ARE CONCERNED. NO DOUBT FIRST SEC WILL BE
ABLE TO PROBE ON THIS POINT WHEN HE GOES TO THE
PALACE.

AND 2.. HE KING ALREADYXXXXXX HAS ALREADY BEEN INFORMED
OF BOTH THESE POINTS AND 1ST SEC. IS BRIEFED TO MAKE THEM AGAIN
THIS AFTERNOON AS REGARDS DEFECTION OF A BRIGADE TO THE FEDAYEEN
THIS IS UNTRUE THERE WAS TROUBLE WITH ONE BRIGADIER MOUHISIN
UT IT HAS BEEN SORTED OUT KOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I AM ENTIRELY
DEPENDANT ON THE PALACE FOR THE TRUTH OR OTHERWISE OF THIS STATEMENT)

3.. ABBIS MAJALI ORDERED HIS TROOPS TO STOP FIRING YESTERDAY
EVENING BUT AGAIN ACCORDING TO THE PALACE THEY WERE FORECED TO
RE OPEN FIRE BECAUSE THE FEDAYEEN CONTINUED FIREING THEMSELVES

4.. AND 5.. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF TAPING A COMPLETE LIST
OF OREIGNERS AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL WE FIND THAT AFTER
ALL BILL PINKEMERGED WITH THIS ALTHOUGH MICHAEL ADAMS COVERING
NOTEMENTIONED THAT HE LIST WAS COXXXXX WAS NOT COMPLETE

WE HAVE A NOTE FROM DUBOISAS FOLLOWS:-

O FEDERAL POLITICAL DEPT. BERNE.

TWO SWISS JOURNALISTSPILET AND ARTEL OF SWISSAIR

MARTELPLUS VONCRAYN OF SWISSAIRAND YSELF ARE WELLBUT NO
NEWS ABOUT IRCC DELEGATION SIGNED DUBOIS

COMM SHALL OF COURSE KNOW MORE IF AND WENFIRST SEC. TRIP TO

HOMMAR COMES OFFM UT TO JUDGE BY THE IEW FROM THIS EMBASSY
(POSSIBLY EVEN MORE FOGGY THAN YOURS THINGS ARE VERY MUCH
QUIETERIN THE TOWN NOW THAN THEY HAVE BEEN SINCE THE BEGINNING
OF THE CRISIS

PLEASE FORGIVE SOME INCOHERANCEBUT A SOLDIER OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY
WAS HIT BY A SNIPERJUST BEFORE THIS CONFERENCE C STARTEDSINCE
WHENA FIELD GUN AND A TANK HAVE BLASTED THE BUILDING TO BITS
JUST ACROSS THE ERD CIRCLE NEXT TO THE U.N. HEADQUARTERS(D.P.)
WHICH IS ITSELF HAS ALSO HAD A GOING OVERM THIS MAY EXPLAIN SOMT
SOMETHING OF ZAID RIFAI'S PREFERENCE FOR FETCHING FIRST SEC.
HE NOISE HAS BEEN VERY CONSIDERABLE N INDEED.

PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT I SHALL ET AT THE KING JUST AS SOON AS I CAN

London

MANY THANKS FOR THIS

4

I AM SURE YOU WILL SEE THE KING JUST AS SOON AS YOU CAN
WE WERE NOT SEEKING TO GET YOU TO DO SOMETHING AGAINST YOUR BETTER
JUDGEMENT.

I WAS MERELY ANTICIPATING LEGITIMATE MINISTERIAL ENQUIRIES.

FROM YOUR REPORT THINGS BEING QUIETER MUST BE A COMPARATIVE TERM
IF YOU ARE

OPERATING AGAINST THE BQC XXX BACKGROUND OF A FIELD GUN
AND TANK DEALING WITH A SNIPER.

IT IS THESE SORT OF FACTUAL REPORTS WHICH NATURALLY TEND
TO CAUSE US TO DOUBT THE KING'S ASSURANCES THAT THINGS ARE GOING
BETTER. BUT WE ARE NOT (FORTUNATELY) ON THE SPOT AND ONLY YOU CAN
GIVE US A BALANCED PICTURE.

WHEN WOULD YOU LIKE THE NEXT TELE CONF ???

Adman

PNDTT NOISY ELIMINATION OF ONE SNIPER DOES NOT OF COURSE CONFLICT
WITH MY STATEMENT THAT THE J GER GENERAL BATTLE HAS DIED AWAY
THERE WILL PROBABLY BE MANY MORE SMALL INCIDENTS OF THIS KIND. LL BEING WELL I THINK OUR NEXT TELECONF.
HOULD TAKE PLACE T QYPPZ BY WHICH TIME I HOPE I'LL BE SEC.
WILL HAVE RETURNED FOR HOMMAR XXXXX FROM HOMMAR.
MEANWHILE WE SHOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TAPING THE NAMES OF PERSONS
AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL WHOM WE KNOW TO BE ALRIGHT
THEY INCLUDE NUMEROUS NATIONALITIES AND I HOPE YOU WILL
CAN PASS THEM ON. OTHERWISE NO MORE FOR NOW.

PRESS RELEASE

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED FROM 10 DOWNING STREET
ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1970

This evening the British Government were assured through H.M. Ambassador at Amman that the Jordan Government were continuing to do everything possible to secure the safety of the hostages.

The British Government also received an appeal from the Government of Jordan for urgent medical help for the victims of the fighting in Amman. We understand that similar appeals have been addressed to other Governments.

The British Government are informing the Government of Jordan that they are ready to respond to this appeal as rapidly as possible. We have already been in urgent contact with the International Committee of the Red Cross about the best way of co-ordinating help.

Medical ~~supplies~~ and other relief supplies are being made ready in this country and will be provided as soon as an international relief operation can start. We are mobilising further help as a matter of urgency.

Text dictated to Balmoor 11/15/75

(33)

ADVANCE COPIES

JORDAN

P.S.

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

P.S. TO MR. ROYLE

P.U.S.

SIR P. ADAMS

.....

MR. GALLAGHER

HD. N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF Rm. W 117 (4)

HD. A. & T. D.

HD. ARABIAN DEPT.

HD. N.A. DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT. (2)

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.

PERSONNEL OPS. (Welfare Section)

SECURITY DEPT.

U.N. DEPT.

HD. COMMNS. DEPT.

P.S. NO.10 DOWNING STREET

P.S. TO HOME SECRETARY

P.S. TO S/S for Defence

CABINET OFFICE; SIR B. TREND
SIR R. HOOPER
MR. O'LEARY
DIO

DIS MOD

DOC MOD

RESIDENT CLERK

John H

SECRET

CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MOD DIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 191000Z

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET (DTG 191000Z)

ADDRESSED TO MOD UK DI 4 RPTD FOR INFO TO DA AMMAN
JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 191000Z SEP FROM BRITMILAT.
REF MY 181930Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 190900Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF SAY FIGHTING IN AMMAN IS STILL CONFUSED BUT ARMY
ALREADY HOLD LARGE AREAS OF CITY AND ARE STEADILY GETTING
ON TOP. INTERMITTENT FIRING CONTINUES.

TWO. ARMY HAS SENT STRONG FORCE OF TWO BRIGADES WITH

ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND 100 PLUS TANKS TO IRBID. TOWN REMAINS IN FEDAYEEN HANDS BUT IS SURROUNDED BY JORDAN ARMY. IDF ESTIMATE ATTACK WILL BE PUT IN SHORTLY.

THREE. THERE IS A REPORT THAT "AN IRAQI SOURCE" HAS CONTACTED A SENIOR PERSONALITY IN THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND ASSURED HIM THAT IRAQI FORCES WILL EVACUATE JORDAN, SAME SOURCE IS ALSO SAID TO HAVE TOLD JORDANIANS THAT IRAQ WILL SUPPORT JORDAN AGAINST SYRIA IF THERE IS ANY INTERVENTION BY LATTER. IDF NOW HAVE EVIDENCE THAT FIGHTING EQUIPMENT IS ALSO BEING MOVED BACK TO IRAQ PARTICULARLY FROM THE NUMBER ONE DIVISION OF THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN. THERE IS NO CO- OPERATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN THE IRAQI AND SYRIAN FORCES IN JORDAN.

FOUR. THE SITUATION IN RAMTA IS THAT TOWN REMAINS IN FEDAYEEN HANDS. APPARENTLY JORDAN ARMY WITH ONE BATTALION OF INFANTRY AND TWO COMPANIES OF TANKS ATTACKED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND FEDAYEEN APPEALED TO SYRIANS FOR HELP. ARTILLERY SUPPORT WAS GIVEN TO FEDAYEEN FROM BEHIND SYRIAN BORDER AND SOME TANKS, NUMBER UNSPECIFIED, CROSSED BORDER AND PENETRATED 2KM INSIDE JORDAN. TEL RAMTA POLICE STATION WAS TAKEN OVER BY SYRIAN FORCE. THE JORDAN ARMY ATTACK WAS THROWN BACK BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT A COUNTER-ATTACK IS BEING MOUNTED SHORTLY. THE IDF BELIEVE THE SYRIAN TANKS HAVE WITHDRAWN ACROSS THEIR OWN BORDER.

FIVE. IN MAFRAQ THE FEDAYEEN ARE IN CONTROL. THERE ARE NO JORDAN ARMY UNITS IN VICINITY BUT MAIN FORCE OF IRAQI TROOPS ARE CONCENTRATED THERE.

SIX. IN SALT THE ARMY CONTINUES TO TAKE OVER TOWN. THERE HAS BEEN SERIOUS FIGHTING IN AREA MAINLY BECAUSE FEDAYEEN SUPPLY DUMPS ARE LOCATED THERE. AT MIDNIGHT 18 SEPT THE CLEARANCE OF THE TOWN HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED.

SEVEN. THE IDF SAY THERE IS NOW NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THEREFORE IN THEIR VIEW NO COMPROMISE IS LIKELY. ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY EGYPT, HAVE BEEN SEEKING TO STOP FIGHTING BUT ALL ATTEMPTS HAVE FAILED. THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN CHIEF OF STAFF, SADEQ IS EVIDENCE THAT ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE CONTINUE.

EIGHT. FEDAYEEN REINFORCEMENTS MAINLY FROM THE SAIOA GROUP ARE COMING IN FROM BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON. CASUALTIES ARE SAID TO BE NOT AS HEAVY AS INDICATED BY THE INTENSITY OF FIRE. THE IDF COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE FIGURE OF 5000 CASUALTIES PUBLISHED IN EL AHRAH. THE IDF HAD INFORMATION WHICH CONFIRMED THE FEDAYEEN CLAIM THAT COMMANDERS OF THE JORDANIAN 2ND DIVISION AND 12 TH INFANTRY BRIGADE HAD BEEN CAPTURED. THEY ALSO CONFIRM THE ARMY ARE CAPTURING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF FEDAYEEN. BOTH SIDES ARE BEGINNING TO HUSBAND THEIR AMMUNITION SINCE THE EARLIER PROFLIGATE AND INDISCRIMINATE USE OF WEAPONS. ANY SHORTAGES ARE BOUND TO HURT THE FEDAYEEN MORE THAN THE ARMY.

NINE. THE IDF SAY THAT THE FEAR OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION PARTICULARLY THE U.S. PRECAUTIONARY MOVES AND THE POSSIBLE THREAT OF ISRAELI ACTION HAS SCARED BOTH THE SYRIANS AND IRAQ. THEY EMPHASISE THAT THEY HAVE AVOIDED ANY THREAT OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION " WE HAVE KEPT VERY QUIET".

TEN. IDF ARE EXPRESSING CAUTIOUS BELIEF THAT ARMY IS GRADUALLY GETTING ON TOP AND SECURING THE COUNTRY.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN
DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD DI 4 AND JIS NE.

BARNES.

SECRET

ADVANCE COPIES

HI-JACKING

(33)

6

P.S.

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

P.S. TO LORD LOTHIAN

P.S. to the Royal

MR. BOTTOMLEY

MR. GALLAGHER

SIR P. ADAMS

MR. STANLEY

.....

.....

HD. A. & T.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF Rm. W 117 (4)

HD. N.E.D.

HD. CONS. DPT.

HD. NEWS DPT.

HD. UN DPT.

HD. COMMS. DPT.

.....

.....

P.S. NO.10 DOWNING STREET

P.S. TO HOME SECRETARY

P.S. to Sec of State for Defence

CABINET OFFICE: SIR B. TREND
SIR R. HOOPER
MR. O'LEARY
DIO

DIS MOD.

DOC MOD.

RESIDENT CLERK

Text passed to Balmain

LOP 654/19

FLASH

FCO

GRS 204

VQWAF F A'

FLASH TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 191200Z

TO MOD UK DI 4

19 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO MOD UK DI 4 RPTD FOR INFO TO DA AMMAN,
JIS NE, WASHINGTON.

FOH 191200Z SEP.

REF MY FOH 191000Z SEP.

JORDAN INTERNAL FROM BRITMILAT.

1. IDF REPORT THAT JORDAN ARMY APPEAR TO BE GAINING
CONTROL OF AMMAN. IT IS LIKELY THEY WILL BE IN FULL CONTROL
OF CITY SHORTLY.

2. KING IS REPORTED AS BEING VERY CONCERNED OVER THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE IS LETTING IT BE KNOWN BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS THAT HE HOLDS ARAFAT RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR SAFETY.

3. IN IRBID THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SITUATION. NO ATTACK HAS YET BEEN MADE BY JORDAN ARMY WHO CONTINUE TO SURROUND CITY WITH TANKS.

4. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MOVES OF IRAQI UNITS IN MAFRAQ AREA. ONE BRIGADE (?) HAS MOVED WEST OF TOWN TO HIGH GROUND. IDF REGARD THIS AS CHANGE IN DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS TO PLACE IRAQI FORCES IN BETTER POSITION TO GUARD AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE IDF ATTACK. ALTERNATIVELY IT WOULD PLACE THEM IN BETTER POSITION SHOULD THERE BE ANY SYRIAN INTERVENTION REQUIRING ACTION BY THE IRAQI FORCES. IDF EMPHASISE THAT ALL THEIR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT IRAQIS HAVE NO INTENTION OF INTERVENING MILITARILY THEMSELVES.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON AND DEFCOMCEN

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD UK DI 4 AND JIS RE.

MR. BARNES.

NNNN

TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN
AT 1600Z on 19/ix
AMMAN

A VEHICLE FROM THE PALACE COLLECTED MY AND THE U.S. FIRST SEC ALSO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WHOSE EMBASSY AND RESIDENCE ARE IN A "SAFE AREA" AT 1440 LOCAL TIME. THE DRIVER REFUSED TO COME ANY NEARER TO US.

2. AT HOMMAR ZAID RIFAI' AN ARMY DOCTOR AND EVENTUALLY THE KING MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO SPEARES AND O'CONNELL (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS SEEN SEPARATELY).

A...THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT APPEALS MOST URGENTLY TO THE BRITISH AMERICAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO COPE WITH A CATASTROPHE COMPRABLE WITH THE AFTER AFFECTS OF AN EARTH QUAKE

B...ESTIMATED CASUALTIES WHICH EXISTING RESOURCES CANNOT DEAL WITH MAY BE AS MANY AS 5,000 EXCLUDING THE DEAD. ALL HOSPITALS ARE ALREADY CRAMBED AND WOUNDED ARE LYING IN THE STREETS.

C...THIS MEDICAL AID IS REQUIRED FOR CIVILIANS AND FEDAYEEN EVEN MORE THAN FOR JORDANIAN TROOPS.

D...IF POSSIBLE WHOLE FIELD HOSPITALS ARE REQUIRED. ONE WOULD BE SET UP NEAR THE AIRPORT, ONE NEAR AN EXISTING MILITARY HOSPITAL AND ONE AT JEBEL ASHRAFYA.

E...SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN A WAY OF MEDICAL COMPONENTS WERE SALINE, PLASMA, DRUGS TO REDUCE SHOCK IN ORDER TO MAKE OPERATIONS POSSIBLE AND TEAMS OF SURGEONS AND ANAESTHETICS.

F...IN ORDER TO SAVE TIME MEDICAL OFFICERS AND ORDERLIES IN UNIFORM WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FROM ALL THREE COUNTRIES.

G...IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT BRITISH MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND DRUGS FROM CYPRUS MIGHT BE MOST REDILY AVAILABLE AND COULD BE TRANSPORTED BY THE CENTO ROUTE. THE KING SAID THAT KING FAISAL HAD AGREED TO GIVE CARTE BLANCHE FOR OVERFLIGHTS.

H...THE KING DID NOT MENTION THE ICRC EXCEPT TO SAY THAT RED CROSS PLANES WERE MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE PERMISSION TO OVERFLY SYRIA THAN OTHERS AND THIS WOULD SAVE TIME.

I...WASFI TEL TOLD SPEARES AND O'CONNELL THAT ALL SERIOUS RESISTANCE HAD CEASED IN AMMAN. THERE WAS BOUND TO BE TROUBLE FOR A WHILE YET FROM ISOLATED POCKETS AND SNIPER FANATICS BUT IT WAS HOPED TO LIFT THE CURFEW AT LEAST AT THIS END OF JEBEL AMMAN TOMORROW.

J...THE SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN HAS STILL TO BE DEALT WITH AND THIS WAS THE NEXT PRIORITY.

K...INCREDIBLE QUANTITIES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION HAD BEEN OVERRUN IN FEDAYEEN DUMPS AND WELL EQUIPT UNDERGROUND HEADQUARTERS. FACILITIES WOULD BE PROVIDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESS TO SEE THEM. DOCUMENTS CONTAINING PLANS TO TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY HAD BEEN CAPTURED.

L...THE KING SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A "DREADFUL" TASK TO CARRY OUT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WAS BOUND TO BE MESSY AND HE NEEDED HELP TO CLEAR UP THE MESS.

M...THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR RECEIVED A SIMILAR REQUEST BUT DID NOT DIVULGE DETAILS. THE KING DID NOT MENTION THAT HE HAD ASKED ANY OTHER COVTS. E.G. FELLOW ARABS FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

A VEHICLE HAS JUST ARRIVED FROM HOMMAR AND I AM OFF TO SEE THE KING. I MAY BE LATE FOR OUR PLANNED CONFERENCE BUT MEANWHILE THE VEHICLE HAS PICKED UP CHRISTOPHER LUSH AND DUMPED HIM HERE TO STAND IN FOR ME WHILE I AM AWAY.

THE TROOPS ARE STILL TAKING OUT SNIPERS AND HAVE BEEN LOOTING SHOPS AND SOME UNOCCUPIED HOUSES BUT AS OF NOW THE GENERAL BATTLE HAS DIED AWAY AND I REALLY THINK THAT APART FROM SNIPERS AND ISOLATED POCKETS THE MAIN HOLOCOUST IN AMMAN ITSELF MAY BE NEARLY OVER BUT THE CURFEW IS STILL IN FORCE, WE ARE WITHOUT ELECTRICITY EXCEPT FOR AN EMERGENCY GENERATOR HERE AND THERE AND WITHOUT TELEPHONES.

London

V
MANY THANKS FOR THIS MOST USEFUL REPORT WHICH WE WILL NOW DIGEST

V
GIVEN THE SCALE OF THE DISASTER AND THE FACT THAT THE KING HAS ~~WANTED~~
APPEALED TO THE FRENCH AMERICANS AND OURSELVES WE WILL NOW URGENTLY
EXAMINE WITH THE FRENCH AMERICANS AND THE I C R C HOW BEST
H
TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS.

IT SEEMS AT FIRST SIGHT THAT FROM MANY POINTS OF VIEW IT WOULD BE
BEST IF NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS WERE GIVEN AN I C R C UMBRELLA

BUT WE WOULD NOT WISH THE THIS TO DELAY COMING TO JORDANS HELP.

WAIT ONE PSE

WHAT IS THE REVELANCE IN PARA G TO THE CENTO ROUTE?
DOES THIS INDICATE THAT THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS MIGHT
DENY OVERFLYING FACILITIES? WHAT ABOUT THE U A R AND THE
ROUTE OVER SAUDI ARABIA FROM THE SOUTH ?

AMMAN

THIS IS THE AMBASSADOR JUST RETURNED FROM HOMMAR.

BEFORE I ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS I HAVE ONE OR TWO POINTS TO
SUPPLEMENT THE REPORT I DICTATED EARLIER.

1.. KING HUSSEIN ASKED ME TO SEND A MESSAGE TO MR HEATH

TO SAY HOW GRATEFUL HE WAS FOR BRITAIN'S EVIDENT MORAL SUPPORT
AT THIS TIME OF CRISIS. HE HAD SEARCHED HIS HEART IN ORDER
TO BE QUITE SURE WHETHER THERE WAS NOT SOME ALTERNATIVE TO THE
DREADFUL OPERATIONS ON WHICH HE HAD EMBARKED AND WHICH HE THOUGHT
WOULD VERY SOON BE OVER. HE HAD CONSIDERED SERIOUSLY ABDICATING
TO PREVENT BLOODSHED BUT HAD DECIDED THAT THIS WOULD SOLVE NOTHING
AND THAT HE WOULD BE DESERTING HIS POST ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ - A POST
WHICH DEMANDED THAT HE RESTORE THE SECURITY OF A VITAL PART
OF THE MIDDLE EAST. HAD HE DESERTED HE WOULD BE LETTING DOWN
HIS ALLIES. HE HOPED THAT MR HEATH WOULD UNDERSTAND HIS PREDICAMENT
HIS MESSAGE DID NOT REQUIRE A PERSONAL ANSWER.

... THE U A R HAVE VOLUNTEERED TO SEND AN AIRCRAFT WITH MEDICAL SUPPLIES

3.. THE KING HAS ASKED THE USSR ^{ALSO} FOR MEDICAL HELP

4.. I ~~EX~~ EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES THE BBC FACED IN PUTTING OUT A ~~MA~~ BALANCED PICTURE OF EVENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF MORE THAN A ~~W~~ TINY TRICKLE OF ~~COMMUNIQUE~~ COMMUNIQUE

FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVT. AND A SPATE OF STUFF FROM THE PALESTINIANS.

WAS FI TEL INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THE JORDAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY PALESTINIANS AND THAT THE ARMY IN AMMAN WERE BETTER AT FIGHTING THAN EXPLAINING BUT NOW THE TELEX WAS WORKING AGAIN HE HOPED THAT THINGS WOULD IMPROVE

5.. ON THE GENERAL SITUATION IN AMMAN THE KING SAID THAT THEY HAD OVERRUN THE PASC HEADQUARTERS CAPTURING ARAFAT'S DEUPYY ABU AYYAD TOGETHER WITH IBRAHIM BAKR AND SAMIR KHATIB SOME THOUSANDS OF LESSER FEDAYEEN HAD GIVEN UP OR COME OVER TO THE GOVTS SIDE. AT THE SAME TIME HE ADMITTED THAT WHILE ALL THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS AS WELL AS THE IMPORTANT FEDAYEEN ~~BASES~~ BASES HAD BEEN OCCUPIED THERE WERE STILL SOME AREAS OF THE SUQ INCLUDING THE PHILADELPHIA HOTEL WHICH STILL NEEDED SORTING OUT. HIS TROOPS

WERE DOING A HOUSE BY HOUSE OPERATION. HE REITERATED THAT THE VERY IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT TO RECOVER THE HOSTAGES ALIVE HAD QUITE CONSIDRABLY CAUSED HIS TROOPS TO PULL THEIR PUNCHES. THIS POLICY WOULD CONTINUE.

London

MANY THANKS FOR THIS VERY MUCH MORE ENCOURAGING REPORT AS REGARDS THE HOSTAGES, WE WANT THE BEST ASSESSMENT OF THEIR LIKELY WHEREABOUTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS ALSO INDICATION OF THE KINGS THINKING ABOUT SECURING THEIR RELEASE.

AS YOU KNOW THE BERNE GROUP IS STILL CONSIDERING THE PROBLEM AND WE LEAD NEED TO KNOW WHAT RELEVANCE THEIR DELIBERATIONS MAY HAVE TO THE KINGS PLANS FOR FINDING AND RELEASING THE HOSTAGES

London (Cont'd)

1 ELEX CONF WITH AMMAN 5
1600Z on 19/IX — Page 4 (omitted for copy only)

YOU MAY ALSO HAVE SEEN THE BERNE TELEGRAM REPORTING CONTACT IN BEIRUT BETWEEN IC RC REPS AND QUOTE PFLP LEADERS UNQUOTE

WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF THIS OR WHO THESE SUPPOSED LEADERS ARE .

~~WANT ONE SE~~

V
AS REGARDS MEDICAL HELP IS THERE ANY PROSPECT , DOES THE KING THINK, OF THE SYRIANS AGREEING TO OVERFLIGHTS BY THE RAF WITH MEDICAL HELP? WOULD THE KING ASK THE SYRIANS ABOUT THIS OR WOULD HE EXPECT THE ICRC TO DO SO?

~~WANT ONE SE~~

WHAT IS YOUR OWN VIEW ABOUT THE USE OF RAF AS AGAINST ICRC AUSPICES FOR THE DISPATCH OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES . DO YOU THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GET AN ICRC UMBRELLA FOR ALL THE CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES ? WE SUPPOSE THAT THE PARAMOUNT NEED IS FOR SPEED.O

AMMAN

TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS IN REVERSE ORDER

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW INCLUDING SPEED WHICH SHOULD NOT PRESENT A GREAT PROBLEM IN THE ICRC COMPLEX THAT HERE SHOULD BE AN ICRC UMBRELLA BUT WE SHOULD HAVE NO HESITATION IN PUBLICISING OUR CONTRIBUTION UNDER IT

NEXT.

I DONOT KNOW T WHAT THE KING THINKS BUT HIS PREVIOUS REMARK ABOUT THE SYRIANS BEING MORE LIKELY TO LET RELIEF PA PLANES COME IN IF THEY HAD RED CROSS MARKINGS MAKES ME BELIEVE THAT HE SHARES MY VIEW THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT REPT NOT AGREE TO RAF OVERFLIGHTS

● WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE BERNE TELEGRAM WHICH YOU MENTIONED

AS REGARDS RELEASING THE HOSTAGES THE KING'S ~~MAN~~ VIEW IS THAT HIS TROOPS ARE SO FAR COMMITTED IN THEIR HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCHES THAT THE BEST CHANCE OF GETTING THE HOSTAGES BACK LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE TROOPS SPEARHEADING THE SEARCH IN LIKELY AREAS ARE WHAT HE CALLS HIS "RED BERETS" WHO HAVE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS MATTER ~~IN ADDITION~~ BESIDES BEING A PART FROM THE FANATICS OF THE ROYAL GUARD HIS BEST TROOPS.

The following announcement was agreed by all five members of the
Berak Group this evening and immediately released for broadcasts to the
Middle East

The five governments hold responsible for the safety of the hostages all those in whose hands they may be. The governments call upon those holding hostages to provide information on their whereabouts and well-being. They require that the hostages should be brought to a safe place which, in the view of the governments, is a prerequisite for an orderly transfer. The governments stand ready to consider at any time proposals for the release of all the hostages.

They also reaffirm their mandate to the ICRC

19/9/70.

Telex conversation 18.30Z with Amman.

17.9.70.

Amman

(A)

R TEL NO 353 JUST RECEIVED I CANNOT SPEAK TO THE PALACE UNTIL THEY CHOOSE TO ANSWER A RADIO TELEPHONE LINK TOMORROW MORNING AT 0700Z. JACQUINET IS IN COMMUNICATION. YOU MAY HAVE HEARD THAT OUR TELEPHONES HAVE BEEN CUT OFF FOR 3 DAYS. NOR IS THERE ANY COMMUNICATION WITH BEIRUT EXCEPT THROUGH OUR DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL WHICH IS PRETTY CLOGGED UP. I SHOULD THERE-

FORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TRANSMIT THIS REQUEST.

YOUR PAR 3 AGAIN. I CANNOT DO THIS TILL TOMORROW MORNING. GENERAL (MEDICAL) MAJALIS ACCORDING TO LATEST INFORMATION SOMEWHERE IN WEST AFRICA.

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT IF I GO BACK TOMORROW TO THE JORDANIAN GOVT. WHICH IN OUR PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES MEANS THE KING (THE REST OF THEM

ARE SOLDIERS IN ACTION OR DIRECTIONING IT). WE SHALL HAVE LOST SOME HOURS SEEING THAT MY NEXT RE RADIO CONTACT WITH THE PALACE (I HAVE NO OTHER PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT) IS AT 0700Z. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT YOU CAN TAKE THE KING'S REQUEST ON MY FIRST SEC. AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO MEAS A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVT.

THE SAME PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MYSELF AND THE JORDANIAN GOVT. APPLIES TO A REQUEST THAT THEY APPLY THROUGH THEIR OWN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN GENEVA (IF THEY HAVE ANY). THEIR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT HAS ACCORDING TO THE KING AND AS REPORTED BY ME EARLIER BEEN OCCUPIED BY PALESTINIANS.

London

(B)

WE ARE CONSIDERING HOW TO SAVE TIME AND YET PUT ANY REQUEST TO THE ICRC WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT.

THE POINT IN OUR TELEGRAM NO 353 WAS THAT THE ICRC WITH WHOM WE ARE IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE IN GENEVA WANT A FORMAL APPROACH FROM THE JORDANIANS THEMSELVES AND WE WERE SUGGESTING THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD SHOULD

SUGGESTING THAT THE JORDANIANS MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE THIS REQUEST THROUGH THEIR OWN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN BEIRUT OR GENEVA.

AS A FORMAL REQUEST OF THE ICRC

IF HOWEVER THESE ARE NOT OPERATING WE WOULD TRANSMIT A REQUEST FOR THEM. THE PROBLEM IS AT PRESENT WHETHER WE CAN TAKE WHAT YOU AND THE AMERICANS HEARD FROM THE KING THIS AFTERNOON AND THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT

SINCE THE ICRC WILL NOT MOVE ON THIS WITHOUT A REQUEST FROM THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND SINCE WE OF COURSE APPRECIATE THAT TO WAIT FOR YOUR NEXT CONTACT WITH THE KING INVOLVES AS DELAY OF SOME 12 HOURS (AND PROLONGS THE SUFFERING OF THE DYING AND THE WOUNDED IN THE STREETS OF AMMAN) WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PASS A MESSAGE TO THE ICRC ON THE BASIS OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH THE KING IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS, PROVIDED THE KING WERE TO CONFIRM THIS REQUEST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH HIS CHANNELS

CHANNELS

MESSAGE BEGINS

TO THE ICRC GENEVA WE HAVE RECEIVED A VERY URGENT ORAL REQUEST FROM KING HUSSEIN THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN AMMAN FOR THE ICRC TO CO-ORDINATE MEDICAL RELIEF FOR JORDAN. ACCORDING TO THE KING THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF WOUNDED JORDANIANS IN URGENT NEED OF MEDICAL ATTENTION. KING HUSEIN HAS ADDRESSED SIMILAR APPEALS TO THE FRENCH, AMERICAN AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS. HE HAS ASKED HIM TO TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO YOU TONIGHT BECAUSE HE HAS NO RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT WILL CONFIRM THIS REQUEST THROUGH THEIR OWN CHANNELS ~~AS~~ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE **MESSAGE ENDS**

Amman SUTTHANK YOU PLEASE DELETE "TOMORROW" FROM LAST SENTENCE OF MESSAGE I CANNOT BIND THE KING TO THIS OVERNIGHT ALTHOUGH AM ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD CONFIRM THIS TOMORROW IF AS WE HAVE ARRANGED WE MAKE CONTACT AT 0700Z PLEASE WAIT ONE I HAVE TO CONTACT MY 1ST SEC....

London THE MOD HAVE ASKED FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT IT WILL BE SAFE ENOUGH FOR BRITISH MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO OPERATE IN FIELD HOSPITALS IN JORDAN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY ARE CONCERNED LEST MEDICAL ORDERLIES AND DOCTORS BE SHOT UP BY POCKETS OF FEDAYEEN. THEY HAVE ALSO REQUESTED AS MANY DETAILS AS POSSIBLE ON MEDICAL REQUESTS IN AS PRECISE MEDICAL LANGUAGE AS POSSIBLE. THEY HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT APPROACH THE TURKISH RED CROSS FOR PERSONNEL IN ORDER TO STAND A BETTER CHANCE OF HAVING ENOUGH PERSONNEL OF THE SAME SORT OF BACKGROUND LANGUAGE RELIGION ETC.....

Amman DXI ASSESMENT

IS THAT PROVIDED BRITISH MEDICAL PERSONNEL OPERATE AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS ORGANISATION THEY WILL BE ALRIGHT. THERE IS OF COURSE A RISK OF BEING SHOT UP BY FANATICS IN THIS KIND OF WAR BUT IT IS ONE WE ARE OUGHT TO WARXXX

THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS TO REFUSE HELP.

London WE WERE CALLED AWAY TO TELEPHONE THE AMERICANS THE FRENCH AND GENEVA, NOT TO MENTION THE RUSS, IN ORDER TO PRESS ON WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS. V

WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE AMERICANS TO CO-ORDINATE THIS OPERATION TONIGHT IN GENEVA AND HAVE TRANSMITTED THE MESSAGE AGREED WITH YOU EARLIER. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH IN PARIS AND HOPE THAT THEY WILL AGREE TO CO-ORDINATE IN GENEVA TOO. ONE POINT WOULD BE HELPFUL FROM YOU. DO YOU KNOW HOW THE RUSSAINS WERE BROUGHT INTO THIS? WE SHALL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO TRY TO ROPE THEM IN UNDER THE UMBRELLA UMBRELLA. ~~THE RUSSIAN~~ GOODNIGHT TO YOU IS HAVE LEFT YOU UP SO LONG. HOPE THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES WILL BE DELIVERED TOMORROW.

Message Received 6.30 pm 19/9/70.



10 Downing Street
Whitehall

Mr Rogers statement —

Deplore intervention and
call for withdrawal
of alien forces from
Jordan. [Tried 0645 approx]

Rogers will call in the Soviet
ambassador to make a
strong demarche and insist
on immediate withdrawal.
The press statement will
merely say that Rogers
has seen the Soviet ambass.
ador.

SECRET

7

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 19 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

SECTION I : Jordan

General situation

Reports of scattered firing in Amman have continued, and the initial successes of the Royalist forces have not been fully consolidated. H.M. Ambassador has said that he is not entirely confident that the Army are mopping up as efficiently as they might, since they are reluctant to leave their tanks and engage in close combat. Israeli sources have confirmed this view. Israeli sources have also reported that the Fedayeen are in control of Irbid, which is at the same time being shelled by the Army, and that the Iraqis are likely to disengage (Tel Aviv telno. FCH 181930B).

Syrian Activity

2. Information on the possibility of Syrian intervention has come from several sources. H.M. Ambassador reported in his 2115 telex conference that the Palace had claimed that Syrian tanks had crossed the frontier by some 250 yards and were shelling Jordanian positions. Israeli sources went some way to confirming this.

Diplomatic Action

3. H.M. Ambassador also reported that the King had asked for "diplomatic action". In response to this request, a telegram has

/has been

SECRET

been sent to Cairo and Baghdad, asking for representations to be made to the Egyptians and the Iraqis unless the Ambassadors felt that such a move would be counterproductive. (F.C.O. telno 910 to Cairo).

4. The P.U.S. also spoke to the Soviet Ambassador at his home and informed him of the Syrian move. With reference to the Soviet representations to us on the evening of 18 September (see paragraph below) he asked the Soviet Ambassador to report the above facts to his government and to suggest that they should speak with the Syrians.

5. UKMIS New York were asked to report the events to U Thant and ask him to speak to the Syrian representative without disclosing the sources of his information. U Thant should link this to the representations which the Arab governments had made to him during the afternoon. UKMIS New York have since reported that Sir Colin Crowe has spoken to U Thant.

Soviet Ambassador

6. The Soviet Ambassador called on the P.U.S. on the evening of 18 September to inform him of a message which the Russians are about to send to the Americans (FCO telegram No. 799 to Moscow). The message hoped that the U.S. Government would agree that it was incumbent on all states concerned (including states external to the region) to act with caution and do nothing to make the situation more difficult. It hopes that the U.S. Government would use its influence to restrain Israel. The
/Russians

Russians had appealed to Jordan, Iraq, Syria and the U.A.R. and were trying to make their point of view known to the leadership of the "Palestinian Movement";

Communications in Amman

7. H.M. Ambassador remains at the Embassy. The telephones are still cut off and the curfew continues. The Embassy has been unable to contact either the ICRC or U.K. nationals. The airport is closed but under full army control, and could be opened when necessary. H.M. Ambassador and his First Secretary are both in intermittent contact with the King by radio telephone; Mr. Phillips hopes to see the King tomorrow and to obtain authority to get round the British Community.

SECTION II : Hostages

Location

8. There has been no hard news about the hostages. The Palace have reported that a house to house search is in progress in the Wahdat. It is however possible that the hostages have been moved to Mafraq, where they are being held by PFLP, surrounded by Iraqis themselves surrounded by Jordanians.

Nationality

9. Mr. Eban confirmed to the Secretary of State when he called yesterday that none of the hostages are straightforward Israeli nationals. Of the 35 Americans, 5 are rabbis and of these 2 are dual-nationals but resident in the U.S. and travelling on U.S. passports.

/Additional

Additional Hostages

10. It now seems likely that the report in Berne telno 285 that further hostages had been taken is inaccurate. Berne telno. 294 reports that no confirmation can be found for this story.

New Terms from PFLP

11. Washington telno. 2760 reports that the U.S. Embassy in Beirut has heard of new terms offered by the PFLP for the release of the hostages. These are understood to be the release of all hostages, except the Israelis and duals, in exchange for the 7 Fedayeen held in Europe plus the corpse.

Soviet Ambassador

12. In his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, the P.U.S. said he hoped that, when speaking to the guerilla leadership about the Jordan internal situation, the Russians would use their influence to secure the early release of the hostages.

SECTION III : Berne Group Negotians

Background to the Berne Group

13. Berne telegram No. 293 reported on the representatives of the four other countries in the Group, and recommended that when instructions were sent to Berne for use in Group, H.M. Ambassador at Bonn, Washington and Tel Aviv should, whenever practicable, be instructed simultaneously to approach the governments in the three capitals to send instructions to their Berne representatives.

/Meeting

Meeting

14. The Berne Group met at 1600 hours (Berne telegram No. 295). The Swiss reported that the Federal Council had decided to appeal to all those fighting in Jordan to spare the lives of the hostages; and to the Syrian, Iraqi and U.A.R. Governments and the Arab League to try to get the hostages moved from the danger zones into a neutral Arab country.

15. The President of the ICRC had said that the Red Cross could no longer concentrate entirely or mainly on the exchange of hostages: their prime concern must be to help all victims of the fighting. They believed that the hostages were in several groups, possibly of mixed nationality.

16. The German supported the British formula. The Israeli said he had no instructions: the question was being discussed between President Nixon and Mrs. Meir. When the Israeli was pressed, the American defended his position.

New Formula

17. The continued stone-walling by the Israelis and the situation in Jordan suggested that the British formula was no longer appropriate. Instructions were therefore sent to Berne early this morning (telegram No. 180), Washington and Bonn to seek early agreement in the Berne Group on a new formula on the following lines:-

"The Four/Five Governments hold responsible for the safety of the hostages all those in whose hands they may be. The Governments call upon those holding hostages to provide

/information

information on their whereabouts and well-being. The Governments stand ready to open negotiations at any time for the release of all the hostages. They also reaffirm their mandate to the ICRC."

Washington telno. 2763 reports that this text has had a favourable initial reception in the State Department.

P.U.S. - Kissinger/Sisco

18. On the Prime Minister's instructions the P.U.S. rang Dr. Kissinger at the White House at about 0100 hours to ask the result of the day's meetings with the Israeli Prime Minister. Dr. Kissinger said that Mrs. Meir was very determined not to resume negotiations unless the violations of the cease fire by the Egyptians and the Russians were rectified. Dr. Kissinger was uncertain what had taken place between the Americans and the Israelis on the question of the hostages, and Mr. Sisco rang the P.U.S. later to say that no headway had been made on this subject. The Israelis, however, had not been entirely negative and he would try again on Saturday morning to make some progress on the proposed communique to be issued from the Berne Group. The Israelis gave the Americans the impression that they were waiting for the outcome of events in Jordan before making any move on the hostages.

/IV

IV Beirut

19. The Lebanon appears to be quiet at the moment (Beirut telno. 464).

V Mr. Eban

20. When he called on the Secretary of State, the Israeli Foreign Minister said he thought that the Berne Group were considering the next move over the hostages too much in isolation from the situation on the ground. Further negotiations must take into account who had sovereignty.

21. The seven Fedayeen held in Europe were known murderers of Israelis. Israeli opinion therefore thought it unreasonable that Israel should make a contribution to secure the release of the hostages.

22. Mr. Eban agreed with the Secretary of State that urgent contact should be made with King Hussain and that the ICRC should not at this stage be involved in further negotiations.

23. The Secretary of State told Mr. Eban of King Hussain's report that Israeli forces had opened fire across the cease-fire line. As the King had said he would deal with that area when Amman had been settled, the Israeli action was not helpful.

VI Amman Evacuation

24. No change.

VII Miss Khaled

25. No change.

/VIII

VIII U.S. Intention in Jordan

26. Washington telno. 2747 reports that the White House appears to have successfully scotched press stories deriving from the President's briefing in Chicago on 17 September. Press references have in fact been few.

IX B.B.C. Reports

27. The King has complained several times of the pro-Palestinian bias of the B.B.C.'s reports, comparing them unfavourably with the Voice of Israel. No.10 have also remarked on this bias. Mr. Reddaway has subsequently spoken to the acting Head of the B.B.C. who has promised to remedy the situation.

X Secretary of State's Meeting with Next of Kin

28. The Secretary of State met next of kin of hostages at 15.00 on 19 September. He explained H.M.G.'s position to them. A frank discussion ensued.

XI Libyan Attitudes

29. It is reported that a meeting of Arab Heads of State is shortly to take place in Tripoli to reconcile the warring factions. In addition Col. Qadafi met Nasser on 17 September; subsequently the U.A.R. Chief of Staff was sent to Amman with a message for King Hussain and Arafat from Nasser, Qadafi and Nimeiri. Tripoli telno. 1312 reports a uniformly hostile attitude to the Jordanian Government.

/XII

XII French Ambassador in Baghdad

30. H.M. Ambassador in Baghdad reported (telno. 630) that the French Ambassador had told him that he and his colleagues from "friendly countries" had been summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the small hours. They were asked to request their governments to use their good offices with the Jordan Government to avert further bloodshed

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN
SIR DENIS GREENHILL AND DR. KISSINGER AT 1.00 AM
ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1970

Sir Denis

The two points I really wanted to raise were, have you anything to tell us after your meeting today as regards the attitude of your visitor to the question of helping to release the hostages.

Mr. Kissinger

*[Sentence inaudible]
I knew about the meeting with the Secretary in the morning. There was*
Another meeting ^{which is only} ~~was~~ now ending ^{of} and ~~there was nothing of significance to~~ report. *There was no significant progress so far as I could see.*

Sir Denis

Was there anything else of mutual interest which took place.

Dr. Kissinger

They were pretty strong on no negotiations unless some ^{rec}ratification. ^{Otherwise} There was a rather detailed account of Egyptian violations *which added nothing to what we already knew.* She was very determined on ~~some of the~~ negotiations *(i.e. no negotiations without rectification).* ~~Reported to our people about Syrian tanks.~~

Sir Denis

If you have any information on the hostage question additional to what you said perhaps you could get Joe Sisco to tell me.

Dr. Kissinger

You can be sure of that.

Sir Denis

The last point is, which we have already passed to you I think, and that is that the King reported to our people tonight that Syrian tanks had

Dr. Kissinger

Oh yes, I have heard that. You have probably heard that the Soviet *gave us*

/have

~~have sent~~ a rather conciliatory note.

Sir Denis

They came in, ~~they read it tonight~~ and showed it to us ^{tonight.} and I

Mr. Kissinger

How do you read it?

Sir Denis

I read it in exactly the same way as you do but it was a very sensible tone and we have just spoken again to the Soviet Ambassador and told him of the Syrian move and asked him if he would take action.

Mr. Kissinger

Excellent.

copy to Sir D. Greenhill .

[note : much of this was v. inaudible and the transcription is in places approximate only]

MESSAGE PASSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
EMERGENCY UNIT ON JORDAN BY AMERICAN EMBASSY
AT 18.50 HRS 20.9.70

SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS' STATEMENT ON JORDAN

We have been informed that tank forces have invaded Jordan from Syria during the night and have moved towards Rampha. We have also been informed that Jordanian armour is resisting this invasion. We condemn this irresponsible and imprudent intervention from Syria into Jordan. This action carries with it the danger of a broadened conflict. We call upon the Syrian Government to end immediately this intervention in Jordan, and we urge all other concerned Governments to impress upon the Government of Syria the necessity of withdrawing the forces which have invaded Jordan.

Private Secretary

We have given BOAC a list of persons on the hijacked aircraft whose passports were not returned.

2. A list of the 54 passengers was given to them yesterday evening and we followed this up this morning with a list of 105 names supplied by the American Embassy and 59 other names ~~from~~^{of} the passengers and crew of the VC-10.

3. In view of ~~the~~ reports from Germany and, we understand, from Beirut, that an attempt may be made to hijack other aircraft by hijackers using these passports, we asked BOAC to ensure that these lists were given the widest possible distribution. There appears, however, to be no international body active at weekends who would be able to do this. BOAC promised that they would ask their Offices to pass on the list of names to the local security authorities and that they would get in touch with either ICAO or IATA first thing on Monday morning with a view to having the lists given the widest possible circulation.

D.H. Gillmore

(D.H. Gillmore)

20 September, 1970

Copies to:

Mr. Renwick

Miss Deas

Mr. Daunt

Sir P. Adams

Mr. Bottomley

Mr. Gallagher

Mr. Tripp

Mr. Hanbury-Tenison

✓ Private Secretary, No. 10

*We now understand that the
Secretary-General of Interpol has
been given the lists.*

D.H. Gillmore

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 0700 on 20 September, 1970
(all times referred to are BST)

I : JordanSituation in Amman

H.M. Ambassador reported at 1700 that the main holocaust seemed to be nearly over, and that the King hoped to be able to lift the curfew at least in some parts of Amman in the course of 20 September. Israeli sources tend to confirm Mr. Phillips' view.

Syrian Activity

2. The Syrians do not appear to have advanced from their previous positions, but Israeli sources report that Syrian tanks have been firing on Jordanian troops near Ramta and that the Syrian Air Force has been put on alert (Tel Aviv telno. 876).
3. H.M. Ambassadors in Cairo and Baghdad have spoken to the governments concerned about the Syrian activity, as instructed in F.C.O. telno. 910 to Cairo of yesterday. Baghdad have reported that the Iraqi government thinks it most useful to put pressure on King Hussein (Baghdad telno. 636). Cairo report that the Egyptian objective is a general cease-fire (Cairo telno. 1034).
4. U Thant has not been able to get in touch with the Syrian delegate yet (UKMIS New York telno. 1974).

Foreigners in Amman

5. C.B.O. Bill Pink managed to reach the Intercontinental Hotel and to bring back a list of all foreigners, who, with one exception, are reported to be well. The exception, a Swede, had

/been

been removed to hospital with a minor bullet wound. The relevant Embassies in London have been informed of the names of their nationals. All members of the Berne group subsequently expressed their warm admiration for Pink's action (Berne telno. 299).

Communications in Amman

4. No change. The Ambassador has not yet been able to contact the British community.

Embassy Staff

5. Arrangements are in hand to send out additional staff to relieve temporarily those who have recently been under pressure.

Information from the Israelis

6. Tel Aviv have reported (telno. 876) that the flow of intelligence about Jordan from the Israelis has dried up somewhat. They ascribe this in part to the fact that we have little to offer them in exchange.

Exchange of Messages between King Hussein and the Prime Minister

7. The King sent a message to Mr. Heath expressing his appreciation of "Britain's evident moral support" (Amman telex conference 1700). In reply (F.C.O. telno. 356 to Amman) Mr. Heath told the King of H.M.G.'s distress at the suffering caused by the fighting. They were taking urgent action in response to the King's appeal for medical relief, and were grateful for his assurances that he was doing everything to secure the release of the hostages.

II : Medical Relief

8. The King has appealed to the British, American, French and Soviet governments for medical assistance to cope with

/casualties

casualties (civilian and fedayeen as well as Jordanian troops) who may number as many as 5,000 (telex conference at 1700 and 1930 hours).

9. H.M. Consul General in Geneva has been instructed to pass a message from King Hussein to the ICRC asking them to act as co-ordinators for the relief arrangements (F.C.O. telno. 34 to Geneva). An ICRC representative has told H.M. Consul General that the ICRC could in principle take on the co-ordinating task. However, the main committee would consider this problem today, 20 September. The Americans have agreed to this co-ordination; and we are in touch with the French and hope that they will do so too.

10. A statement issued by 10 Downing Street at midnight announced that H.M.G. were ready to respond to King Hussein's appeal as soon as possible. They were in touch with the ICRC about co-ordinating help. Medical and other relief supplies were being made ready in this country (F.C.O. telno. 35 to C.G. Geneva).

11. Lord Carrington has instructed the Ministry of Defence to give all possible assistance. The British Red Cross have undertaken to warn the Disaster Emergency Committee that an appeal may soon be forthcoming from the Jordanian government via the ICRC. The Treasury have been warned that a financial commitment is likely

III : Hostages

12. There is no further news on the hostages. The King has reiterated his warning that his troops should be most careful

/to avoid

to avoid harming them. In his message to the Prime Minister, King Hussein assured him that the Jordan government were continuing to do everything possible to secure the release of the hostages. This was reflected in the statement issued from No. 10 at midnight.

IV : Berne Group

Meeting

13. The Berne Group met at 1500 hours and agreed to the following revised version of H.M.G.'s new formula:-

"The five governments hold responsible for the safety of the hostages all those in whose hands they may be. The governments call upon those holding hostages to provide information on their whereabouts and well-being. They require that the hostages should be brought to a safe place which in the view of the governments is a prerequisite for an orderly transfer. The governments stand ready to consider at any time proposals for the release of all the hostages.

The mandate to the ICRC has been reaffirmed." (Berne telno. 299).

ICRC Message from Beirut

14. The meeting also considered a message received by the ICRC (Geneva) from their delegation in Berne that the PFLP leaders had asked for confirmation of their understanding that the U.S. had accepted PFLP terms for freeing the hostages. If this were so, the PFLP would disclose by stages first the number and then the names of Palestinian detainees in Israel whom they wished to be freed. Subject to U.S. agreement at each stage, the PFLP would finally release the hostages (Berne telno. 297).

/The Berne Group

15. The Berne Group agreed a reply to the ICRC stating that neither the U.S. nor any other government had accepted the proposals put forward by the PFLP contact in Beirut and doubted whether he was in touch with or had any authority over those holding the hostages. The governments concerned could not consider any proposal until they had received a full list of hostages held by the PFLP, and the number and names of fedayeen in Israeli hands whose release they wanted (Berne telno. 299).

Mrs. Meir

16. In her talks in Washington Mrs. Meir continued to reject any idea of an exchange deal for the hostages and to maintain that Israel had already made its contribution in not objecting to a deal involving the prisoners in Western hands and in indicating that the two Algerians would not be a stumbling block (Washington telno. 2769).

V : B.B.C.

17. In his 1700 hours telex conference, Mr. Phillips said that he had explained our difficulties with the B.B.C. to the King and suggested that more information from the Jordanian government would help to produce a more balanced picture. Wasfi Tel said that things should improve now that the Jordanian telex was again functioning.

VI : Reactions in other Countries

South Yemen

18. Aden have reported a statement published by the South Yemen Foreign Ministry on 18 September which denounces the actions of the Jordanian government and attributes the current strife to

/ "a

"a reactionary-imperialist-zionist conspiracy to exterminate the Palestine resistance movement."

Soviet Union

19. Moscow report (telno. 1079) Tass and Izvestia as saying that further fighting can only benefit the "Tel Aviv extremists" and fearing that it will be used by "imperialist circles" to "further the situation for their own ends against the Arab peoples." An article in New Times expresses opposition to hijacking as a political weapon (Moscow telno. 1074).

Iraq

20. Baghdad suggest (telno. 635) that the Iraqi government has now determined on a more moderate course than the extreme line adopted at the beginning of the crisis. In particular they have withdrawn support from the PFLP and switched to the PLO.

Kuwait

21. The strike called by the PLO with the aim of stopping the Kuwait subvention to Jordan has been a failure. An anti-Hussein demonstration of some 4000 persons (mainly Palestinians) has taken place (Kuwait telno. 331).

Egypt

22. Cairo reports (telno. 1026) that editorial writers have avoided taking a position on the Jordanian/Palestinian issue by concentrating on condemning "Western imperialist adventures in the Arab conflict."

Libya

23. Tripoli telno. 1320 tells of a strongly worded message sent
/on

on 18 September by the new Libyan Foreign Minister to his Jordanian counterpart. Highly critical of the Jordan government, this message contrasts markedly with the non-committal message sent jointly by Nasser, Nimeiri and Qadafi. Libya has also terminated her subvention to Jordan.

VII : International Civil Aviation Organisation

24. Air Commodore Russell has reported from Montreal (UK Rep. ICAO telno. 32) that the ICAO Council met on 18 September to consider the U.S. draft proposals on reactions against hijacking. The U.S., Canadian, Indonesian, Tunisian and U.K. delegates spoke substantially. Canada presented their proposal and a working paper.

25. To allow more remote countries to instruct their representatives, it was agreed to resume on 29 September, although the U.S. would have preferred an earlier date.

VII : Further Hijackings

26. The German representative in the Berne Group said that his government had received a report that more hijackings of aircraft could be expected in the next 72 hours. The hijackers would use the passports removed from passengers on planes previously hijacked. Other representatives had received similar reports. (Berne telno. 298). The Board of Trade have warned airport authorities in this country.

IX : Miss Khalid

27. The ICRC in Geneva have told H.M. Consul General that they may soon be making a formal request to the British, German
/and Swiss

and Swiss governments to permit access by a senior ICRC doctor to the seven fedayeen held in Western Europe. The move would be designed to improve the ICRC's standing with the guerilla organisations in Jordan. H.M. Consul General will suggest to the ICRC that the chances of our agreeing were slight unless the PFLP grant reciprocity, i.e. access to our hostages whose whereabouts were completely unknown.

Stop Press

Amman Embassy communications

The Embassy reported at 0707 that their emergency power unit had been hit and was out of action. We are at present having difficulty in establishing two-way contact with Amman. If contact can be established traffic, especially cypher traffic, will take longer to transmit. It will not be possible to have telex conferences.

Middle East Crisis

SITREP at 1800 on 20 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

I: Jordan

Situation in Amman

Amman Embassy communications

The Embassy reported at 0707 that their emergency power unit was out of action. Contact with Amman has been limited to very short exchanges. During the earlier part of the day the Embassy could transmit only en clair traffic. They now have limited cypher facilities. An emergency generator is to be flown to Beirut tonight for onward transmission by the earliest possible means to Amman.

Situation in Amman

2. Mopping up appears to be continuing.

Syrian Activity

3. There have been conflicting reports about a Syrian incursion at brigade strength in northern Jordan. Amman radio announced early this morning that the Syrian force had been repulsed. The latest communication on the subject from Amman (at 1512) reiterated an earlier request for intervention. However the source of this telegram is not known and we have asked H.M. Embassy Amman for clarification.

4. The U.S. Embassy have told us that they have received a request from the King that they should issue a condemnation of the invasion and put out a statement that intervention from an

outside/

outside power could not be tolerated and would necessitate international action. The French Embassy have told us that they have a request for condemnation in broadly similar terms, but which would be issued by the Four powers (U.K., U.S., France, Soviet Union).

Foreigners in Amman

5. C.B.O. Bill Pink managed to reach the Intercontinental Hotel and to bring back a list of all foreigners, who, with one exception, are reported to be well. The exception, a Swede, had been removed to hospital with a minor bullet wound. The relevant Embassies in London have been informed of the names of their nationals. All members of the Berne group subsequently expressed their warm admiration for Pink's action (Berne telno. 299). A telegram from H.M. Embassy at 11.50 reported that all members of the Embassy staff had been located and were well. The Ambassador has not yet been able to report on members of the British community.

Embassy Staff

6. Arrangements are in hand to send out additional staff to relieve temporarily those who have recently been under pressure.

Exchange of Messages between King Hussein and the Prime Minister

7. The King sent a message to Mr. Heath expressing his appreciation of "Britain's evident moral support" (Amman telex conference 1700 19 September). In reply (F.C.O. telno. 356 to Amman) Mr. Heath told the King of H.M.G.'s distress at the suffering caused by the fighting. They were taking urgent action in response to the King's appeal for medical relief, and were grateful for his assurances that he was doing everything to secure the release of the hostages.

II: Medical/

II: Medical Relief

8. The King has appealed to the British, American, French and Soviet governments for medical assistance to cope with casualties (civilian and fedayeen as well as Jordanian troops) who may number as many as 5,000 (telex conference at 1700 and 1930 hours).

9. H.M. Consul General in Geneva has passed a message from King Hussein to the ICRC asking them to act as co-ordinators for the relief arrangements (Geneva telno. 47). An ICRC representative has told H.M. Consul General that the ICRC are considering this problem today, 20 September and will let us know their decision as soon as possible. The Americans and the French have agreed to this co-ordination.

10. A statement issued by 10 Downing Street at midnight announced that H.M.G. were ready to respond to King Hussein's appeal as soon as possible. They were in touch with the ICRC about co-ordinating help. Medical and other relief supplies were being made ready in this country (FCO telno. 35 to C.G. Geneva).

11. Lord Carrington has instructed the Ministry of Defence to give all possible assistance. The British Red Cross have undertaken to warn the Disaster Emergency Committee that an appeal may soon be forthcoming from the Jordanian government via the ICRC. The Treasury have been warned that a financial commitment is likely. The results of a meeting on the subject of medical aid held this morning under the auspices of the M.O.D. are summarised in FCO telegrams nos 36 and 37/^{to}C.G. Geneva.

III: Hostages

12. There is no further news on the hostages. The King has reiterated his warning that his troops should be most careful to avoid harming them. In his message to the Prime Minister,

King Hussein assured him that the Jordan government were continuing to do everything possible to secure the release of the hostages. This was reflected in the statement issued from No. 10 at midnight on 19 September.

Private Secretary

Mr. Barson of the British Red Cross phoned the Emergency Unit at 17.30 B.S.T. He said that the M.O.D. were being "negative" about a suggestion that a B.B.C. camera crew should travel on one of the Red Cross flights out to Nicosia. We had earlier said that the F.C.O. had no objection to the B.B.C. being allowed to travel provided that M.O.D. were not against it. Ministers may wish to discuss this question when they meet this evening.

(D.H. Gillmore)
20 September, 1970

Copies to:

Mr. Renwick
Miss Deas
Mr. Daunt
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Bottomley
Mr. Gallagher
Mr. Tripp
✓ Mr. Hanbury-Tenison,
P.S. No.10.

CONFIDENTIAL

11.

Mr. Tripp

An official of the American Embassy called the Emergency Unit at 13.30 B.S.T. on behalf of the U.S. Minister, Mr. Green.

2. He said that the U.S. authorities had received information from Zaid Rifai at 07.45 local time that 50 Syrian tanks had invaded Jordan during the night in the Ramtha area. The Jordanian Army had intercepted the Syrian forces, destroyed several tanks and taken some prisoners. The remaining Syrian tanks had fled.

3. Zaid Rifai had told the Americans that the Jordanian Government was requesting the following:

- (a) that the United States issue a statement condemning the invasion; and
- (b) that the United States make a declaration stating that the intrusion of an outside power into Jordan could not be tolerated and would necessitate international action.

Zaid Rifai said that the same information had been passed to ourselves and the French.

4. The U.S. Embassy asked that either Sir P. Adams or Mr. Tripp call Mr. Green as soon as possible (U.S. Embassy Ext. 229).

(D.H. Gillmore)
20 September 1970

Copies to:

Private Secretary,
Mr. Daunt,
Sir P. Adams,
Emergency Unit,
P.S. No.10.

*Passage deleted and returned under
Section 3(4) J.R. Green 13.6.2000*

Accordingly, we have a

fairly clear picture of how the Israelis understand the position on the ground in Jordan. But we do not have much indication of how they assess the probably development of events. We think, however, that they are likely to have assessed throughout the first days of the fighting that the Jordanian Army would prevail. They probably also assessed that, if there was no further interference, the Jordanian Army would be able to contain and perhaps in the end drive back the Syrian forces. In these circumstances it may well have been that the Israeli Cabinet saw no need to take firm decisions on the circumstances in which they might intervene. We think however that they are now likely to be reconsidering the position.

The Israelis presumably are now taking serious account of the possibility that the situation in Jordan could turn gravely to their disadvantage. For example, a ceasefire into which both Hussein and the fedayeen adhered would open the way to some sort of Arab peacekeeping and supervisory force which could be counted upon in practice to favour the fedayeen. Such a situation would presumably leave the Syrians effectively in control of north western Jordan and the Iraqis in control of eastern Jordan. Central Jordan, north of Amman might be shared in a confused way between the fedayeen, the Army and the Iraqis. Given the fact that one of the few common elements in the position of the Iraqis, the Syrians and the Egyptians is that each of them has close military and political relations with the Soviet Union. It is presumably possible that the Arabs would acquiesce in or even invite some form of Soviet presence in Jordan. In the first place such a presence might come in a humanitarian guise and in the circumstances would presumably have the acquiescence of the Jordanian Government. From such beginnings it might seem to the Israeli Government that it was only too likely they would have to reckon with some form of Soviet military presence in Jordan as well as in the UAR, Syria and Iraq.

E.R.

SIR BURKE TREND
c.c. Sir Robin Hooper

CABINET OFFICE
A 6644
20 SEP 1970
FILE INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.
Jordan

14
Mr. M. M. M. 22/9
The P.H. may like to see.
It is inevitably speculative;
but not at all impossible.

Current
Intelligence
[comp]

Just after the Middle East CIG had finished its meeting this afternoon we received a press report that King Hussein has issued a clear order for a ceasefire. At this point we do not know whether it contains conditions (as previous ceasefire offers have done), whether it would be accepted by the fedayeen and the Syrians or even whether all the units of the Jordanian Army would obey it. But the mere announcement does, so it seems to me, increase the possibility that the Israelis would intervene militarily within the next 24 hours.


We had a long discussion at the CIG about the possibility of Israeli intervention. In various assessments over the last few days we have given our views on the chances of such an intervention; and, since there is no new evidence and the possibility is so evidently in everybody's minds, we did not put down the discussion in writing. Moreover, there are so many permutations and combinations ^{that} they would require a fairly lengthy paper to do full justice to them. However, I think you may wish to have in mind the following considerations.

We generally agreed that the Israelis would intervene militarily if they thought it was probable that the Russians were about to establish a military presence in Jordan or if either Syria or Iraq effectively took over Jordan. At the other end of the scale we thought that the Israelis had no special feeling for Hussein and would not intervene simply for the sake of saving his kingdom. On the whole we thought they would be unlikely to intervene if a moderate Palestinian Regime, for instance led by Arafat, took over Jordan: they could do business with such a Regime. We were also convinced that the Israelis would judge intervention purely on grounds of Israeli national interest and that they would only intervene if they thought their security was threatened. Even if their security might seem to be threatened, e.g. by the presence of Syrian forces in north west Jordan, we thought they would prefer that the potential threat should be disposed of by Jordanian action rather than by Israeli intervention. Whether or not these judgements are right, they were easy to make compared with the extreme difficulty of

judging how the Israelis would balance conflicting conditions viz the desirability of giving the Jordanians or others the time and opportunity to dispose of any potential threats to Israel against the possibility that delay in action might lead towards an even worse situation for Israel than would otherwise have occurred. We thought that their inaction so far was largely to be explained, firstly by their belief that the Jordanian Army would probably win, secondly, by their readiness to acquiesce in what seemed the most likely alternative, namely a moderate fedayeen victory, and thirdly, by their knowledge that delay was most unlikely significantly to affect their ability to take decisive military action against Syria, Iraq or even the fedayeen.

Although we thought the delay would not affect the Israeli military capability, we thought that in certain circumstances it might make the political situation harder for them. We had a discussion on the basis of an informal piece of paper which I circulated and which is attached. We thought that, if the Israelis assessed that the situation described in paragraph 2 of the paper was on the point of coming about, ~~that~~ the likelihood of their military intervention would considerably increase. We also thought that, if there was a ceasefire at present, the Israelis would be likely to assess that the situation described might occur fairly rapidly. We all agreed that there was nothing to prevent the Israelis intervening militarily in the immediate future if they so decided. In the light of this discussion the news of a possible ceasefire suggests rather strongly that there could be an Israeli military intervention soon, perhaps early tomorrow.

Finally, it is worth noting that the American representative at the discussion suggested in a rather pointed way that the Israelis might try to argue that, if they were to intervene, they should do so in company with their friends. I continue to doubt, however, whether the Americans would agree to this.


J A THOMSON

21 September 1970

TELEGRAM: FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO
UKMIS NEW YORK

5

CYPHER

SECRET

FLASH

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY.

You will have seen that there is to be an Arab Summit Conference in Cairo tomorrow. King Hussein will not be there, but Arafat will. I think that it might be useful, and could do no harm, if I were to send a message to President Nasser as Chairman of the Conference, urging him to secure the release of the hostages.

My immediately following telegram contains the text of my proposed draft message. I have asked the F.C.O. Emergency Unit to despatch it to Cairo as soon as possible, for onward transmission to Nasser, unless you see any objection.

SECRET

MIPT

Following is text of proposed message to Nasser:

When 18 months ago we had our long discussions in Cairo about a possible settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict and about the U.A.R.'s relations with the West, and in particular with Britain, we agreed that we would try to make a fresh start, and we were both anxious that, if I and my party were returned to power, there should be a better understanding between Britain and the Arab world.

It is in this context that I venture to send you this message, as you preside over the Arab Summit Conference at this very important moment in Middle East history. We in Britain have endeavoured to play our part in bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict. Following the strife in Jordan we have sent medical aid to Cyprus to be at hand so that it can be moved in as soon as possible to help the wounded and the suffering.

It is on the particular point of the hostages still held in Jordan that I am writing to you. I know that you are opposed to the hijacking of aircraft, and the fear and agony brought to innocent travellers, and I have admired the way in which you have declared your position on this matter. There still remain over 50 people held as hostages whose fate and whereabouts are unknown to us. As you know, we, the Swiss and the German Governments have agreed that in the context of a satisfactory exchange for all the hostages we will return Leila Khaled and the

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

other six people whose release is being sought, together with the body of Leila Khaled's dead companion. ~~Such an~~ *We are sure* ~~to discuss where such an exchange might~~ exchange could very conveniently take place, in Cairo itself.

I am sending you this message in the hope that you can take the opportunity of this Summit Conference, and the presence of some of those most concerned, to secure the release of these people, who have played no part whatever in events in Jordan.

I can assure you, Your Excellency, that nothing would do more to contribute to that better relationship which both of us so much desire than that you should be able to arrange this exchange ~~in Cairo~~ through your own intervention at the Summit Conference.

EDWARD HEATH

SECRET

SECRET

15 - ^{IF} FILE

September 21, 1970

I should be grateful if you would transmit the attached message from the Prime Minister to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary by Flash Telegram to New York.

It is obviously desirable that, if the attached message to President Nasser is to go, it should reach him before or at the beginning of the Arab Summit Conference. The Prime Minister would therefore be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as clearance is received from New York.

RTA

A. Ibbott, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Subject

CYPHER/CAT-A--

S E C R E T

COPY NO: 16

FLASH UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1980 21 SEPTEMBER

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SECRET

DTG 211350Z

SERIAL No. T87^{AN}/70

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1980
OF 21 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS
MOSCOW.

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PRIME MINISTER.

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT AN URGENT MEETING OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL AND WE ARE WORKING FOR THIS! THE DIFFICULTIES
ARISING FROM THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES, AND THE DANGERS OF A
WIDE-RANGING DEBATE WERE SET OUT IN UK MISSION TELEGRAM NO. 1978.
AS I SAID THERE, PROBABLY THE MAIN DIFFICULTY IS THE ATTITUDE OF
THE JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVE WHO IS A MILITANT PALESTINIAN.

2. I AGREE WITH YOUR THINKING THAT IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS
TO ACT, NOW IS THE TIME IF EVER. BUT FOR ANY EFFECTIVE ACTION THE
PERMANENT MEMBERS MUST BE IN AGREEMENT AND ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS
MAY DEPLORE SYRIAN INTERVENTION I DOUBT IF THEY WILL BE READY
PUBLICLY TO CONDEMN IT OR BACK EFFECTIVE ACTION. MOREOVER SYRIA,
I SEE, DENIES THAT HER FORCES ARE ENGAGED. THUS I CAN SEE ENORMOUS
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ARGUMENT AND DELAY AND LITTLE HOPE OF AN EARLY
AND CLEAR-CUT RESOLUTION. IT MAY WELL BE THEREFORE THAT A FOUR
POWER APPEAL ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.
1978 WILL BE THE BEST HELP WE CAN BRING TO JORDAN. I SHALL KEEP
YOU INFORMED.

S E C R E T

/N.P. 3

S E C R E T

-2-

3. ON THE ISSUE OF INTERVENTION ON THE GROUND, WE SHOULD BE VERY CHARY OF INVOLVING BRITISH TROOPS. AT THE FIRST NEWS OF ANY SUCH MOVE OUR HOSTAGES WOULD NO DOUBT BE KILLED. THAT APART, THE OPERATION WOULD BE MILITARILY VERY DIFFICULT AND IT WOULD BE EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT TO EXTRICATE OURSELVES WHETHER OR NOT THE OPERATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL. MOREOVER IT WOULD SERVE TO UNITE ARAB OPINION AGAINST HUSSAIN, WHEREAS AT THE MOMENT TO JUDGE FROM HIS HALF-HEARTED STATEMENTS AND DILATORY ACTIONS NASSER AND, I SHOULD GUESS, MANY MODERATES ARE SECRETLY ON HIS SIDE. THIS IS NOT JUST A JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR. IRAQ, ALGERIA AND LIBYA AS WELL AS SYRIA ARE AGAINST THE KING. THIS IN MY VIEW WILL BE AN UNENDING FIGHT WHICH WILL EBB AND FLOW FOR YEARS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH THE ODDS STACKING AGAINST THE KING, HE IS UNLIKELY TO WIN UNLESS HE WAS TO BREAK WITH ALL THE ARABS AND GO IN WITH ISRAEL.

4. INTERVENTION BY ISRAEL CARRIES THE SAME POLITICAL RISKS:

HUSSAIN WOULD CERTAINLY BE LINKED IN ARAB PROPAGANDA WITH ISRAEL. EVEN IF THE TRUTH DID NOT LEAK, I WOULD SEE LITTLE FUTURE FOR HIM OR FOR AN INDEPENDENT JORDAN. DIVERSIONARY ACTION ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 878 TO THE F.C.O. WOULD SEEM TO CARRY SLIGHTLY LESS RISK OF THESE CONSEQUENCES, BUT THE RISK WOULD STILL BE CONSIDERABLE.

S E C R E T

/5. I SEE.

S E C R E T

UTMIS NEW YORK TEL.NO. 1980 TO F.C.O.

-3-

5. I SEE THAT TODAY'S BRITISH PRESS HEADLINES ANSWERS I GAVE AT LONDON AIRPORT ABOUT MILITARY INTERVENTION. THESE ANSWERS WERE GIVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN AND DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) RELATE TO THE SYRIAN INVASION, OF WHICH AT THE TIME THERE WERE ONLY RUMOURS. AT KENNEDY AIRPORT I USED THE WORDS RECOMMENDED FOR USE WITH THE PRESS AND SAID IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE SYRIAN ATTACK QUOTE WE HAVE NOT BEEN THINKING IN TERMS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THIS STRIFE AT ALL AND I THINK THAT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IF THE JORDANIANS DECIDED ON THIS, IS THE APPROPRIATE FIRST ACTION. UNQUOTE.

6. I HAVE NOW SEEN F.C.O. TEL. NO. 1192 WITH WHICH I AGREE ALTHOUGH AS I HAVE SAID WE MAY IN THE END BE COMPELLED BECAUSE OTHERS WONT COOPERATE TO SETTLE FOR SOMETHING OTHER THAN A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

FCO PASS PARIS MOSCOW

SIR C. CROWE.

[COPIES PASSED TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISec DISTRIBUTION

S E C R E T

DDDDD

Subject.

CYPHER/CAT-A-

SH UKMISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1982

SECRET

COPY NO:
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
21 SEPTEMBER

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. 187th/70

SECRET

DTG 211615Z

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1982
OF 21 SEPTEMBER AND TO WASHINGTON (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PRIME MINISTER.

JORDAN/SYRIA.

AS I SAID IN MY EARLIER TELEGRAM (UKMIS TELEGRAM NO. 1980) I WAS
GLAD TO SEE THAT THE CABINET HAD REJECTED ANY IDEA OF MILITARY
INTERVENTION BY BRITAIN AND WERE AGAINST WESTERN INTERVENTION TOO.
IN CASE THE QUESTION COMES UP ACTIVELY AGAIN AS A RESULT OF
AMERICAN PRE SURE THE FOLLOWING POINTS OUGHT IN MY VIEW TO BE
GIVEN FULL WEIGHT.

(I) WESTERN INTERFERENCE WOULD BE DEEPLY RESENTED BY ALL ARAB
COUNTRIES.

(II) THE CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN REFLECTS IN TWO RESPECTS OPINION
WIDELY HELD THROUGHOUT ARABIA. THE FIRST IS THAT MONARCHICAL
RULE SHOULD BE ENDED. HUSSEIN AND FEISAL ARE INCREASINGLY
THE TARGETS OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES. THE SECOND THAT THE
MAJORITY OF ARABS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, LIBYA, SOUTH YEMEN AND
ALGERIA CONSIDER THAT ANTI-ISRAEL POLICIES ARE NOT BEING
PURSUED WITH SUFFICIENT VIGOUR BY THE KING. THE PALESTINIAN
REVOLT STRIKES A VERY DEEP CHORD IN ARAB HEARTS. ANY
WESTERN COUNTRY THEREFORE WHICH INTERVENES TO TRY AND SAVE
JORDAN WILL BE INVOLVING ITSELF IN A DEEP QUARREL IN ARABIA
AS A WHOLE, THE CONSEQUENCES AND END OF WHICH NONE COULD
FORETELL.

(III)

SECRET

S E C R E T

-2-

(111) JORDAN AS IT IS IS NOT A VIABLE COUNTRY. THE SOLE HOPE OF IT SURVIVING AS IT IS WOULD BE IF EGYPT AND ISRAEL MAKE PEACE AND JORDAN WAS ABLE TO ENJOY A FREE FLOW OF TRADE AND OTHER ADVANTAGES OF CONTACT WITH ISRAEL. IF THAT PROSPECT COULD BE REVIVED THEN THERE MIGHT BE A CHANCE, BUT EVEN THEN INTERVENTION AGAINST SYRIA WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE BY ISRAEL. IF THE WEST EMBARKED ON IT THE ISRAEL-EGYPT PEACE EFFORT WOULD BE SET BACK SINE DIE.

2 I AM THEREFORE STRONGLY AVERSE TO A WESTERN INTERVENTION.
INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING SENT TO FREEMAN TO SEE ROGERS ABOUT THIS AND
I SHALL DO MY BEST TO CONVINCE HIM WHEN I SEE HIM ON WEDNESDAY.

SIR C. CROWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISec

S E C R E T

DDDDD

CYPHER/CAT A

S E C R E T

P. Moen Esq.

COPY NO: 6

18

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1192

TO UKMIS NEW YORK
21 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T 211220Z.

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1192 OF 21 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON TEL AVIV PARIS AND MOSCOW.

CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THIS MORNING BETWEEN THE PRIVATE
SECRETARY AND THE PUS: JORDAN/SYRIA.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE CABINET HAVE NOW CONSIDERED THE SITUATION
AND, SUBJECT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEWS THE PRIME MINISTER
THINKS THAT HMG SHOULD NOW WORK AND BE SEEN TO BE WORKING FOR A
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON THE SYRIAN INVASION OF JORDAN. WE
SHOULD WORK PRIMARILY WITH THE FRENCH AND WITH THE AMERICANS
ESPECIALLY IF, AS WE ARE TOLD, THE JORDANIANS THEMSELVES ARE SEEKING
A MEETING. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE CORRECT COURSE FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:

- A. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF INTERVENING MILITARILY IN SUPPORT OF THE
KING'S APPEAL.
- B. ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY BE ONE MEANS OF DIMINISHING
THE DANGER TO THE HOSTAGES AND MIGHT PROVIDE COVER FOR A PROTECTED
EVACUATION OF THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY THROUGH AMMAN AIRPORT OR POSSIBLY
VIA AQABA.
- C. UNLESS INTERNATIONAL ACTION IS TAKEN IN SUPPORT OF JORDAN'S
INDEPENDENCE THE LESSON WILL BE CLEAR TO THE GULF RULERS AND THE
SAUDIS.
- D. WHENEVER THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACTED RECOURSE HAS IMMEDIATELY BEEN
MADE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

/THIS IS

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

-2-

THIS IS THE SORT OF SITUATION FOR WHICH THE U.N. WAS PRESUMABLY FORMED AND IT WOULD BE A SAD COMMENTARY ON IT IF NO ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLEAR CASE OF THE MILITARY INVASION OF ONE STATE BY ANOTHER ESPECIALLY A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSION SAID THAT THE CABINET AGREED THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON PROMOTING A DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DESPITE THE RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES INVOLVED. IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD WE OURSELVES INTERVENE IN JORDAN BY MILITARY MEANS: AND THE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES FOR WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM UNITED STATES INTERVENTION ENTITLED US TO REPRESENT FORCEFULLY TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT THEY TOO SHOULD REFRAIN FROM INTERVENTION OF THEIR OWN. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT, NOT LEAST IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION THAT WE SHOULD NOT PART COMPANY WITH THE UNITED STATES ON ANY FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IF WE COULD POSSIBLY AVOID DOING SO: AND WE SHOULD THEREFORE SUSPEND JUDGMENT FOR THE TIME BEING ON OUR ATTITUDE IF DESPITE OUR STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO THE CONTRARY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO INTERVENE IN JORDAN AND SOUGHT OUR HELP IN DOING SO, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE PROVISION OF SUPPORT FACILITIES IN THIS COUNTRY OR E.G. IN CYPRUS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

PRISEC

S E C R E T

DDDDD

P.S.

P.S. TO MR. GODBER

P.U.S.

SIR A. ADAMS

MR. GALLAGHER

HD. N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF Rm. W 117 (b)

HD. A. & T. D.

HD. ARABIAN DEPT.

HD. N.A. DEPT.

DEFENCE DEPT. (2)

P.U.S.D.

NEWS DEPT.

PERSONNEL OPS. DEPT.

PERSONNEL OPS. (Welfare Section)

SECURITY DEPT.

U.N. DEPT.

HD. COMMNS. DEPT.

~~P.S.~~ NO.10 DOWNING STREET

P.S. TO HOME SECRETARY

CABINET OFFICE:

SIR B. TREND

SIR R. HOOPER

MR. O'LEARY

DIO

DIS MOD

DOC MOD

RESIDENT CLERK

CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2783

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

21 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET.

211700Z

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2783
OF 21 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN TEL AVIV UKMIS
NEW YORK (FOR S OF S) BERNE C G GENEVA AND MOSCOW.

JORDAN.

ROGERS SENT FOR ME AT 1600Z. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO PROPOSE THAT ANY
EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS FROM JORDAN WHICH MIGHT BE DECIDED UPON
SHOULD BE A JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN US. ROGERS EMPHASISED THAT THE
U S HAD NOT YET DECIDED ON AN EVACUATION AND THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR
IN AMMAN DID NOT YET CONSIDER THE TIME RIPE. AN EVACUATION MIGHT
BE A MORTAL BLOW TO WHAT WAS LEFT OF THE KING'S PRESTIGE.

2. I ASKED ROGERS WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN ANY U S PLANS
FOR EVACUATION. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE US BRIEFED DURING TODAY ABOUT
THEIR CONTINGENCY PLANNING, BUT HE MADE IT PLAIN THAT EVACUATION IN
THEIR VIEW DID NOT (AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE) INVOLVE MILITARY
INTERVENTION. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE A CASE OF ASKING THE KING TO
PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SECURITY. HE CONTEMPLATED THAT THE SERVICES
OF THE I.C.B.C. MIGHT WELL BE REQUIRED. HE ASKED WHETHER WE WERE

* PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SECURITY. HE CONTEMPLATED THAT THE SERVICES OF THE I C R C MIGHT WELL BE REQUIRED. HE ASKED WHETHER WE WERE CLEAR ABOUT THE STATUS OF AMMAN AIRPORT FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES. I SAID THAT I WAS NOT UP TO DATE ABOUT THIS BUT TOLD HIM THAT H M AMBASSADOR, AMMAN, HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF AQABA WITH THE KING.

3. I THEN ASKED ROGERS WHETHER I COULD ASSUME THAT THE U S WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING MILITARY INTERVENTION. ROGERS CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE NOT CONTEMPLATING IT AS THINGS NOW STOOD. HE WAS UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC DECLARATION TO THIS EFFECT BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE

/RUSSIANS

RUSSIANS COULD BE DOING FAR MORE TO RESTRAIN THE SYRIANS AND WAS RELUCTANT TO RELIEVE THEM OF ANY OF THEIR ANXIETIES ABOUT U S INTENTIONS FOR THE TIME BEING.

4. I ASKED ROGERS FOR HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WITHOUT REVEALING MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 1192 TO UKMIS NEW YORK. ROGERS SAID HE WAS NOT AGAINST A MEETING IN PRINCIPLE BUT HE DOUBTED WHETHER TODAY WAS THE TIME FOR IT. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER IN PRACTICAL TERMS IT WAS THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED OR HOW MANY OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED REALLY WANTED IT. HE ADDED QUOTE BESIDES I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE ISRAELIS ARE INTENDING TO DO. BUT IF THEY DECIDE TO MOVE AGAINST SYRIA, WE MIGHT BE EMBARRASSED BY A RESOLUTION. LET'S WAIT ANOTHER DAY OR TWO BEFORE WE DECIDE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNQUOTE.

I PRESSED ROGERS WHETHER HE DID IN FACT KNOW OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS AND HE ASSURED ME THAT HE DID NOT.

5. ROGERS MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS RECEIVING INCOMPLETE AND INADEQUATE INFORMATION FROM AMMAN AT PRESENT (WHICH SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS ANY CRITISISM OF THE U S EMBASSY THERE). HE ASKED US TO SHARE EVERYTHING WE COULD WITH HIM AND PARTICULARLY ASKED TO BE KEPT ABREAST OF ANY COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE KING PERSONALLY. WE ARE OF COURSE DOING THIS. HOWEVER ROGERS IS CLEARLY ANXIOUS ABOUT NOT BEING IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE KING.

6. I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO COPY THIS TO OTHER POSTS AS YOU SEE FIT.

F.C.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN TEL AVIV BERNE CG GENEVA AND MOSCOW.

MR. FREEMAN.

GR 465

SENT 21/1848Z MTS

PRIME MINISTER

HI JACK

Middle East

The attached three telegrams from New York and Washington report the initial steps taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Freeman.

Since then I understand from Sir Philip Adams that the Americans have continued to oppose the Security Council Meeting on the grounds that it can do no good and that they are still considering what they should do (this is faintly ominous but of course they have been doing this for a long time). The French have been spoken to but were unenthusiastic. The Jordanian representative has had instructions to ask for a meeting and has gone back to his Government to recommend that he should not carry out his instructions. The U.A.R. have said that the matter should be dealt with by the Arab League.

The Americans have again been spoken to in Washington to urge them to refrain from intervention.

Something has been achieved, though it is precious little, in that we cannot now be accused of having failed to try to make use of the U.N. machinery. Mr. Godber does not think that there is more that can be done for the moment, at least until we have learnt the outcome of the American examination of the position - they have repeatedly promised to keep us informed.

Am.

September 21, 1970.

Middle East CrisisSITREP at 0700 hours on 21 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

I : Situation in Amman

The curfew has been lifted in some parts of Amman, and a few people have been seen on the streets. Shelling continues however against Jebel Ashrafiya and there are reports of fighting in the Husayn and Wahdat camps.

2. A pool newspaper report passed by the Embassy, (Amman tel 621) said King Hussein appeared to be winning the Battle of Amman but the Fedayeen are holding out in pockets in the hope of Syrians coming. Estimates of dead and wounded run into thousands. The Army report that about 1000 commandos have surrendered in the fighting, and several Fedayeen leaders have been captured, including Ibrahim Bakr an executive committee member of the P.L.O.

3. The American Embassy is experiencing considerable communications difficulties and is out of touch with the King. We are passing messages where possible. The Americans are also worried about the security of their Embassy.

II : Syrian IncursionMilitary Situation

4. The general situation appears to be deteriorating rapidly. A force of Syrian tanks estimated at between two and three brigades crossed the border into Jordan. Irbid has fallen and the King believes the armoured columns are now heading for Amman.

5. The Iraqi 6 Armoured Brigade normally stationed at Deraa is moving to Mafraq, but they may be leaving Jordan with the rest

/of the

of the Iraqi forces (Tel Aviv telno. 201700Z). The King has been in touch with the Iraqis over difficulties caused by their forces surrounding Mafraq air base. (Amman telno. 628) and has disposed his forces about Amman in a position of all-round defence in case the Iraqis try to intervene (Amman 202020Z).

King's Appeals for Help

6. Messages from the King passed by our Embassy in Amman called for "Israeli or other air intervention or threat thereof" (Amman telno. 201000Z and "moral diplomatic support, public condemnation and threat of international steps" (Amman telno. 4). Letters signed by the King and addressed to H.M.G., the Americans, Russians and the French called for maximum pressure on the Syrian Government to withdraw their forces immediately (Amman telno. 627).
7. The King telephoned the American Ambassador in Amman at 0200 hours with a personal message for President Nixon. After reference to the deteriorating situation he requested "immediate physical intervention, both land and air". He said immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover were imperative. The message foreshadowed a possible early request for the landing of troops and asked what notice would be required to respond to such a request. The King said he was unable to contact the British Ambassador and asked that the message should be passed to H.M.G. (Washington telegram No. 2778 inter alia).
8. Dr. Kissinger subsequently spoke to Mr. Freeman in Washington and to Mr. Moon at No. 10. He said that the U.S. government were still discussing their course. Their only decision so far had been to increase certain readiness measures such as to alert certain troops. They would not take any precipitate decisions
/and would

and would keep H.M.G. informed (FCO tel No. 2104 to Washington).
Security Council

9. The Jordanian Permanent Representative was instructed to call for a Security Council meeting. The Secretary of State recorded (U.K. MIS New York telno. 1978) that the U.S., French and Soviet missions and even the Jordanian representative himself were not in favour of a meeting.

10. But the Americans and French agreed that if the situation were really serious it would be almost essential for the Council to meet.

In view of the latest developments, which post-date U.K. MIS New York tel. No. 1978, the Prime Minister has agreed that [there should be an urgent meeting of the Council at which we should propose a resolution and should go along with our friends if possible, but alone if necessary.] The P.U.S. has spoken to Mr. Graham in New York who will put this to the Secretary of State.

Earlier U.S./ British Action

11. On the Prime Minister's instructions the Permanent Under-Secretary had earlier summoned the Soviet Ambassador and told him that H.M.G. hoped the Soviet Government would urge the Syrians to withdraw (FCO tel 803 to Moscow). The Secretary of State made statements to the press at London Airport. U. K. MIS telno. 1977 reports his press conference on arrival in New York.

12. Mr. Rogers made a statement condemning the Syrian intervention. Mr. Sisco summoned the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and handed him a Note (Washington telnos. 2773 and 2774).

/III

*This is not
correct and
is being
amended.*

III : U.A.R. Activity

12. Cairo have reported (telno. 1025) the texts of telegrams sent on 19 September by Nasser to King Hussein and Yasir Arafat, and subsequently published in Al Ahram. The message to the King asks for urgent efforts towards a cease fire both for the sake of those involved, and because of fears that the U.S. may exploit the situation. It says that General Sadiq is at the King's disposal to help bring a cease fire about.

13. The message to Arafat opens similarly with a reference to General Sadiq, and goes on to express support for the People of Palestine and the resistance movement. At the same time it regrets the spilling of Arab blood - Jordanian or Palestinian. The U.A.R. attitude will be determined in the light of the response to its initiative.

14. Ahram reports that the King announced a cease fire at 1800 hours (local time) but does not say who broke it. It also attacks the Iraqi government for undermining the cease fire and reports Bourguiba's proposal for an Arab Summit Conference to discuss the Jordan crisis in the presence of Hussein and Arafat as having been accepted by Hussein, Qadafi and Boumedienne.

15. A subsequent telegram (Cairo telno. 1041) reports Jordan as having asked for an urgent meeting of the Arab League to consider its complaint against Syria. However consultations between the governments concerned may result in the withdrawal of the Jordanian request.

IV : British Embassy Amman

16. The generator was put out of action by a hit early on 20 September and although Piccolo is now back on steam, the

/generator

generator has to be cooled with buckets of water and traffic has to be kept to a minimum. Essential parts to effect the necessary repairs have been despatched and will arrive in Beirut at 0930 today. Onward transmission will be effected at the earliest opportunity.

17. All members of the Embassy staff have been located and are unharmed. According to an informal message from the Embassy this morning, one of their two wireless operators is sick.

V : Medical Relief

ICRC

18. H.M. Consul-General has followed up his approach to the ICRC on 19 September with a formal note requesting the ICRC on behalf of the Government of Jordan to coordinate a medical aid operation to Amman as soon as possible (C.G. Geneva telno. 47). The French have agreed, as did the U.S. yesterday, that the ICRC should undertake this coordination.

19. The ICRC met yesterday but having expressed gratitude for the U.K. offer of assistance came to no decision about the type of operation they should undertake. H.M. Consul General in telephoning this news to us at 0020 suggested that they would wait and see how events turned out in Jordan before taking a decision.

20. In the meantime, an ICRC plane has flown from Beirut to Amman and back to unload medical supplies. It is to make another run today with further supplies and 6 medical staff.

21. M. Boisard was on the plane and has reported that, in his view, the need is for emergency medical supplies rather than more substantial items such as field hospitals which could not

at the moment be easily transported from the airport.

22. A U.A.R. plane which landed about the same time as the one from the ICRC also delivered medical supplies, but was fired at both while landing and taking off.

U.K. Action

23. D.O.C. have 4 Hercules aircraft on stand by. Two have already left Lyneham for Akrotiri carrying a field ambulance section (13 men), a field surgical team (9 men), the light section of a field hospital (24 men) and Royal Signals staff to set up a communications link in case U.K. personnel are sent into Jordan. Both planes are also each carrying half a ton of miscellaneous medical supplies including plasma. There was not room for a B.B.C. camera crew.

24. The British Red Cross have started to alert civilian medical personnel who might man the field hospital if Ministers decide that we should not provide Services medical staff. This will take a few days.

25. The ICRC are however adamant (see C.G. Geneva telno. 48) that all personnel must be there in civilian guise. They think that the arrival of medical personnel on a military basis would bring certain death to the hostages.

U.S. Action

26. The U.S. propose to provide two mobile hospitals, but with minimal U.S. staffing.

/VI

VI ; Hostages

27. There has been no further news on the hostages.

VII : Berne Group

28. The Berne Group did not meet yesterday.

VIII : Further Hijackings

29. In the light of the report from Berne on 19 September that further hijackings might be expected by persons travelling on the passports of those in the previously hijacked planes, BOAC have been given a list, prepared with the help of the Americans, of those persons and the details of their passports. BOAC promised to pass this list on immediately to their own offices and first thing on Monday to ICAO and/or IATA. We understand that the Secretary-General of Interpol has also been given a copy.

IX : Miss Khaled

30. Nothing to report.

confidential

ee
Note for File

ICRC Relief

Further to my previous note on this subject, Mr. Evans telephoned again from Geneva at 0020. He told me that the ICRC meeting had now ended and that the ICRC had been in touch with them.

2. The gist of their message was as follows. The ICRC appreciates the UK offer but has to consider Boissart's views that the difficulty of moving equipment from the airport precludes for the time being the use of major items. There is also the problem of getting items in and out (the UAR plane was shot at while landing and taking off). The ICRC suggests that the British government should await further news on how and when contributions might most usefully be sent.

3. The ICRC plane is to go tomorrow from Beirut to Amman with further supplies and medical personnel, including Swiss and Kuwaitis and six doctors and nurses. Boissart will want to contact the authorities in Amman to obtain transport from the airport for this equipment, but he still thinks it impossible to take any heavy items.

4. The ICRC view is that it has decided to aid the victims of the conflict. It has received various offers from various governments and Red Cross societies, but the situation does not currently allow a massive flow of relief. Therefore the ICRC is sending in what is possible.

5. Mr. Evans commented that the purpose of this remarkably woolly statement was to keep the ICRC in the field for the time being and to make it clear that the use of military personnel at the moment would raise major problems. Mr. Evans remarked that his contact at the ICRC had told him that he had been still more evasive to the U.S. Consul General.

6. Mr. Evans summarised the ICRC's view as being unwilling to take an active role yet and only deciding on its position when the situation on the ground is clear.

7. Mr. Evans will talk firmly to the ICRC tomorrow and ask for an official statement to clarify this message.

Cc. Private Sec 7
A. Renwick
Mr. Moon (No. 10)

Mr. P. Adams

Mr. Daint

Mr. Tripp

Mr. Tesh Mr. H. Tension.

(T. T. Macan)
Emergency Unit
21 September, 1970

confidential
Mr B. Barber.

Conversation between Peter Moon and Dr. Kissinger
at 4.20 a.m. on September 20, 1970

Mr. Moon Good evening. I am sorry that Sir Denis Greenhill is not here at present.

Dr. Kissinger I have spoken to your Ambassador, and I would like on this occasion to pass on to you a message we have received from our Ambassador in Amman. May I read it to you?

Mr. Moon Please.

Dr. Kissinger It reads as follows:-

"The King phoned me at 3.00 a.m. He said that he wanted me to pass the following message most urgently directly to the President. Message follows:-

'The situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. The town of Irbid occupied. This having disastrous effect on the tired troops in the capital and surrounding. After continuous action and shortage of supplies ...'

Look, Mr. Moon, we are going to deliver this to you immediately. *Through our Ambassador.* This is the fastest way to do it.

Mr. Moon It has been passed to Mr. Freeman already?

Dr. Kissinger I have read it to Mr. Freeman, but he does not have the full text.

Mr. Moon I see.

Dr. Kissinger But in effect it asks for air strikes from any quarter including, we would have to assume, from you because we were asked to pass this message to you.

Mr. Moon I see. In fact it is very similar to the message which we were asked to pass.~~to you.~~

Dr. Kissinger That's right. It is stronger than your message that you passed to us.

Mr. Moon Yes, but with the same meaning.

Dr. Kissinger It has the same meaning exactly, and as I have told your Ambassador, we have informed the Israelis of this message.

Mr. Moon I see.

Dr. Kissinger And your Ambassador has all other information.

Mr. Moon Very well, Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger And, of course, you will tell Denis Greenhill of this.

Mr. Moon Yes of course I will, and we will get in touch immediately with our Ambassador and get the full text of what you have told him.

Dr. Kissinger Right.

Mr. Moon Have you any other comments you wish to make for the Prime Minister?

Dr. Kissinger No. We are discussing our own course of action which we have confined up to this moment to increasing certain readiness measures such as alerting certain troops, but we have not made any decisions yet.

Mr. Moon Are you continuing to meet at this time?

Dr. Kissinger We are considering it, but we will of course not do this precipitately.

Mr. Moon What do you mean when you say you are considering it?

Dr. Kissinger We are considering the message and we will not take any precipitate action, and you would of course hear from us.

Mr. Moon Thank you very much. I will pass that on. I am grateful to you.

Dr. Kissinger Give my best regards to Denis.

Mr. Moon I will.

Dr. Kissinger Goodbye.

Mr. Moon Goodnight, Dr. Kissinger.

*copy to Sir D. Greenhill.
+ Sir B. Trend*

Dr Kissinger telephoned N° 10 at approx
4.20 a.m. with reference to ^{the} P.U.S.' earlier
call to the White House (our ~~letter~~ tel N°...)

2. He said that the U.S. Ambassador in
by the King at 3 a.m.
Amman had been asked to pass an
urgent message ^{directly} to the President. The
message had said that the situation
was deteriorating dangerously following a
massive Syrian invasion. The Jordanian
forces in the North were disoriented. ^{IRBID} Ibid
was occupied. This was having a
disastrous effect on the troops in the
capital and surroundings. ^{3.} The message

went on to ask for air strikes
from any quarter. On this Dr Kissinger
commented "including we would have
to assume from you since we are
asked to pass this message to you".

Dr Kissinger said that the message
was in stronger terms than the similar
message which we had received. They
had informed the Israelis of this message.

3. Dr Kissinger said that he had
spoken also to you and that they would
get their Embassy here to let us
have the full text of the King's message.
[This has now been received]

4. In reply to a question, Dr Kissinger
said they were still discussing
their course. The only decision so far

was to increase certain readiness
measures such as alerting certain
troops. But they had not made
any decisions and would not
take any precipitate decisions. If Kissinger
promised ^{that} ~~that~~ we would ^{be kept} ~~be kept~~ ~~from~~
informed.
~~then~~.

21/9

Commander Howe

Situation in Amman

We have had a message
in Amman.

Save your Embassy out of
touch with King. Guards
reduced from 30 to 15.

Confirmed here 13-30 our
friend King H. has definitely
requested O.M.C. to pass on
to Israeli request for
air strike . . .

Request seem to have
been made just 10:00 morning
this evening

he believes it is to pass over

on.

But believe it is best
position to do so since Mrs M.
is in N. Y.

he thinks that it is important
to handle matter this way since
you are closest to Israeli
and will be able to influence him
on whether or not to act.

If Israelis do act you
are of course most closely
affected.

Conversation between Sir Denis Greenhill and a member
of Dr. Kissinger's staff at the White House at 2 a.m.
on September 21, 1970

Sir Denis

[tape recorder missed first few lines]

we have had.
....[a message from Amman which covers the
following points. First that it says that
the situation is deteriorating and the U.S.
Embassy is out of touch with the King. The
number of Bedouin guards on the American Embassy
has been reduced from 30 to 15, ^{two} ~~to~~ of whom are
wounded. This is the important part of the
message. We had confirmation here at 2330 our
time that King Hussein had definitely requested
HMG to pass on to the Israelis a request for an
air strike on the Syrian troops which are massing.
The request seems to have been made first this
morning and then at about 1830 Jordan time this
evening. We believe there is an obligation
to pass the message on but believe that the
US Administration are in the best position to do
so since Mrs. Meir is in New York. We think
that it is important to handle the matter this
way since you are closest to the Israelis and
will be able to influence them on whether or not
to act upon the King's request. If the Israelis
do (of course) act you are most closely affected.
If you could get this to Dr. Kissinger right
away I would be grateful.

White House O.K. Sir. We will probably come back to you
and talk to you some more about it.

Sir Denis O.K.

White House Thank you very much. Did you say this comes
from the Prime Minister?

Sir Denis Yes I have just come out of a meeting with the
Prime Minister.

White House All right sir. Thank you very much. Nice to
talk to you. Goodbye.

Dist. - Sir B. Trend
Sir D. Greenhill

Mr. Tripp

Mr. Miller of the U.S. Embassy showed me at 0500 hours an extract from a telegram sent by their Ambassador in Amman. It contains the message from the King to President Nixon referred to in Washington telegram No. 2778 and in the telephone conversation between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Moon. The extract read as follows:-

The King phoned me at 3 a.m. He said that he wanted to pass the following most urgent message directly to the President:-

"Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. Irbid occupied. This having disastrous effect on tired troops in the capital and surroundings. After continuous action and shortage supplies Military Governor and Commander in Chief advise. I request immediate physical intervention both air and land as per the authorisation of government to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Jordan. Immediate repeat immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover are imperative. Wish earliest word on length of time it may require your forces to land when requested which might be very soon."

King said he was unable to contact British and asked us to get this message to British government most urgently.

(A.Ibbott)
Emergency Unit
21 September, 1970

MESSAGE PASSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
EMERGENCY UNIT ON JORDAN BY AMERICAN EMBASSY
AT 18.50 HRS 21.9.70

SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS' STATEMENT ON JORDAN

We have been informed that tank forces have invaded Jordan from Syria during the night and have moved towards Rampha. We have also been informed that Jordanian armour is resisting this invasion. We condemn this irresponsible and imprudent intervention from Syria into Jordan. This action carries with it the danger of a broadened conflict. We call upon the Syrian Government to end immediately this intervention in Jordan, and we urge all other concerned Governments to impress upon the Government of Syria the necessity of withdrawing the forces which have invaded Jordan.

UNEDITED COPY

QRVZTE TEL AVIV

16 X

0704/22

ADVANCE COPIES

PS

PUS

Minister of State (Mr. Gough)

Sir P. Adams

Emergency Staff (6)

Ad. N. E. Dept

Ad. N. A. Dept

Ad. News Dept

D/O No. 10 Downing St

RC

DWF E002/22

LWY NR266/22

FLASH FCO

GR230

CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH CAIRO

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1047

22 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL 220630Z

ADDRESSED FLASH TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM
NUMBER 1047 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1970, RE: FLASH TO UKMIS NEW YORK
AND IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, BONN, BERNE, TEL AVIV, AMMAN.

YOUR TEL NO 1216 TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NASSER

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM MIFT, THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION YET
... CAIRO THAT ARAFAT WILL ATTEND THE SUMMIT, IN SPITE OF
IMPASSIONED APPEALS TO HIM TO DO SO. I WOULD PROPOSE THEREFORE
THAT THE WORD QUOTE PROBABLE UNQUOTE SHOULD BE INSERTED IN THE
PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH BEFORE THE WORD QUOTE PRESENCE UNQUOTE.

2. I THINK THAT THE WORDING OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH COULD
PROVOKE AN EGYPTIAN RIPOSTE THAT THEY FOR THEIR PART COULD
THINK OF MANY ACTIONS BY H M G WHICH WOULD DO MORE TO CONTRIBUTE
TO AN IMPROVED ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP. I WOULD THEREFORE, WITH
RESPECT, PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING REVISED WORDING:

'' IF YOUR EXCELLENCY WERE ABLE TO ARRANGE THIS EXCHANGE THROUGH
YOUR INTERVENTION AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE, IT WOULD, I CAN
ASSURE YOU, CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO THAT BETTER RELATIONSHIP WHICH
BOTH OF US SO MUCH DESIRE. ''

3. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION BY FLASH TELEGRAM THAT YOU AND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREE. I WILL THEN ARRANGE FOR THE
MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED BEFORE THE SUMMIT BEGINS AT 1400 HOURS
G M T TODAY.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO UKHIS NEW YORK AND IMMEDIATE TO
WASHINGTON, BONN AND BERNE.

BEAUMONT

Subject

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1215

TO UKMIS NEW YORK

22 SEPTEMBER 1970

(EMERGENCY STAFF)

SECRET. 223231Z.

No T89170

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 1215 OF 22 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO WASHINGTON BONN BERNE TEL AVIV
AMMAN.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM PRIME MINISTER TO FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY.

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THAT THERE IS TO BE AN ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE
IN CAIRO TOMORROW. KING HUSSEIN WILL NOT BE THERE, BUT ARAFAT WILL.
I THINK THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL, AND COULD DO NO HARM, IF I WERE TO
SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NASSER AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE,
URGING HIM TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES.

2. MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE DRAFT OF MY
PROPOSED MESSAGE. SIR R. BEAUMONT SHOULD SEEK THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE AS SOON AS HE RECEIVES A
TELEGRAM FROM YOU AGREEING TO THE ACTION I HAVE PROPOSED.

DOUGLAS-HOME

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

EMERGENCY STAFF

N.E.D.

SECRET

Subject

22⁹

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE'S
TELEGRAM NO 1216

TO UKMIS NEW YORK

22 SEPTEMBER 1970

(EMERGENCY STAFF)

SECRET 220232Z.

SERIAL No. 190ⁿ/70

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 1216 OF 22 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO WASHINGTON BONN BERNE TEL AVIV
AMMAN.

M.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED MESSAGE TO NASSER:

WHEN 18 MONTHS AGO WE HAD OUR LONG DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO ABOUT
A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND ABOUT THE
U.A.R.'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH BRITAIN,
WE AGREED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO MAKE A FRESH START, AND WE WERE
BOTH ANXIOUS THAT, IF I AND MY PARTY WERE RETURNED TO POWER, THERE
SHOULD BE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE ARAB WORLD.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I VENTURE TO SEND YOU THIS MESSAGE,
AS YOU PRESIDE OVER THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT THIS VERY
IMPORTANT MOMENT IN MIDDLE EAST HISTORY. WE IN BRITAIN HAVE
ENDEAVOURED TO PLAY OUR PART IN BRINGING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT. FOLLOWING THE STRIFE IN JORDAN WE
HAVE SENT MEDICAL AID TO CYPRUS TO BE AT HAND SO THAT IT CAN BE
MOVED IN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO HELP THE WOUNDED AND THE SUFFERING.
IT IS ON THE PARTICULAR POINT OF THE HOSTAGES STILL HELD IN
JORDAN THAT I AM WRITING TO YOU. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE OPPOSED TO
THE HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT, AND THE FEAR AND AGONY BROUGHT TO
INNOCENT TRAVELLERS, AND I HAVE ADMIRERD THE WAY IN WHICH YOU HAVE
DECLARED YOUR POSITION ON THIS MATTER. THERE STILL REMAIN OVER
50 PEOPLE HELD AS HOSTAGES WHOSE FATE AND WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN
TO US. AS YOU KNOW, WE, THE SWISS AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENTS
HAVE AGREED THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY EXCHANGE FOR

/ALL THE

SECRET

OPERATION. IF THERE WERE ANY REQUIREMENT FOR THE USE OF SOVEREIGN
BASE AREAS IN CYPRUS WE WOULD WISH TO BE INFORMED VERY EARLY
OF WHAT WAS REQUIRED AND WOULD HAVE TO BE IN ON ANY STATEMENTS MADE.

/.....2.

-2-

2. GREENE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE AWARE OF OUR PLANS FOR
EVACUATION USING EITHER AQABA OR AMMAN. THEY DID NOT WISH TO
DO ANYTHING TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION. EVERYTHING THAT THEY
HAD SAID ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL HAD BEEN
IN THE CONTEXT OF EVACUATION. THEY WOULD HOPE THAT ANY AIRCRAFT
THAT TOOK MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN COULD TAKE PEOPLE OUT.

3. THE P.U.S. SUMMARISED OUR POSITION AS:

(I) FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY ARMED INTERVENTION:

(II) EXTREMELY APPREHENSIVE OF THE DANGERS OF A MILITARY-ASSISTED
EVACUATION ON THE LINES ENVISAGED BY THE AMERICANS (PARA 5
OF TEL UNDER REFERENCE):

(III) DETERMINED TO GET PEOPLE OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BY ANY
SAFE MEANS, INCLUDING COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT CHARTERED TO TAKE
MEDICAL STORES ETC. INTO AMMAN:

(IV) WISHING TO KNOW IF ANY CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR EVACUATION
WHICH MIGHT ENTAIL THE USE OF THE SBAS. IF SO, WE WOULD NEED
TO CONSULT MINISTERS VERY EARLY ON.

4. GREENE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THESE VIEWS TO WASHINGTON SO THAT
THEY COULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY FOLLOW-UP OF THE VOGT/NUTTER
DISCUSSION WITH YOU. WE SAID WE WOULD BE INFORMING THE SECRETARY
OF STATE IN NEW YORK OF THIS DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICAN MINISTER
SO THAT SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME COULD FOLLOW THIS UP IN WASHINGTON
WITH MR. ROGERS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

24

ADVANCE COPY
SENT TO <u>P.S.</u>
<u>P.U.S.</u>
<u>No. 10 D. St.</u> ✓
<u>Emergency Staff.</u>

CYPHER

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2121

TO WASHINGTON
22 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET
221520Z

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 2121 OF 22 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE), AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BERNE, GENEVA AND HQBFNE.

YOUR TEL NO 2791: JORDAN.

MINISTER AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON THE P.U.S. THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS EVACUATION PLANS FROM JORDAN. ON THE GENERAL QUESTION OF EVACUATION P.U.S. SAID THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE AMERICANS. WITH REFERENCE TO THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT WE WERE HOWEVER VERY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE SUGGESTION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION FOR AN EVACUATION (PARA. 5(C) TEL UNDER REFERENCE). SUCH AN INTERVENTION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE MISINTERPRETED AND THERE WOULD BE VERY GRAVE REACTIONS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. WE WERE, HE HOPED, A LONG WAY SHORT OF SUCH A STEP AT THE MOMENT. IF IT EVER CAME TO IT, HOWEVER, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE METICULOUS PREPARATION TO ENSURE THAT THE OPERATION WAS NOT MISINTERPRETED. IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO ANNOUNCE THE PURPOSES OF ANY SUCH OPERATION. IF THERE WERE ANY REQUIREMENT FOR THE USE OF SOVEREIGN

SECRET

-2-

ALL THE HOSTAGES WE WILL RETURN LEILA KHALED AND THE OTHER SIX PEOPLE WHOSE RELEASE IS BEING SOUGHT, TOGETHER WITH THE BODY OF LEILA KHALED'S DEAD COMPANION. WE SHOULD BE VERY READY TO DISCUSS WHERE SUCH AN EXCHANGE MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

I AM SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE IN THE HOPE THAT YOU CAN TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THIS SUMMIT CONFERENCE, AND THE PRESENCE OF SOME OF THOSE MOST CONCERNED, TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THESE PEOPLE, WHO HAVE PLAYED NO PART WHATEVER IN EVENTS IN JORDAN.

I CAN ASSURE YOU, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THAT NOTHING WOULD DO MORE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BETTER RELATIONSHIP WHICH BOTH OF US SO MUCH DESIRE THAN THAT YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO ARRANGE THIS EXCHANGE THROUGH YOUR OWN INTERVENTION AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE.
EDWARD HEATH.

DOUGLAS-HOME

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
EMERGENCY STAFF
N.E.D.

SECRET

Amman *12/9.*
WE PROPOSE TO TRY TO AVOID THE RISK OF JOURNALISTS GETTING ON THE AIRCRAFT AHEAD OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN BY ARRANGING THAT THE DC6 TAXIS TO THE RJAF END OF THE RUNWAY INDIVIDUALS OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT THE FIRST PLANE LOAD WH SHOULD TAKE 52 BRITISH WOMEN WITH CHILDREN AND UNACCOMPANIED WOMEN PLUS 20 UN WID WIVES AND CHILDREN THE MEN LEFT BEHIND CAN PROBABLY DO A USEFUL JOB SEALING UP THEIR REMAINING POSSESSIONS.

MEANWHILE WOULD YOU PLEASE ARRANGE FOR A NOTICE TO BE PUT OUT BY THE BC BBC ASKING THAT ALL BRITISH WOMEN WITH CHILDREN AS WELL AS SINGLE WOMEN WHO WISH TO BE EVACUATED FROM AMMAN TOGETHER WITH WIVES AND CHILDREN OF U.N. STAFF SHOULD BE READY TO LEAVE AT ANY TIME TOMORROW MORNING 23 SEPTEMBER.

WOULD YOU PLEASE ALSO SEND A TELEGRAM TO BEIRUT TO SAY THAT WE MUST HAVE A FLEXIBLE ETD FOR THE DC6 IN EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES IT MAY TAKE US ALL MORNING TO ROUND UP THE EVACUEES AND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO HAVE THEM READY AT AMMAN AIRPORT UNTIL THE EARLY AFTERNOON.

AS REGARDS ETA COULD BEIRUT PLEASE (SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION EARLY TOMORROW) ENSURE THAT THE PLANE IS AVAILABLE AT AMMAN NOT LATER THAN 0900Z.

London
ON FILLING UP THE AIRCRAFT WE THINK THAT AFTER THE 52 BRITISH WOMEN WITH CHILDREN WE SHOULD FILL UP THE PLANE WITH UNACCOMPANIED BRITISH WOMEN AND THEN WITH BRITISH MEMBERS OF THE U.N. AND ANY OTHER BRITISH PERSONNEL WHO WISH TO LEAVE *AMMAN*. AFTER ALL, THIS PART OF THE EVACUATION IS A PURELY BRITISH EXERCISE AND A BONUS TO ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS MADE THROUGH THE ICRC.

REGARDING YOUR INCOMING MSG YOU HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD ME

Amman
(C)
THE 52 INCLUDES ALL BRITISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO WISH TO LEAVE IT WOULD HAVE A DISASTEROUS EFFECT IF WE WERE TO ALLOW BRITISH MEN TO LEAVE IN ADVANCE OF THE UN WOMEN AND CHILDREN IF I AM ORDERED TO DO OTHERWISE IS I SUPPOSE I SHOULD HAVE TO COMPLY.
KKKKKK

YOUR INFORMATION NOTED

London
(C)
WE HAVE HAD ANOTHER THOUGHT ABOUT INDIVIDUALS FOR THE PLANE AND AGREE THAT IF 52 IS THE TOTAL OF BRITISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO WISH TO LEAVE THEN YOU MAY FILL UP THE PLANE WITH WIVES AND CHILDREN OF U.N. STAFF AND ANY OTHER WOMEN AND CHILDREN AT YOUR DISCRETION.

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO PUT TO US NOW ?

FOR YOUR INFORMATION...

Amman
(2) THINGS HAVE BEEN PRETTY LIVELY OUTSIDE SINCE DARK. THE POCKETS OF ~~RES~~ RESISTANCE SEEM TO BE ABOUT GARDENKEEPER SIZE

At the risk of being boring I would like to remind you of the importance of letting us have the information requested in para 9 of our telegram 407 to Beirut. I suggest, that during our teleprinter conversation first thing tomorrow you let us have a ~~SITREP~~ SITREP ON AMMAN AIRPORT AND SECURITY IN THE CITY.

Amman
(3) REGARDING PARA 9 OF FCO TEL NO 407 TO BEIRUT I CERTAINLY OUGHT TO COMMENT TOMORROW ON THE SECURITY STATE OF AMMAN AIRPORT AND ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR COLLECTING EVACUEES I CANNOT POSSIBLY HOWEVER ESTIMATE FROM HERE THE SECURITY RISKS INVOLVED IN THE PASSAGE OF A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT OVER SYRIAN AIRSPACE. I AGREE THAT WE TALK AGAIN AT 0630Z TOMORROW.

MY 3RD SEC. HAS JUST BEEN ON R/T AND HAS AN URGENT MESSAGE TO CONVEY AS WELL AS A SITREP FROM THE PALACE ON TODAY'S FIGHTING IN THE NORTH.

THE KING HAS HEARD FROM POPULAR FRONT SOURCES IN BEIRUT THAT THERE IS IMMINENT DANGER TO HIS FAMILY IN THE U.K. HE URGENTLY REQUESTS THAT IMMEDIATE CLOSE PROTECTION BE AFFORDED TO THOSE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY IN THE U.K. WHICH INCLUDES PRINCESS MUNA.

Amman
(2) PLEASE ASSURE THE KING THAT WE WILL OF COURSE TAKE ALL ACTION NECESSARY TO PROTECT THOSE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY NOW IN THIS COUNTRY.

SITREP OF FIGHTING.....

Amman
14 SORTIES WERE FLOWN BY RJAF DURING THE DAY. THE SYRIANS LOST 12 TANKS DESTROYED AND 3 DAMAGED AND SUFFERED DAMAGE TO A.P.C.'S AND OTHER VEHICLES. A HEAVY GUN POSITION WAS STRAFED AS WERE VEHICLE CONCENTRATIONS NEAR IRBID. ATTC ATTACKS WERE MOUNTED ON AMMUNITION AND FUEL DUMPS AND IN ONE OF THESE A JORDANIAN HUNTER WAS LOST WHEN IT WAS CAUGHT IN THE EXPLOSION.

THE PILOT Baled OUT BEHIND SYRIAN LINES.

ARTILLERY AND ARMOUR HAVE ALSO BEEN IN ACTION EFFECTIVELY.

OPERATIONS ARE TO BE RESUMED TOMORROW.

THE KING REQUESTS THAT THIS INFORMATION BE PASST TO THE AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS.

WE ARE ALMOST OUT OF BEER BUT I DO NOT THINK YOU CAN HELP US BY
TELEPRINTER. PLEASE REST ASSURED THAT WE SHALL DO OUR VERY BEST
TO GET THIS CONVOY AWAY TOMORROW. MEANWHILE I AM VERY PLEASE
THAT YOU ARE XXXXXX THAT YOU HAVE A POSSIBLE FURTHER AIRLIFT
AVAILABLE FOR THURSDAY AND WILL KEEP THE AQADA OPTION OPEN.

Lower

(2)

WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE BEER ON THE PLANE.

VOK

A (1)

TELEX CONF WITH AMMAN 1630Z 22/IX
(1) AMMAN

THE LIFTING OF THE CURFEW WHICH I REPORTED IN MY TELCONF THIS MORNING WAS OF SHORT DURATION AND THE CURFEW WAS REIMPOSED AT ABOUT 0000Z BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS THOUGH ISOLATED OUTBURSTS OF FEDAYEEN FIRE TO WHICH THE JORDAN ARMY REPLIED WITH HEAVY AS WELL AS LIGHT WEAPONS. SOME OF IT WAS VERY NEAR THE EMBASSY AT LEAST ONE SNIPER WHO HAS BEEN PLAGUING US HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. SOME MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WHO REACHED THE EMBASSY DURING THE LIFTING OF THE CURFEW MANAGED TO GET AWAY WITH DIFFICULTY. I WAS ALSO ABLE TO VISIT MY HOUSE AND RETURN AFTER GETTING A CHANGE OF CLOTHING. I HAVE NOT KEPT ANY EXTRA MEMBERS OF THE STAFF IN WITH ME BECAUSE OF THE STRAIN ON EXISTING FACILITIES.

KING HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO COMPLAIN THAT THE FEDAYEEN ARE ONLY KEEP-
ING IT UP BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE AMERICA-
NS AND OURSELVES TO SUPPORT HIM BY PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS TO GO
FOR THE SYRIANS BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO TELL FROM MOMENT TO
ANOTHER WHAT HIS MAJESTY REALLY WANTS. IT REMAINS TRUE THAT
SO LONG AS THE SYRIANS (AND ALSO IRANI) THREATS REMAIN THE FEDAYEEN
WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE THEIR RESISTANCE IN AMMAN.
I AM VERY GLAD TO HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF YOUR TELNO 407 TO BEIRUT
ABOUT THE DC6 FREIGHTER AND THE ARCCSY. I HAVE MANAGED TO ALERT
THE PALACE ABOUT PROVIDING TRANSPORT AND AN ESCORT TO THE AIRFIELD
AND ALSO TO WARN THE MEMBER OF MY STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING
THE EVACUATION OF WHAT IS AFOOT.

EVERYTHING WILL DEPEND ON THE STATE OF SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT
TOMORROW BUT IF ALL IS WELL I HOPE BEIRUT WILL GIVE
US THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ETA TO ENABLE ME TO GET THE CONVOY GOING.
I SHOULD HAVE SAID EARLIEST POSSIBLE NOTICE OF THE ETA.
THERE IS AN ANNOYING COMPLICATING FACTOR IN THAT AN AIRCRAFT
ABOUT WHICH FOR SOME REASON I WAS NOT INFORMED WAS DUE TO ARRIVE
TODAY THIS INFORMATION REACHED JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS AT THE
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL WITH A RESULT THAT 110 OF THEM WENT TO
THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING AND ARE STUCK THERE. I UNDERSTAND THAT
THE PLANE WILL COME IN TOMORROW IF THE SITUATION PERMITS
BUT THAT IT CAN ONLY CARRY 35 PASSENGERS. I WILL HOWEVER DO MY
BEST TO SORT THIS OUT.

(1) London

THANK YOU

ABOUT EVACUATION WE VERY MUCH HOPE THE ARRGTS FOR THE DC WILL
GO THROUGH WITHOUT ~~DIFFICULTY~~ ^{you} ONE OF THE POINTS
I WAS TO HAVE MADE TO WAS THAT THE JOURNALISTS SHOULD NOT
RPT NOT JUMP THE QUEUE. THIS THEY SEEMS TO HAVE DONE AND IT WILL
PROBABLY BE BADLY RECD HERE. ~~THIS~~ THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE ~~IMPORTANT~~
IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE DC 6
TOMORROW. HAVE YOU GOT A REASONABLY FIRM FIGURE
OF THE NUMBER OF THE COMMUNITY WHOM YOU CAN GET TO THE AIRPORT
TO FLY OUT ON THE DC 6. ITS CAPACITY IS SAID TO BE 85 RPT
85. WE SHALL NEED A SITREP ON THE STATE OF THE AIRPORT AT FIRST LIGHT
TOMORROW FOR BEIRUT NICOSIA ~~AM~~ AND HQ DFNE. OK SO FAR ???

2) AMMAN

I AM AFRAID I HAVE NO MEANS OF CONTROLLING THE JOURNALISTS
I CANNOT EVEN TELEPHONE THE HOTEL NOR MY OWN STAFF THOUGH
SOME EXTRANEIOUS PERSONS SUCH AS THE IRANIAN AMBASCADOR CAN
TELEPHONE ME AS A RESULT OF A ~~WIRELESS~~ PARTIAL RESTORATION
OF THE LINE.

WE CAN TAKE UP ALL OF THE FIGURE OF 80 LEAVING SOME WAITING TO
GO IF WE CAN MAKE CONTACT WITH THOSE CONCERNED IN SPITE OF THE
RENEWAL OF THE CURFEW. THESE FIGURES AND THE NEED FOR A SITREP
ARE BOTH IN YR TEL ~~NO 407~~ NO 407 TO BEIRUT.
WE SHALL DO OUR BEST. I WONDER IF GIVEN REASONABLE CONDITIONS
AT THE AIRPORT THE DC6 COULD NOT MAKE ANOTHER TRIP EITHER TOMORROW
OR ON 24TH. ??

I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO KEEP THE AQABA IDEA ALIVE UNTIL WE KNOW
HOW WE STAND.

WE HAVE HAD A RATHER ~~?~~ RUFFER DAY THAN WE EXPECTED AFTER YESTERDAY'SX
BUT CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE ASSAULT ON ~~SNIPERS~~ SNIPERS AND POCKETS
OF RESISTANCE TODAY WHICH WAS PRETTY TERRIFIC WILL GIVE US A CALMER
DAY TOMORROW. AS I HAVE SAID I HAVE MANAGED TO CONVEY THE GIST
OF FCO TEL NO 407 TO ZAID RIFAI' AND TO MY COORDINATOR OF EVACUATION

LONDON

(2)

MANY TKS I APPRECIATE VERY WELL THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH YOU
ARE OPERATING AND THE ~~INTERESTING DIFFICULTIES~~ ^{DIFF.} IN TRYING TO
COORDINATE AND ORDERLY EVACUATION.
WE SHALL ~~NOBVIOUSLY~~ OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE QUITE A LOT TO YOUR
DISCRETION AND GENIUS ~~IN IMPROVIGATION~~ ^{IN} GETTING
OUR PEOPLE AWAY. WE DO NOT OF COURSE WANT YOU TO TAKE
UNACCEPTABLE RISKS BUT IF THE SITN IS NO WORSE TOMORROW THAN
IT HAS BEEN TODAY I EXPECT YOU WILL CONSIDER CONDITIONS SATISFACTORY
TO ATTEMPT A ~~AN~~ EVACUATION OF UP TO ~~40~~ OF THE COMMUNITY
BY THE DC 6. WE HAD CONSIDERED ASKING
THE DC 6 TO MAKE TWO TRIPS ~~DURING~~ THE DAY BUT BECAUSE
OF THE UNCERTAINTIES AND ADVICE FROM BEIRUT
ABOUT PROBABLE DELAYS THERE WE BELIEVE IT BEST TO PLAN FOR ONE
DC 6 FLIGHT TOMORROW AMMAN BEIRUT NICOSIA
WHERE EVACUAEES WILL BE ACCOMMODATED
OVERNIGHT BEFORE BEING FLOWN TO THE U K.
YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE ARE ARRANGING WITH THE ICRC FOR
EVACUATION OF THE REMAINDER OF OUR PEOPLE AND OF THOSE OTHER
FOREIGN NATIONALS WHO WISH TO LEAVE - PROBABLY
ON THURSDAY- WITH MEA CHARTERED AIRCRAFT IN ICRC COLOURS.
OUR NATIONAL BID FOR TWO HUNDRED FOR THIS EVACUATION MAY BE
TOO MANY IF WE SUCCEED IN GETTING GO AWAY TOMORROW AND IF MOST OF
THE BRITISH JOURNALISTS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SHIPPING.
CAN YOU LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU ARE IN CONTACT WITH YOUR FOREIGN
COLLEAGUES PARTICULARLY YOUR FRENCH AMERICAN AND GERMAN AND
U N COLLEAGUES OVER APPRPTS FOR EVACUATION? ANSWERS PLEASE
XXXXXX

3) AMMAN

IT IS OUR TEL NO 638 WHICH GIVES FIGURES FOR U.N. (55) GERMAN (20) AND FRENCH (12) BUT WE HAVE NOT MANAGED TO CONTACT THE RED CROSS AND HAVE ONLY JUST ESTABLISHED A RATHER DICEY TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION WITH THE AMERICANS WHO I HAVXXXXX WHOSE EMBASSY HAS BEEN IN THE THICK OF THE BATTLE ON JEBEL LEWEDDI
PSE HOLD ON A MOMENT PSE

MY 3RD SEC. IS TRYING NOW TO GET A LINE TO U.S. EMBASSY TO ASK HOW MANY THEY WOULD WISH TO EVACUATE IF TRANSPORT WERE AVAILABLE ON THURSDAY. YOU WILL RECALL THAT A RECENT TELEGRAM FROM WASHINGTON SUGGESTED THAT MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HITHERTO AND POSSIBLY EVEN NOW INCOMMUNICADO DID NOT THINK THE TIME HAD ARRIVED TO EVACUATE. I DISAGREE AND AS I HAVE SAID WE ARE TRYING TO GET AN ANSWER AT THIS MOMENT. I WILL MEANWHILE LET U IN AGAIN.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE ARE ALSO WE ARE KEEPING THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AQABA GOING IN CASE THE AMMAN EVACUATION PLAN FALLS THROUGH. HAVE YOU GOT ANY OTHER POINTS ON EVACUATION WHICH YOU WANT US TO ANSWER NOW? YOU WILL HAVE TO PLAY YOUR ~~HAND~~ HAND TOMORROW ON THE DC 6 WITH BEIRUT SINCE WE WILL BE UNABLE TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS ONCE THE AIRCRAFT HAS ~~SET OFF~~ SET OFF.

(4) AMMAN

DELIGHTED TO ~~HEAR~~ HEAR ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AQABA WE MAY STILL NEED IT IF THE SYRIANS AND/OR IRAQIS ADVANCE

MINISTERIAL INSTRUCTION IS NOTED I WILL DO MY BEST ON THE R/T TONIGHT WITH THE PALACE. I AM CERTAINLY PREPARED TO LET THOSE MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WHO HAVE TAKEN A PARTICULARLY TOUGH POUNDING HAVE A BREAK REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE DUE FOR LEAVE. I HAVE WORKED OUT A HARD CORE STAFF WHICH I THINK I SHALL HAVE TO RETAIN WITH ME SHORT OF UTTER DISASTER AND COULD LET YOU KNOW WHO THEY ARE BUT THIS MAY NOT BE THE TIME

I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO CONTROL THE JOURNALISTS (BRACKETS WHOEVER HAS BEEN ABLE TO DO THIS?) BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT MINISTERS THINK IT WOULD BE INEQUITOUS IF THE JOURNALISTS GOT OUT OF AMMAN BEFORE MORE DESERVING CASES OF SICK, WOUNDED, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THEY HAVE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED YOU TO QUOTE TRY TO SEE THAT THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN UNQUOTE. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND YOUR DIFFICULTY IN CARRYING OUT THIS MINISTERIAL INSTN. HOWEVER, IT IS POSSIBLE I SUPPOSE TO ENLIST THE HELP OF THE KING AND THE PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITIES SUCH AS THEY ARE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE JOURNALISTS DO NOT RUSH THE DC6 WHEN IT ARRIVES.
~~WAIT ONE.~~

NEXT ON STAFF. PERSONNEL DEPT ARE KEEN TO LET YOU HAVE TEMPORARY REINFORCEMENTS TO ALLOW YOUR MORE HARD PRESSED STAFF SOME RESPITE IF THE SITUATION PERMITTED COULD YOU LET INDIVIDUALS NOT YET DUE FOR LEAVE TO HAVE A BREAK? WHAT RELIEFS WOULD BE HELPFUL? COURT'S REPLACEMENTS

LONDON (CONT'D)

COURTS REPLACEMENT CAN TRAVEL ON 2 OCTOBER. WOULD YOU ALSO LIKE A TEMPORARY SECURITY OFFICER WHO COULD COME IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS (IF AIR TRANSPORT ALLOWS) TO HELP OUT ?

HAVE YOU OR THE KING ANY NEWS ABOUT HOSTAGES ?

(5) AMMAN

NO NEWS ABOUT HOSTAGES EXCEPT THE ENCOURAGING TELEGRAMS FROM BEIRUT. WHICH SUGGEST THAT THEY MAY NOT BE IN JORDAN

I SHOULD NOT LIKE TO REPLACE SECURITY OFFICERS YET. THEY ARE DOING FINE AND IT HAS TAKEN A BATTLE AND 17 HITS ON THE EMBASSY TO BRING OUT SOME POLITENESS IN COURT. HE HAS DONE WELL IN THIS CRISIS BUT I STILL THINK THAT HE IS UNFIT FOR DUTY IN F NORMAL TIMES IN AMMAN.

I THINK WE CAN ~~LEAVE~~ LEAVE THESE REPLACEMENTS FOR SAY ~~ANOTHER~~ ANOTHER 10 DAYS. KKKKKK

(5) LONDON

TK YOU.

CAN YOU OFFER ANY COMMENTS ON THE MILITARY SITN AND ON SYRIAN AND IRAQI INTENTIONS? IT SEEMS TO US THT THE SYRIANS MAY BE CONTENT FOR SOME TIME TO DIG IN ON THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS IF THERE IS TO BE A CEASE FIRE AND THEN NEGOTNS BETWEEN THE KING AND THE FEDAYEEN THE SYRIANS (AND POSSIBLY THE IRAQIS) WILL BE WELL PLACED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE KING TO MEET THE FEDAYEEN DEMANDS. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WOULD OF COURSE AGAIN OPEN UP THE PROSPECT OF THE ~~WILL~~ KING THROWING IN HIS HAND WHAT DO YOU THINK?

KKKK

(6) AMMAN

SIF PERSONALLY ~~THINK~~ THINK OUR BEST INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ON SYRIAN AND IRAQI INTENTIONS IS COMING THROUGH TEL AVIV PRESUMABLY FROM THE ISRAELI ~~WILL~~ AIRFORCE. THE PALACE CONSISTENTLY TAKE A LESS OPTIMISTIC ~~2~~ VIEW AND CONSTANTLY ASK ~~US~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ ASK US WHAT THE ISRAELIS ARE REPORTING ~~2~~

(6) LONDON

THE U S EMBASSY AT AMMAN HAVE SAID THAT THEY ~~WILL~~ ^{WILL} RUN OUT OF DIESEL FUEL AND HAVE TO GO OFF THE AIR AT ABOUT 2400Z THE AMERICANS HAVE ASKED WHETHER YOU COULD PASS A MESSAGE TO THE KING TO ASK HIM TO GET MORE FUEL TO THE EMBADSSY. THEY SAY THAT THE KING SHOULD KNOW THAT IF HE WANTS TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE U S GOVT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY HAVE THE FUEL TONIGHT.

(7) AMMAN

The U.S. Embassy has just telephoned saying that this message is more alarmist than the facts warrant and have asked us to ignore for the moment. I shall nevertheless mention it at my next R/T contact with the Palace since it should not be difficult for the army to get a supply to them.

THE US EMBASSY

(7) LONDON

APART FROM THAT NO OTHER MESSAGES. IF YOU HAVE A CONTACT WITH THE KING EITHER YOURSELF OR THROUGH YOUR FIRST SECY WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HAVE AN ASSESSMENT OF HIS PRESENT MORALE AND OF HIS VIEWS AS TO THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. IT SEEMS TO US THAT A LOT OF THE STEAM HAS GONE OUT OF BOTH SIDES (NOT SURPRISINGLY) AND THAT THERE MAY BE A PRECARIOUS STALEMATE FOR SOME TIME. THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT IN OUR VIEW TO REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF BRITISH NATIONALS IN JORDAN AND I WILL HOPE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THOSE WHO HAVE LIVED THROUGH THE LAST TWO WEEKS WILL BE READY TO LEAVE. ARE THERE ANY BRITISH NATIONALS STILL IN AREAS OUTSIDE AMMAN I E SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND, MISS COATES? WHAT ABOUT THE SEYCHELLES GIRLS SURELY IT IS UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT THEY WOULD (A) WOULD WISH TO LEAVE OR (B) BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE BY THEIR EMPLOYERS?

(8) AMMAN

OUR FIRST MESSAGE NOTED.
YOUR SECOND MESSAGE ABOUT THE KING NOTED.
AS SEEN FROM HERE THERE IS A REMARKABLY AMOUNT OF STEAM LEFT IN BOTH SIDES.
I SHARE YOUR HOPE ABOUT EVACUATING BRITISH NATIONALS
I ANSWERED ABOUT SEYCHELLE GIRLS THIS MORNING LIKEWISE SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND.
MISS COATES IS PROBABLY IMMOVABLE AND WOULD RATHER PERISH NEAR THE HOLY LAND A THAN FACE THE $\frac{4}{4}$ ENGLISH WINTER.

~~PLEASE WAIT ONE MY 3RD SEC IS ON R/T TO MY 1ST SEC.~~

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have had another talk with Amman (Flag A attached). The exchange was mainly concerned with evacuation arrangements which seem to be going ahead reasonably well, though there may be some difficulty with the journalists who look like trying to jump the gun. All efforts will be made to see that they do not.

The King continues to harp on an Israeli intervention but the Ambassador comments that "it is difficult to tell from one moment to another what His Majesty really wants".

The news from the north ~~is~~ is encouraging.

Syrian casualties in the Irbid area are reported to have been very heavy (J.I.C. assessment attached - Flag B). JIC(A)(70)(SA) 123 d/d
22.9.70

The Arab summit meeting after several postponements during the day is believed now to have started. It is not known whether Arafat is there.

The Berne meeting began at 8.00 p.m.. West has his new instructions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office expect it to be a hard battle.

For the moment, we have accepted that any Security Council meeting must wait on the Arab summit meeting. Approaches are however being made in both New York and Washington to urge the Americans to support the idea of a Four Power statement. These are being concerted with the French. The purpose of the statement would be to condemn foreign intervention in Jordan; to express the hope that all would seek to end the tragic strife; to appeal for medical assistance for the wounded; and to call for the

/safe-guarding

* Passage
related and
retained under
Section 3(4)
J.R. Green
4.7.00

safe-guarding and release of the hostages.

If the Americans agree to action of this kind, it is then proposed that the three powers should put pressure on the Russians. No direct approach is being made to the Russians at this stage because it is considered that without American support, any approach to them would be hopeless - and indeed is very unlikely to be successful in any case.

The press are being allowed to know unattributably that these are the lines on which we are working.

Am.

*You may also wish to see the FCO tel at
Flag C reporting Sir D. Greenhill's meeting
with the U.S. Minister.*

September 22, 1970

P.U.S.

c.c. Sir P. Adams
Mr. Cradock
Mr. Ellingworth
Mr. Renwick
Mr. Acland

26.
Foreign & Commonwealth
Office, S.W.1

British Interests

Reg A
Following our conversation about the Prime Minister's summing up of the discussion in Cabinet this morning (FCO telegram No. 1193 to UKMIS New York, paragraph 2), I have been giving a little thought to this subject.

2. It is not for me to comment on the weight we ought to attach to the preservation of good relations with the U.S. But I think it worth recording some thoughts which have occurred to me in connection with our interests in the Arab world.

3. These interests are of two kinds: tangible and intangible. By intangible interests I mean the friendly (or not unfriendly) attitudes of quite a few political leaders, and other people of consequence, in the Arab world. These interests are of considerable value to us, in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and the Gulf Sheikdoms (where they will become more important to us if and when we withdraw).

4. Our tangible interests are of real importance to our national welfare. In September 1969, JIC(B) attempted to measure their value and to calculate the cost of their loss (permanent or temporary). Some of the more striking figures in the paper produced by JIC(B), of which I attach a copy, are as follows:

-
- (a) the book value of physical assets owned by Shell and BP in the Middle East is in the region of £140 million. This figure excludes the value of oil in the ground;
 - (b) in 1968, the current amount in our balance of payments benefited to the tune of £120 million from profits remitted by British oil companies in the Middle East;
 - (c) the total net cost to our balance of payments through the replacement of oil by the loss of access by British oil companies to their Arab production would be in the range of £50 million to £60 million per annum;
 - (d) in 1968, the value of British exports and re-exports to

/the Arab

SECRET

the Arab world was £250 million;

- (e) in July 1969, outstanding contracts guaranteed by ECGD in the Arab world were worth £280 million;
- (f) in June 1969, private and official sterling balances held by the Arab world were worth about £600 million. Any major or sudden move out of sterling by the holders of these balances would have a serious effect both on international confidence in sterling and on the position of the U.K.'s reserves.

5. I do not claim that our grant of military facilities to the United States for operations in the Middle East would necessarily do us serious damage. But, given our experience of Arab reflexes at the time of the June War and our considered assessment that the sale of Chieftain tanks to Israel would put many of our interests at risk, I do not wish to underestimate the hazards.

6. Action which affected these interests could be of many kinds. These include the sabotage of pipelines, embargos (official or unofficial) on the shipment of oil, the nationalisation of physical assets, strikes at oil company installations, embargos on trade and the withdrawal of sterling balances.

7. Mr. Ellingworth who concurs, points out that because of the cut-backs in Libya, the closure of Tapline and the extreme shortage of tankers at the present time, our oil supplies will in any case only be just sufficient this winter. Even measures short of nationalisation, such as the interruption by the Syrians of the IPC pipeline from Kirkuk, could have most serious immediate implications for our economy.

J. P. Tripp

(J. P. Tripp)

Near Eastern Department

21 September, 1970

This minute gives substance to the concern ^{which} ~~that~~ the Cabinet showed yesterday. The risks to us of US armed intervention are great, but public disavowal from the US presents tremendous political problems. Para 7 above is important and I propose to send a copy of

Mr Tripp's minute to both Sir B. Trend ✓
and to Mr Mozu for their information

Dot Greenhill

22/9

Mr Godber.

~~ST~~ ~~100~~ ~~Local~~ ~~Pontor~~ NOT appear negative

●, keep contact in play.

Find out how many

they are prepared to

release - how they are
names or address numbers
day there some.
numbers & nationality

If we are being offered

52 out 54 & better
condition for 2 - think
then discuss various considerations

Meanwhile ~~stand~~!
Could you not move
all 15 places of supply?

SECRET

Private Secretary

...

I attach herewith a copy of the latest telex conversation with Amman which took place at 06.30Z this morning.

(A.C. Hunt)
22 September, 1970

Copies to:

Mr. Renwick
Mr. Daunt
Mr. Bottomley
Sir P. Adams
Mr. Tripp
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison,
P.S. No.10.

SECRET

SECRET

TELEX CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN

0630Z 22 SEPTEMBER

LONDON IN ADDITION TO :

1. THE INTERNAL SITUATION

2.

MAY I ASK YOU FOR A QUICK RUN DOWN ALSO ON

2. THE HOSTAGES

3. THE STATE OF THE EMBASSYS COMM

Mr Moon

As promised

22/9

AMMAN THE CURFEW HAS BEEN LIFTED BETWEEN 0600 AND 1800 LOCAL TIME WITH THE EFFECT THAT AT THE JEBEL AMMAN END OF TOWN CIVILIANS CAN LEAVE THEIR HOUSES AND TRY TO FIND SUPPLIES WITHOUT BEING SHOT BY THE ARMY BUT FEDAYEEN SNIPERS ARE STILL INTERMITTENTLY ACTIVE AND HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO BE SO BY RADIO WHICH MENTIONS THAT HELP IS ON ITS WAY. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE PALACE SO FAR THIS MORNING AND HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS OF THE SYRIAN OR IRAQI ADVANCE.

A CONTACT LATER LAST NIGHT REVEALED THAT THE KING APPRECIATES HMG ATTITUDE TOWARDS EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE FOR HIM AS CONVEYED THROUGH MY FIRST SEC. YESTERDAY. HE PARTICULARLY UNDERSTANDS OUR CONCERN FOR HIS LONG TERM POSITION AND HOW THIS WOULD INEVITABLY BE DAMAGED BY PRECIPITATE ACTION. HE AGREES WITH ME THAT HIS POSITION COULD BEST BE PRESERVED BY ISRAELI INTERVENTION ON THE PRETEXT OF PRESERVING ISRAELI INTERESTS.

I MAY SHORTLY HAVE MORE TO REPORT ABOUT THE KINGS ATTITUDE.

~~BEARING UP ALRIGHT~~ WE HAVE NOW HEARD FURTHER FROM THE KING AT 0600Z 24 IRAQI TANKS ARE MOVING WESTWARD ~~REXXX~~ ON THE ~~RECHAB~~ JERASH ROAD STILL WITHIN IRAQI AREA. THE IRAQIS HAVE SINCE ASSURED THE KING THAT THIS MOVE IS MERELY TO SECURE THEIR OWN FLANK BUT THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS WATCHING CAREFULLY SINCE A CONTINUATION OF THE MOVE WOULD THREATEN THE WHOLE JORDANIAN POSITION IN THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE SYRIANS.

JORDANIAN HUNTERS ARE MAKING AIRSTRIKES ON THE SYRIAN POSITIONS.

JORDANIANS HAVE LOST 20 TANKS AND SOME CREWS.

KING HUSSEIN IS SEEING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT 0800Z COULD THIS PLEASE BE PASSED TO THE AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS?

LONDON WE SHALL PASS THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE KING TO THE AMERICANS. I AM NOT SURE WHERE WE STAND AT THE MOMENT ABOUT PASSING INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS? BUT WE SHALL PROBABLY LEAVE IT TO THE AMERICANS TO DO THIS.

AMMAN ~~GIVING~~ YOUR LAST COMMENT THE KING HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THE ISRAELIS BE INFORMED SO PLEASE TELL THE AMERICANS THIS TOO.

LONDON I TAKE NOTE THAT THE KING HAS SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR /// THAT ISRAELIS BE INFORMED. WE SHALL TELL THE AMERICANS THIS TOO.

SECRET

SECRET

-2-1

AMMAN:

NO NEWS OF THE HOSTAGES

LONDON 4. REF END OF CONVERSATION LAST NITE. IF THE DC6 IS DULY CHARTERED TO TAKE MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND SPARE PARTS FOR YR GENERATOR TOGETHER WITH THE CSU FROM BEIRUT TO AMMAN ON WEDNESDAY 23 SEPTEMBER, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR SOME OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY TO BE AT AMMAN AIRPORT TO FILL THE AIRCRAFT FOR ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO BEIRUT AS PART OF THE EVACUATION EXERCISE? THIS WOULD NOT OF COURSE AFFECT ANY ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE TO EVACUATE THE BULK ~~OF THE~~ ~~COMMUNITY~~ ~~THROUGH~~ ~~AKABA~~ (SEE RECORD OF MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE CONFERENCE ON 21 SEPTEMBER REACHING YOU FIRST CONTACT TODAY).

AMMAN

REGARDING YOUR QUESTION 4 I AM SURE WE CAN ARRANGE THIS BUT MUST KNOW HOW MANY THE DC6 CAN TAKE ALLOWING FOR A MINIMUM OF LUGGAGE.

LONDON

5. THE GOVERNOR OF SEYCHELLES HAS SAID HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SEYCHELLOISE DOMESTICS IN JORDAN. WE PROPOSE TO ASSURE HIM THAT ANY SEYCHELLOISE WHO WISH TO LEAVE WILL BE INCLUDED IN ANY EVACUATION PLAN. IS THIS ALL RIGHT?

AMMAN

QUESTION 5.. HERE ARE SOME 30 TO 40 SEYCHELLE GIRLS BUT IT IS UNLIKELY IN THE EXTENT THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXTRACT AND DISPATCH THEM IN THE FIRST FLIGHTS OF AN EVACUATION ALTHOUGH WE SHALL OF COURSE DO OUR BEST.

AMMAN

I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO COMMENT ON FCO TEL NO EYUM 307

AGREE WITH PARA 2 IN ANY CASE IF WE WERE TO USE AQABA, THE TIME SCALE MENTIONED AT PARA 1(F) I.E. DAWN WEDNESDAY 23RD SEPT. IS TOO FAST FOR US

ANSWER TO PARA 1(A) ~~WE ARE SURE THAT THE JORDAN XXXX~~

✓ WE ARE ASSURED THAT THE JORDANIAN FORCES CAN PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TRANSPORT AND ESCORT.

I AM RATHER DISTURBED TO SEE WASHINGTON TEL NO 2783

REPORTING THAT THE AMERICANS WISH THE EVACUATION TO BE A JOINT OPERATION AND THAT U.S. AMBASSADOR, WITH WHOM I AM NOT

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

AMMAN
(22-175)

YET IN TOUCH, DOES NOT CONSIDER THE TIME RIPE, WHETHER OR NOT EVACUATION OF NON-ESSENTIALS CIVILIANS IS A MORTAL BLOW TO THE KING'S PRESTIGE, THE KING HIMSELF HAS GIVEN THE AQABA IDEA HIS BLESSING. AS YOU KNOW WE ARE NOT REPT NOT SUGGESTING EVACUATION OF THE EMBASSY AS A WHOLE.

IF THE MEDICAL AID OPERATION CAN BE PUT INTO EFFECT WITHIN TWO OR 3 DAYS, THESE AIRCRAFT WOULD OF COURSE PROVIDE A SIMPLER AND QUICKER MEANS OF GETTING CIVILIANS OUT. THE AQABA IDEA HAS BEEN CONCEIVED AGAINST THE EVENTUALITY THAT AN ADVANCE BY SYRIANS AND/OR IRAQIS WOULD LEAD TO BATTLES IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF AMMAN, THUS RENDERING THE AIRPORT UNUSABLE. I THINK WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPES DURING THE DAY BEFORE COMING TO A DECISION ABOUT THE PRECISE ROUTE AND METHOD OF EVACUATION. BUT IT IS OBVIOUSLY COMMON SENSE TO GET THE AQABA OPERATION AS READY AS POSSIBLE.

MY COUNCELLOR, HEAD OF CHANCERY AND D.A. HAVE MANAGED TO REACH THE EMBASSY THIS MORNING. I AM PROPOSING TO STAND DOWN FOR A FEW HOURS AND GET CLEANED UP BUT WILL BE BACK LATER.

SECRET

Middle East CrisisSITREP at 0700 on 22 September, 1970

(all times referred to are BST)

I : Situation in Amman

The pool report for A.P. and U.P.I. (reference Amman 211530Z) reports that sporadic fighting continues. Amman reported in their 1730 telex conference that the King has ordered a cease-fire and that he hopes to lift the curfew for at least part of today. It remains to be seen whether the Fedayeen are prepared to follow the King's lead. Israeli sources (Tel Aviv FOH 211430Z) similarly report Amman quiet. The 1330 telex conference reported that Jordanian armour is deployed on the outskirts of Amman to counter any Iraqi/Syrian action.

II : Situation in North Jordan

2. Israeli sources (Tel Aviv FOH 211430Z) report Syrian forces in the Irbid area as consisting of two armoured brigades and two armoured regiments with a strength of about 300 tanks and 80 artillery pieces. This force is reported as digging in south and west of Irbid. The total Jordanian strength in the area (40th Brigade) is estimated at about 220 tanks. The Iraqi forces do not appear to have moved further west. The Syrians have denied that any of these forces are Syrian, and claim that they are Palestinian units based in Syria.

3. Amman reported (in their 1730 telex conference) that Mireiwiid Tel had called an hour earlier with a message from the King. This confirmed that Irbid had fallen and that it, together with numerous surrounding villages, had been occupied. However Tel

/doubted

doubted whether the Syrians would advance to Amman, although if they and/or the Iraqis wished to, they could be on the outskirts in a matter of hours.

4. Tel's report however conflicted with a conversation with the Palace reported in the same conference which suggested that an armoured column had set off towards Amman but had been intercepted by the Jordanian Air Force.

5. The likelihood of Israeli intervention against the Syrians has been discussed in the day's telex conferences.

III : Diplomatic Activity

Security Council

6. A telegram issued to Ukmis New York confirming the Prime Minister's view that H.M.G. should work for a Security Council meeting (FCO telno. 1192).

7. Mr. Rogers told H.M. Ambassador, Washington that he was not against a meeting in principle, but doubted whether it was the best time for one. If the Israelis decided to move against Syria, a Resolution might be embarrassing (Washington telno. 2783).

8. The Secretary of State agreed that the Security Council should act soon if it was to act at all. But effective action would depend on agreement among the Permanent Members and he doubted if this existed (Ukmis New York telno. 1980).

9. Ukmis New York telno. 1984 and 1985 report the line Mr. Haydon is taking with the press.

10. The Americans asked us not to take any irrevocable step vis-à-vis the Security Council, pending the outcome of a meeting in Washington which Mr. Sisco was holding and which was considering all possible contingencies. The U.S. representative's instructions

/are to

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are to discourage a Council meeting for the time being (Ukmis New York telno. 1981).

11. The French remain strongly in favour of four-power action. Their reservations about Security Council action stem not only from their concern at the lack of effectiveness of U.N. action; they are probably also looking to their future interests in the Arab world if King Hussein does not survive (Paris telno. 861).

Other Diplomatic Activity

12. The Jordanian Ambassador called on Sir P. Adams to ask for diplomatic support. H.M. Ambassador, Moscow spoke to Vice Minister Kozyrev to reinforce earlier representations to the Russians in London that the Soviet Government should urge the Syrians to withdraw their forces from Jordan (Moscow telno. 1084).

King's further Appeal for Assistance

13. The King appealed to France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, as Permanent Members of the Security Council, to do all they could to halt the invasion and to secure the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan (telex conference at 1730). To ensure that the governments concerned had received the appeal Ukmis New York were asked to communicate copies of the text to the missions of the other three powers (FCO telno. 1206). Additionally this text was passed to the Soviet Embassy here (FCO telno. 805 to Moscow).

Prime Minister's proposed Message to Nasser

14. The Prime Minister is consulting the Secretary of State on the text of a proposed message to President Nasser/asking him, to use his influence at the Arab summit conference to secure the release of /the hostages

the hostages (FCO telnos. 1215 and 1216 to Ummis New York).

Arab Summit

15. According to radio reports King Hussein and the Iraqi and Algerian Heads of State will not be attending the summit meeting and there is some doubt about the Syrian.

IV : Reactions outside Jordan

Libya

16. Tripoli telno. 1326 reports a statement by the Libyan Government agreeing to the holding of a summit conference in Cairo and suggesting a joint Libyan/Algerian force to keep the peace in Jordan. They consider that Hussein has 24 hours to see sense. If the above points are not met, Libya will take unilateral action as it sees fit.

U.A.R.

17. Cairo report (telno. 1044) that with the passage of time, the U.A.R. attitude is hardening in favour of the guerillas and against King Hussein. The U.A.R. wishes to avoid foreign intervention in Jordan, and to this end is playing down reports of Syrian intervention. Sir R. Beaumont considers that any intervention with U.K. or U.S. blessing would have very serious consequences in Egypt.

Iraq

18. Baghdad reports (telno. 644) that the Baghdad press thinks that 10,000 British troops are on stand-by in Cyprus, that the Jordanian regime has been installed to destroy the Palestine resistance, and that the worry about U.S. citizens in Jordan is merely a casus belli to justify military intervention.

Mr. Hawley ascribes these views (Baghad telno. 645) to the

/inherent

SECRET

inherent Iraqi tendency to see everything in conspiratorial terms.

Syria

19. Tel Aviv telno. 882 reports that Arafat is said to be in Damascus.

U.S.S.R.

20. Pravda suggests (Moscow telno. 1083) that tension is being heightened by U.S. and U.K. military preparations in the Mediterranean. U.K. troops are said to have been sent to Cyprus. There is also speculation about U.S. or Israeli intervention.

V : H.M. Embassy

21. By pouring water from buckets on the radiator of their generator and with the aid of a portable fan, the Embassy has managed to maintain communications; the sick C.B.O. is now understood to be basically all right. Spares for the generator are now waiting in Beirut. Attempts are being made to get them, together with an additional C.B.O. and a spare generator from Beirut, on to Amman.

22. A member of the Embassy staff has now been able, with the aid of an army vehicle, to see all members of the Embassy community (see 1330 telex conference) who are all well. The Ambassador has also been able to strengthen his staff in the Embassy (telno. 632) by bringing in a Third Secretary and to relieve one member of the Registry staff with another.

VI : Evacuation

23. H.M. Ambassador has now recommended that the British Community should be evacuated at the earliest opportunity and thinks that it is no longer wise for the community simply to keep its head down during the fighting. There appear to be three possible routes -
/over the

over the Allenby Bridge into Israel, by air from Amman and by plane or ship out of Aqaba. Of these the last seems most likely and the King sees no difficulty about security and transport. H.M. Ambassador will let us know the next move in due course. A Ministerial committee discussed evacuation yesterday.

24. The Quai d'Orsay have been informed of our views on evacuation, but are unaware of any similar proposal for the French community (Paris telno. 862). They will however keep in touch. Similarly Mr. Rogers discussed the problem with Mr. Freeman yesterday (Washington telno. 2783). The U.S. Ambassador in Amman does not consider the time ripe for evacuation, and fears it might damage the King's prestige.

25. The British Community have been warned to stand by for evacuation at a moment's notice (see 1330 telex). In the event of evacuation, the Ambassador proposes to retain his Counsellor, the Defence Attaché, a First Secretary, a Third Secretary and the Third Secretary (Administration) plus a few others.

26. The party for evacuation would include something over 100 British, 120 journalists and such other foreigners as can be found and got out of Amman.

VII : Medical Relief

ICRC

27. The ICRC have accepted the task of coordination of offers from national Red Cross societies and governments. Acceptance of individual offers would be subject to:-

- (a) no discrimination in medical care for all victims;
- (b) personnel and transport wearing the Red Cross emblem
(no military markings);

/(c)

(c) all personnel wearing civilian clothing (no weapons);
and

(d) all costs of personnel and supplies being borne by
the governments concerned.

28. Action would be directed from Geneva, with an operational
base in Amman and an auxiliary base in Beirut (C.G. Geneva telno. 51

29. The ICRC have asked for further information about H.M.G.'s
offer (C.G. Geneva telno. 52). H.M. Consul General, Geneva has
been instructed to stress to the ICRC the urgency of getting supplies
and personnel to Jordan (FCO telno. 51 to Geneva).

British Contribution

30. R.A.F. aircraft have been transporting to Akrotiri overnight
the light section of a field hospital (66 personnel, 50 beds), an
air evacuation unit (23 personnel) and a small medical administrative
headquarters. A half ton of medical supplies from official sources
as well as donations of drugs and hypodermic syringes from the
British Red Cross and other relief organisations are also on their
way to Cyprus.

31. The Director General of the British Red Cross (who is at
present in Geneva) is to be consulted on the issue of civilian
papers to military personnel (FCO telno. 51 to Geneva).

U.S. Views

32. The Americans are telling the ICRC that they favour three
routes for getting this aid into Jordan - over Israel, over Turkey/
Iran/Saudi Arabia, and over Syria. They expect the ICRC to arrange
overflights, but they think they will be better placed than the
ICRC to get the agreement of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

/VIII

VIII : Hostages - Berne Group

Hostages

33. There is no further news on the whereabouts or fate of the hostages.

34. The ICRC have said that in the event of the hostages falling into Jordanian hands and being released, the ICRC would arrange for an aircraft to take them out of Jordan (C.G. Geneva telno. 50).

Berne Group

35. The Group met at 0830 to consider a message from Boissier in Beirut in which he said it was essential that he should be authorised to discuss the question of detainees in Israel hands. The Group agreed that a reply should be sent asking him to maintain contact with the PFLP (although the Group still had doubts about the standing of the contacts). He should continue to press for access to and for a full list of the hostages and for a detailed statement of PFLP demands (Berne telno. 301).

36. The Berne Group are to meet again this evening (22 September) to consider a further message from Boissier which contained the text of the PFLP's reply to the Group's statement of 19 September. The PFLP reply, which is unhelpful and propagandistic in tone, states inter alia that the Front "is not ready to hear anything except the acceptance in principle of PFLP conditions" and holds the PFLP responsible for any harm the hostages may suffer (Berne telno. 302). Mr. West has asked for instructions. Boissier is returning today to Berne via Geneva.

Israeli Attitude

37. H.M. Ambassador, Tel Aviv has repeated his belief that the Israelis are only likely to be moved by pressure with which the Americans are fully and strongly associated (Tel Aviv telno. 883).

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JORDAN

Irrespective of the outcome of the fighting in Jordan the future of that country is highly uncertain. What follows is speculation. There is little hard evidence on which conclusions can be based, and the numerous possible permutations make it difficult to be precise. This assessment is the best guess we can make at present.

Victory for Hussein

2. Even if Hussein and the Army win militarily and establish their authority throughout the country they will face severe problems. In the first place the fighting seems certain to leave a legacy of extreme bitterness among all fedayeen and most Palestinians against the King and the Bedouin. This will increase the possibility of an assassination and will make for tense relations between the authorities and a substantial part of the population. The period of reconstruction will no doubt involve considerable economic as well as political difficulties. The Syrians might for example close their border with Jordan. Thus closing to Jordan the main outlet for her trade; if it remained closed for more than a few weeks the effect could be serious. If the Libyans do not restore their financial aid to Jordan and if the Kuwaitis suspend theirs as has now been reported the financial consequences for Jordan would be grave indeed. In addition to domestic troubles the Regime will be the object of detestation and almost certainly subversion from a number of Arab capitals, especially Damascus. In order to preserve his position of leadership in the Arab world it is likely that Nasser would for some time continue to take a fairly harsh tone towards Hussein. This situation would for some time to come militate against Arab Israel peace negotiation. (see paragraph below).

3. In the event of victory, hardliners particularly in the Army will be influential and will press for further tough action to curb fedayeen activities. However, this will not mean the end of fedayeen operations in Jordan. Partly because it is impossible wholly to control them for reasons of geography and partly because the King will need to demonstrate his "Arabism", it is probable that fedayeen operations from Jordan against

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Israel will continue at any rate on a limited scale. But in effect they would be under Army supervision and would not be allowed to operate overtly in the towns. Nevertheless, some fedayeen groups would try to restock and re-establish their positions in Jordan in preparation for a second round, and over the long term they might be successful. But on this hypothesis Jordan would no longer be a safe haven for radical fedayeen groups eg PFLP operating against Western interests.

Defeat for Hussein

4. If the King and the Army were defeated militarily the outcome would presumably be a Palestinian led regime in Amman heavily dependent on Syrian support. However, it is probable that in these circumstances the Iraqis would try to get on the bandwagon, and that they would have a significant military presence in the east and centre of the country. A regime of the sort postulated might welcome Soviet assistance. Given the unstable situation the Russians might initially ~~hesitate~~ but if the regime lasted for a period they are likely to consider offering some aid. A Government of this sort might proclaim itself as a Palestinian "government in exile" (but this would make it less attractive to the ^{Russians} ~~Americans~~). There is a strong possibility that the Israelis would find such a regime intolerable and take military action against it.

5. If, contrary to probability, Hussein were succeeded by a Palestinian led regime in which Fatah leaders like Arafat predominated and which excluded heavy Syrian or Iraqi influence the situation would be quite different in Israeli eyes. They believe they could as well do business with such a regime as with Hussein.

Neither Victory nor defeat

6. Hussein is under many intense pressures to compromise. The entire Arab world is urging him to this course: he faces a difficult military situation: he is apprehensive about the morale of his Army. If there were shortly to be a effective ceasefire throughout Jordan the Kingdom would in practice be in fragments. The Government and the Army would hold the south. They would also have the dominant position in Amman but they might not be able to prevent the fedayeen from retaining and reinforcing

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a foothold there. The fedayeen and the Syrians would hold the north west. The Iraqis would hold Mafraq and the areas to the east. In the centre of the country to the north of Amman there would be a confused situation with overlapping positions held by the Army, the fedayeen, the Syrians and the Irzqis. In these circumstances the country would be ungovernable and there would be a strong probability of a resumption of fighting. Nevertheless, the position might for a short period be consecrated by some Arab league decision and conceivably even by a supervisory peacekeeping force composed of contingents from a number of Arab states, eg Libya and Algeria. Such a force could be trusted to favour the fedayeen against the Army.

7. The Israelis would presumably find such a situation unacceptable. They would assume that it could lead to a Soviet military presence in Jordan a dominant Syrian or Iraqi influence on the Soviet Union is almost the only common characteristic of Iraq, Syria and the UAR. In such circumstances the Israelis would probably contemplate military intervention either in Jordan or against Syria or both. The development of events might lead them to advance deep into Jordan and even to occupy permanently a part of Jordanian or Syrian territory. though we think the Israeli government would prefer not to do this on a large scale.

8. Abdication by Hussein

Despite his undoubted courage Hussein seems a tired and discouraged man. Whatever the result he might well abdicate at any time. In this event a military junta might take over using Prince Hassan as a figurehead. A less likely possibility is a compromise regime in which the ex-Chief of Staff Haditha, who had the confidence of the fedayeen and has opposed the fighting, might play a leading role. Whatever was patched up the most likely outcome of abdication by Hussein (or probably of his assassination) would be a disintegration of Jordan sooner rather than later. Part might be taken by Syria, part by Iraq and part by Saudi Arabia. In such circumstances it is probable that part, especially the heights overlooking the Beit Shean valley would be taken by Israel. It is fruitless to try to speculate further.

In comparing the work of typists in the Civil Service and outside it several points would arise of importance from the point of view of efficiency and economy in Civil Service Departments.

The foregoing notes have however all been confined to defining the relative position of typists in the Service and outside it. The two questions are of course closely connected but in some respects the interests of the typists now employed and of the Departments employing them is not identical.

C. E. C
14.6.07

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence
Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II.
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title Pages
will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY
or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C. 2118.

PAGE 4.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
COLIN CAMPS SECTOR.	1. 7. 16.	10.30 am.	Major Hoette wounded in JOHN COPSE. No reports from Coys yet to hand. Reported to Brigade.	
	"	1. pm.	Battalion Hdqtrs moved to MARK COPSE, as JOHN COPSE was full of wounded. Still out of touch with Coys; reported to Brigade.	
	"	8. 21 pm.	Reply sent to BM 41, enquiring as to strength, ammunition, bombs, Lewis guns, &c., in front line: "Strength of Battalion-10 men unwounded. These are runners and Signallers. Have no Lewis Guns. 3000 S.A.A. 350 Bombs. Lewis pans--nil."	
	"	10 pm.	Message received from Brigade that we should be relieved by the 13th and 14th S. Battalions, York & Lancaster Regiment, in the front line; The Battalion to withdraw to ROLLAND trench. Hdqtrs withdrew from MARK COPSE at 10-15 am, and was established in a deep sap in ROLLAND. During the night message received from Brigade to say that information had been received that about 150 of our men had penetrated the front line opposite MARK COPSE, and were still maintaining their position in the German front line. Every endeavour was made to get into touch with them and withdraw them	
	July 2 1. 30 am to 3. 15 am.		Two Officer patrols were sent out from MARK COPSE with men borrowed from the 14 Battn, York & Lancaster Regiment. These went out into No Man's Land and approached the German wire. No Signs of any fighting were apparent, and wounded men, who were met and brought in, stated that any men left in the trenches, had become casualties and unable to offer further resistance. Patrols consequently withdrew. German machine guns were very active, sweeping No Man's Land and a large number of Very Lights were sent up. Lieut. H. Oxley was slightly wounded. Captain E.G.G. Woolhouse and 2nd Lieut. W.H. Rowlands arrived with 80 1st reinforcements. These joined up in ROLLAND trench with the remainder of the Battalion. The Officers now with the Battalion were: Capt. E.G.G. Woolhouse, Captain & Adjutant. N.L. Tunbridge, Lieutenant E.L. Moxey. (M G Officer) 2nd Lieut. C C Cloud, 2nd Lieut. W.H. Rowlands, also Major A. Plunkett of 14	

Cabinet Documents

[illegible]

The above-listed Cabinet documents, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed.

Cabinet documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed M. J. Land Date 6/6/00

JR Green
Prime Minister's Office Records
Hepburn House, Marsham Street